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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

THE PAPERS that constitute this volume (apart from the 
Introduction) were read at the Fourth Annual Conference on 
the Humanities sponsored by the Graduate School of Ohio 
State University under the same title as the volume, October 
27 and 28, 1961. 
In addition to the papers, the conference included a panel 
discussion led by Professor Josephine Bennett, of Hunter Col­
lege; a program of Renaissance dancing directed by Professor 
Helen Allure and Mrs. Katherine Wyly, with music under the 
direction of Professor Herbert Livingston, all of Ohio State 
University; an exhibit of Renaissance books and manuscripts, 
sponsored by the Ohio State University Library; an exhibit of 
Renaissance graphic works and a general exhibit of Renaissance 
art, under the direction of Professor Anthony Melnikas of Ohio 
State University, with the co-operation of Mr. Mahonri Young, 
Director of the Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts; and a program 
Editor's Forword 
of Renaissance music by the New York Pro Musica, under the 
direction of Noah Greenberg. 
Special consultants to the conference were Professor 
Madeleine Doran, University of Wisconsin; Noah Greenberg; 
and Professors Marvin Eisenberg, University of Michigan; 
Wallace K. Ferguson, University of Western Ontario; Glen 
Haydon, University of North Carolina; Charles Mullett, Uni­
versity of Missouri; Charles Parkhurst, Oberlin College; Palmer 
Throop, University of Michigan; and A. S. P. Woodhouse, 
University of Toronto. 
The editor wishes to express his personal gratitude to all 
these persons, and to Professors Franklin Pegues, Harold Grimm, 
Ruth Hughey, Joan Webber, Frank Ludden Call of Ohio State 
University); Professor Vern Torczon of Louisiana State Uni­
versity, New Orleans; and the countless others who made 
possible the conference and, indirectly, this volume. He wishes 
also to thank his wife, Marcia O'Kelly, for her work in prepar­
ing the Index. Above all, he wishes to thank in this perma­
nent form Vice-President Everett Walters of Boston University, 
formerly Dean of the Graduate School at Ohio State Univer­
sity, the originator and unsparing supporter of the Humanities 
Conferences. 
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INTRODUCTION

By

Bernard O'Kelly

GEORGE GASCOIGNE urged the priests to pray for "such as be 
historiographers" that they "trust not too much in every tattling 
tongue,/ Nor blinded be by partiality/' and those professionally 
concerned with the Renaissance have needed this deprecatio 
periculorum—and still need it—as much as anyone. The attempt 
to understand any past is, of course, chancy at best: most people 
probably notice that even their own past is not always available 
on demand. Time is a cruel banker, as Ralegh says, taking in 
trust our all we have, and paying us but with age and dust. We 
cannot know with certainty exactly how we felt ten years ago— 
or yesterday—and often we do not really want to. Apart from 
misremembering things done and said, we simply do not have 
the imaginative power to relive the actual circumstances—always 
infinitely complex—of any past moment or minute or hour. We 
recall most vividly, I suppose, intense and simple things, experi­
ences somehow concentrated and free from seriously relevant 
distractions; and consequently, we like sometimes to pretend 
that most of our own past (or of some larger past—the Renais­
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sance, say) had that kind of simplicity and concentration and 
completeness when it didn't. 
To rediscover the past, we use records, written or other. 
Whether or not these are conceived as art, they always do to 
some extent what art does: they give the present some kind of 
permanence or immortality, an armor against time. And the 
present needs it— 
. . . Ere a man hath power to say "Behold!"

The jaws of darkness do devour it up.

So quick bright things come to confusion.

Lysander is right to extend his pleasantly poignant bombast 
concerning the perilously fugitive quality of things beyond his 
primary subject, love, to all human experience, or at least to 
all things that are truly bright and alive. Men have little power 
against time; and when they die, there is more truth than 
nostalgia in the words of Ecclesiastes: "For the memory of them 
is forgotten. Also their love, and their hatred, and their envy, 
is now perished; neither have they any more a portion for ever 
in any thing that is done under the sun." Among others, the 
artist and the scientist, the chronicler, the poet, the philosopher, 
and the composer all decline (in any age) the advice that 
follows in Ecclesiastes simply to eat, drink, and be merry, and 
instead strive in their various ways to rescue the present—or a 
present—from oblivion, from the chaos that is perpetual loss. 
During the Renaissance many people were unusually con­
cerned to catch and fix the present, the here-and-now inter­
section of time and space that had never been before and 
would never be again. In this may lie some part of an expla­
nation at once for the enduring vigor of their artistic and 
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intellectual enterprises and for their determination to recover 
the past. Their literature frequently shows this preoccupation; 
Samuel Daniel's lines present a common theme uncommonly 
well: 
O blessed Letters, that combine in one 
All ages past, and make one live with all, 
By you we do confer with who are gone, 
And the dead-living unto counsel call; 
By you th'unborn shall have communion 
Of what we feel, and what doth us befall. 
Soul of the world, Knowledge, without thee 
What hath the earth that truly glorious is? 
Why should our pride make such a stir to be, 
To be forgot? 
This heightened consciousness of time, the intellectual habit 
of locating oneself and one's present at the juncture of a denned 
past and a projected future (both much larger than one's own 
lifespan) carries with it a consequence very important to the 
future historiographer. (I am using the term here, it will be 
apparent, not of professional historians, but of all those who 
seek to know, understand, and appreciate the works and ways 
of the past.) When a man makes time past and time to come 
primary terms of his own self-definition and keys to the im­
portance both of his being and of his works, time will truly 
be of the essence of what he creates or in any way projects 
from himself. The concern itself to build a monument more 
lasting than bronze will not normally exist when there is no 
informed interest in the monuments of men long dead and no 
optimistic respect for the opinion of men yet unborn; the desire 
to make one's age great—"to do worthy the writing, and to 
(5)
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write/ Worthy the reading'*—presupposes an awareness at once 
of the otherness of one's own age and of its place in a con­
tinuing succession of ages. Centuries later, we can and do find 
the works and days of the Renaissance the more vivid and the 
more communicative precisely because they were in their own 
time conceived as having, and indeed were effectively endowed 
with, relevance and significance for time in both its reaches. 
Quite apart, then, from the actual volume of extant records 
and relics, the Renaissance seems eminently to offer itself to 
our concern and our understanding because Renaissance men 
and women—many of them, at least—habitually and efficaciously 
had in mind the hope that future generations would have com­
munion of what they felt and what befell them, and would 
judge these worthy of the fine precedents of antiquity which 
they labored to recover and preserve. 
As Professor de Santillana points out in his paper in this 
volume, we do not have much direct evidence about Paolo 
Toscanelli; but we can know rather a great deal about him and 
can conjecture even more with some degree of safety. Our 
scope in this respect depends, I believe, to a large extent on 
Toscanelli's own attitude and that of his contemporaries toward 
time and the importance within it of their thoughts and deeds. 
The very concept of periodization, as we now understand and 
practice it, is (for better or for worse) one of our legacies from 
men and women of the Renaissance. They may have used the 
device crudely and without much consistency, even by our own 
unexacting standards, but its importance to them demonstrates 
their desire to cope with the reality of time and change and to 
establish over that reality some degree of intellectual mastery. 
Perhaps the one thing that could not have been subtracted 
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(without destroying the unity of the rest) from the authentic 
and basic cultural community in the Renaissance of which 
Professor Bush writes convincingly is the set of assumptions and 
preoccupations characterizing the age in the matter of man's 
situation in time. Certainly the cultural awareness of them­
selves that people had in the Renaissance was inextricably and 
importantly bound up with their sense of time and of them­
selves as somehow definable in time. For this, as I have indi­
cated, we have every reason to be grateful. 
Unfortunately, even with special help from the peculiar 
awareness of time that existed in the Renaissance, we are 
always in peril of unsuspected ambush by ancient enemies 
that can subvert or distort our conceptions of the past. There 
are more partialities than the one Gascoigne wanted the priests 
to deprecate, and I should like to review some of them here, 
especially since the essays that follow demonstrate, each in its 
own way, how one may make efficacious the prayer urged by 
Gascoigne. 
Among the partialities that can blind us to truth about the 
past, the most perverse and perhaps the most insidious is pre­
cisely the desire for absolute clarity of vision, for simplicity, for 
complete definition. The tendency in this direction is, I have 
suggested, always a companion of human thought about the 
past, and the metaphoric name "Renaissance" itself offers a 
special invitation to the mind's instinct for univocal definition, 
since it implies the unity of a single—if prolonged—event. 
Further, the Renaissance has been customarily looked upon 
as the beginning of "modern times," so that the quest for 
knowledge of it translates itself easily into a search for some 
single core of meaningfulness for ourselves, and the real kinds 
(7)
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of significant homogeneity that did exist within the Renais­
sance, especially in comparison with our own time, can make 
that search both promising and enticing. 
The partiality for simplicity and neatness, then, may make 
us overeager to know when the Renaissance began, within a 
year or two, a decade or two, and when it ended: we would 
like our periodization in sharp focus. We may become impatient 
to discover the three essential achievements of the Renaissance, 
or the five infallible tests of the true Renaissance spirit, or the 
eleven fundamental preoccupations and attitudes of Renaissance 
man, seeking to reduce God's plenty (or man's variety) to 
common denominators that are too low. For monistic minds 
there will always be the "one great central fact about the 
Renaissance"; and since thousands of such minds have been 
at work, there are in some sort of currency thousands of "one 
great central facts" about the Renaissance. As soon as a man 
accepts one of these as final, his mind is largely relieved of 
the burden of complexity, of diversity, of change, paradox, and 
inconsistency—eternal companions of human existence. Dual­
istically inclined minds produce perhaps more dangerous pack­
ages, because these seem more sophisticated and carry an 
intrinsic, a formal, plausibility. "There are two main currents 
in the Renaissance." Yes, and so many pairs of candidates have 
been proposed in elaborations of some such statement that 
simply to collect and document them might now prove a life's 
work. There seems to be, indeed, some mysterious cause— 
although perhaps it is nothing more mysterious than the cir­
cumstance that many Renaissance minds were themselves in­
clined to dualism—making the Renaissance more prone to 
dichotomistic treatment than any other area of study: we are 
often invited now to divide not only the Renaissance but 
(8)
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Renaissance scholars as well into two currents or two conflicting 
camps, and the choices offered for the exercise seem well on 
their way to becoming legion in their turn, although they 
always seem to come in matched pairs. 
It is not, of course, that the great central facts and the 
significant polarities about the Renaissance are not usually true 
and important, especially if one abstracts from the exclusive 
claims for truth and importance made on their behalf. Obvi­
ously, too, many of them are presented as heuristic or didactic 
devices by means of which we may organize our knowledge, 
and nothing more. The danger lies in settling with too much 
finality upon one or two (or five or eleven) significant keys to 
the understanding of the Renaissance and then trying to make 
all the doors fit the keys. Partiality of this kind makes us more 
inclined to dismantle facts than to dismantle schemata. 
The chief antidote to the mind's partiality for reducing 
complexities to oversimplifications lies in the recognition that 
the quest for truth must always be a quest for truths. There 
is no Truth about the Renaissance—there are truths, an almost 
infinite number of them, and some of them ought to seem to 
us very strange bedfellows indeed. The student of the Renais­
sance should see himself, not as the Redcrosse Knight setting 
out to right the wrongs of Una and see her face unveiled, but 
in the much less heroic role of a juggler learning to keep 
constantly more and more items before his eyes without drop­
ping any or allowing their number—however great—to obscure 
for him the existence among them of relationships and patterns. 
The Redcrosse Knight, after all, discovers that there are a 
thousand more things in the world than Una and a dragon, 
and that they are all important, however unforeseen they may 
be, or however confusing. 
( 9 ) 
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A second historic obstacle to a true understanding of the 
Renaissance has lain in the apparently natural tendency of the 
human mind to approximate human history, human experience 
in the past, to a single life process. The "organic metaphor" has 
been under attack from many quarters for a long time, but its 
strength is as the strength of ten: men continue to discover the 
seeds and roots of the Renaissance, its first tender shoots, the 
growing saplings; they observe and point out a flowering, a 
maturity, the lasting fruits, the decay. This partiality can be 
worse than the first, since it imposes a preconceived conceptual 
structure on human thought and events instead of simply deduc­
ing one a posteriori. It seems necessary to remind ourselves 
frequently that human history is not a magnolia tree or a rose­
bush, and that analogies intended to clarify reality can and 
must obscure reality when they are allowed to approach literal­
ness. I might add that for certain obvious reasons the Renais­
sance entices some men to organize their thoughts in a solar 
instead of an organic allegory: dawn, daybreak, high noon, 
twilight, and sunset take on for them a peculiar validity that 
we do not usually accord metaphors, with the particular harm 
in this instance that one is led half-consciously to conceive of 
the time just before (and just after) the Renaissance as night. 
A third partiality with widespread bad results for the under­
standing of the Renaissance might be called the partisan or 
ideological bias. The militant secularist, the doctrinaire anti­
clerical, will labor to establish (if he doesn't simply assume) 
that everyone and everything of any importance during the 
Renaissance tended to liberate man or assert his freedom from 
ecclesiastical authority and institutional religion in general: he 
will find all the glory and splendor of the age to lie in man's 
emancipation from the darkness of superstition and the shackles 
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of theistic orthodoxy. The sectarian Catholic, similarly, will 
find ways to interpret all the major achievements of the Renais­
sance so that they redound to the credit of the Church: finding 
Erasmus distinctly non-sectarian (and consequently a good deal 
more Catholic than himself), he may relegate him to a historical 
limbo; he may spend much time and energy trying to diminish 
or obscure the unlovely aspects of the Renaissance papacy; he 
may even comb Shakespeare's plays, not for their better under­
standing or appreciation, but for evidence (which he will not 
find) or hints that their author was a crypto-Catholic. The 
scholar who espouses eccentricity will show that the Renais­
sance above all else prized singularity, originality, and non­
conformism; the traditionalist will demonstrate that love of 
tradition and fear of disorder are the motivating forces in 
Renaissance artistic and intellectual activities. The proponent of 
free-enterprise capitalism interprets the Renaissance as an age 
of great progress occasioned by resolute economic privatism (and 
privateering); the moralizing collectivist relates all major aspects 
of the age to its strong sense of community and its elevation 
of human values over those related to economics and power. 
The aestheticist and the humanist; the atheist, the agnostic, and 
the believer; the rationalist and the anti-rationalist—men and 
women of all these and of hundreds of other more or less suc­
cessfully systematized preconceptions at one time or another 
have seen the real significance of the Renaissance to lie in its 
having been lucky enough to share their preoccupations and 
convictions. Sometimes, of course, a partisan bias in scholarship 
owes its origin to nothing other than a man's having "rasshelye 
. . . spoken that cummeth fyrste to hys tonges ende," and 
afterwards feeling obliged to "studye for reasons wherewyth to 
defende and confyrme hys fyrste folyshe sentence." 
oo
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In passing, it may be remarked that one kind of partisanship 
may be disappearing from contemporary scholarship, although 
its effects will endure for a long time: renascentiolatry. Just as 
the humanists reinvented periodization, adopting it in the main 
from their models in the Augustan age, so they reinvented the 
Augustan device of almost worshiping—or pretending almost 
to worship—the men and ways of an earlier age. This legacy 
was in turn gratefully accepted by many nineteenth-century 
men and women, "Romantics" and others, especially if they 
were admirers of the good life but abhorrers of the means 
provided by the Industrial Revolution for achieving it. They 
turned to the Renaissance with devotion; and instead of equip­
ping Plato with vigil lamps and a halo, they decked out the 
entire age with these candescent but not always illuminating 
marks of glory. For them the good was the Renaissance, the 
non-Renaissance was the bad. The lamps have not all been 
extinguished, but it is harder for us—partly because we cannot 
think of human history (or human nature) in quite the same 
numinous way—to mythologize or sanctify the Renaissance. In 
this loss to devotion, there can be, I think, only gain for truth. 
Partisan scholarship of any sort should not, of course, be 
condemned without full recognition that it has its beneficial 
side effects. The reading of many conflicting partisans, while 
it may result in a rich and desperate muddle for the mind, 
may also happily leave one with a balanced eclectic view. 
Moreover, even the most partial scholars can deserve our 
gratitude for the industry with which they dig for evidence to 
support their diversified investments. The evidence is always 
valuable, even when the conclusions it was meant to support 
must be committed to an eccentrics' paradise. 
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Closely related to partisanship, one may discern a fourth 
peril to true understanding, a trick of perspective which is 
less easily taken into account and corrected. No matter how 
loyally he tries to be something other, every man who retains 
some shreds of sanity must remain a child of his own time. 
And it is of the nature of our minds to treat the past as being 
most importantly a preparation or an overture to the present 
we live in, since that is (naturally) what is most important 
and most real to us. Because of this tendency, we show a warm 
interest in those Renaissance things and people that seem most 
relevant, most congenial, to our own time and experience, but 
play at best the role of antiquarians with regard to those things 
our ancestors said and thought and did which men have 
subsequently discarded as old-fashioned, unworthy, or based on 
false scientific assumptions. To what we find sympathetic in 
the Renaissance, undue emphasis can easily accrue by means 
of a kind of massive, collective egocentricity: a search for our­
selves in others. The phenomenon was not unfamiliar to men 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the pre-anthropologists 
and proto-ethnologists among the discoverers and explorers were 
delighted at the recognition of familiar ways and concepts in 
people of alien cultures, and not infrequently misunderstood 
what they met because of an eagerness to confirm the essential 
oneness, as they understood it, of mankind. There is also a 
perversely topsy-turvy version of this partiality: a morbid and 
exaggerating fascination with whatever in the other culture or 
age makes it markedly different from one's own, whatever 
startles or titillates by its otherness from one's own experience. 
In the "world" of the early travel books "nothynge is more easye 
to be founde, then be barking Scyllaes, rauenyng Celenes, and 
C13)
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Lestrygones deuowerers of people, and suche lyke greate and 
vncredyble monsters." Some scholars seem to have approached 
the Renaissance with a determination to find similar marvels. 
Perhaps more often, however, fables—whether monstrous or 
not—persist in Renaissance scholarship simply because real 
knowledge is lacking. The reader will observe more than once 
in the papers that compose this volume, and in much contempo­
rary Renaissance scholarship elsewhere, the phrase "the present 
state of our knowledge"; many of the errors and false emphases 
of past research have come from insufficient awareness of the 
inadequacy, not of any one scholar's information, but of the 
information collectively held and available to anyone. One of 
the greatest contributions that can now be made to Renais­
sance studies lies in the precise location of our ignorance and 
the discerning of what significant information needs to be dis­
covered or collected. Apart from giving direction to profitable 
research, this permits us at least to make allowance for what 
we do not know. 
Finally—not that I intend here an exhaustive syllabus of 
perils—there is a kind of partiality in language itself. In seeking 
to know the Renaissance, we must depend, as I have said, on 
written records, and this is true even when our immediate con­
cern is with non-linguistic art forms such as music, sculpture, 
painting, and architecture (see Professor Lowinsky's and Pro­
fessor Janson's papers below). Words are dangerous, however. 
It is true that language has, in some of its uses, a peculiar 
toughness and durability: "stark naked" remains connotatively 
powerful for us long after we have forgotten that "stark" in 
this phrase means "rump" (although linguistically sophisticated 
birdwatchers might recognize the root from the name of the 
redstart). But the resiliency of language is not always of direct 
CM)
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help to us, as this perhaps extreme example shows, and language 
accepted uncritically must be recognized as a tortuous or hap­
hazard road to knowledge: someone from an earlier age would 
know what we meant by "stark naked" or "redstart," but might 
well be astonished to hear that a play had involved "stark" 
acting. Time and change play silent games with our words. 
When we meet in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century authors 
words that we have reason to know we don't understand, we 
set about finding out what they meant. Used literally or figura­
tively, words related to psychological assumptions, for instance, 
or to medical practice or physical science, are fairly easy to deal 
with: element, humor, complexion, melancholy, spirit, fantasy, 
animal—these and hundreds of words like them we now, thanks 
to the work of many scholars, make an adjustment for in our 
minds when we have begun to move about in Renaissance texts. 
No contemporary sense, we are fully aware, will be quite 
adequate for such words. But we can and perhaps must fall 
into traps with words for which we habitually make no adjust­
ment. No matter how hard we try, we can never now be able 
to hear quite what our ancestors heard in "fire," "water," 
"earth," or "air"; and however alert we may be to the concept 
of elements in Renaissance thought, we are not likely to be 
very sensitive, habitually, to the individual names of the ele­
ments. The more familiar and basic the word, the more likely 
we are to go wrong. It is, I think, virtually impossible for us 
to know what "the dark" or "darkness" was for people who 
had only fire to supplement the sun, moon, and stars; and we 
can't really know what "light" was for them, either. Part of 
what they understood by "day" and "night" is similarly inac­
cessible to us, because we cannot erase our own consciousness 
of man's victory over physical darkness, and consequently much 
C15)
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of their most meaningful symbolism reaches us only secondhand 
and in an approximate form. 
Gentle, fair, wild, sweet, mountainous, old, distance, savage, 
foreigner, generous, beer, afar: hundreds of important and 
unimportant "ordinary" words are at least minor traps for us 
when we read Renaissance texts, carrying meanings for our 
ancestors that we can scarcely imagine, and too rarely try 
to imagine. 
Moreover, as Professor Kristeller points out in his paper in 
this volume, we use words and categories of thought in talking 
about the Renaissance that people alive then did not have, or 
for which they had contents different from ours. A constant 
check on our use of language is of the greatest importance in 
all study of the past; but in our study of the Renaissance the 
check is all the more necessary because the "modern" European 
vernaculars were then taking—or had taken relatively recently— 
the form which, by and large, they have kept to our day. We 
are less likely to make mistakes reading vernacular documents 
of earlier ages, in which the more obvious differences from our 
own usage can of themselves impose upon us a warier sensi­
tivity to the perils of language. 
Oversimplification, partisanship, the imposing of metaphor 
upon reality, the distorting effects of time, inadequate knowl­
edge, a too unsophisticated use of language—all of these have 
had particular ways of causing writers since the Renaissance 
to present an image of the age that belies to some extent the 
reality, and it is usually with relief and often with surprise that 
one turns from the partialities of later "historiographers" to the 
firsthand reports of people who lived in the age itself. One must 
be on guard, of course, against the possibility of an obvious (but 
rather subtle) fallacy in the formulation of some such principle 
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as "the true understanding of the Renaissance is to be found, 
not in the schematizations and structured conceptualizations of 
later men and women, but in the firsthand understanding of it 
that belonged to men and women who actually lived during the 
Renaissance"; on the other hand, if one is seeking the reality 
of the Renaissance, clearly one must always begin and end 
with the direct testimony of the only human beings who were 
on-the-spot witnesses. 
The scholar does not thereby escape either the disadvantages 
or the uncertainties of periodization; in a sense, as I have said, 
the Renaissance must take a large part of the credit or the 
blame for the importance to our thought of this uncertain and 
dubious science. The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century practition­
ers were, if anything, less unanimous, less careful about the 
bases of their divisions, and more capricious in assigning termini 
a quo and ad quern for past ages and for their own age, "modern 
times," than scholars are likely to be now. But Gascoigne can 
remind us that scholars must guard against tattling tongues as 
well as partiality. Taking his words again in a large sense, we 
should recall that witnesses in any age or circumstance are to 
be credited not as to what is true, but (other things being 
equal) as to what they believe to be true. And the concern of 
this volume is precisely that: the things that Renaissance men 
and women believed to be true of themselves. We have no 
right, in any event, to be disappointed at the discovery in their 
testimony of contradiction and inconsistency; even in this age 
of flourishing social sciences, men and human events still resist 
rigid classification and precise definition. Roger Ascham is 
typical (at least of the English scene) when he writes in one 
place of the sad condition in his "forefathers' time, when 
papistry, as a standing pool, covered and overflowed all Eng­
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land"; and he is equally representative when he writes—without, 
one must imagine, any awareness of a possible inconsistency— 
that his country should return to its "old wont" and find in 
following the same forefathers' example "labor, honest pastime, 
and virtue" so that the youth will be "plucked from idleness, 
unthrifty games, and vice." The "new" age, mainly a bad thing, 
seems for Ascham (here) to have begun when Englishmen put 
down their longbows for reasons other than eating, sleeping, or 
praying. Elsewhere he seems to see the new age, insofar as it 
is a good thing, beginning with England's emancipation from 
Rome, and insofar as it is bad, beginning with the "new" phe­
nomenon of Italianate Englishmen and the organized attempt 
by Catholics to destroy English moral fiber by promoting 
obscene literature. Stephen Gosson, in a famous passage, goes 
so far as to exhort his readers to find again the qualities of 
"Englishmen" of the second century (although one may suspect 
hyperbole in a few of the virtues he notes, like going naked 
and standing dinnerless up to the chin in marshes for several 
days), and seems to situate the beginning of all modernity— 
that is, all degeneracy—with the new popularity of the "secular" 
theater. Others in the time, taking a more academic view, dated 
the new age from the return of Greek studies to western Euro­
pean universities, or the end of Aristotelian scholasticism and 
the substitution of a newly recovered Platonism. Platonism had, 
of course, never been lost, and, as Professor Kristeller reminds us 
in this volume and elsewhere, Aristotelianism did not leave 
the universities. 
The examples of Ascham and Gosson remind us that 
particular perils lurk in English testimony about the Renais­
sance. The Tudor usurpation, together with accompanying 
administrative changes and (until our own time) perhaps his­
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tory's most successfully engineered collective brain-washing 
about the immediate past, provided most people, it would 
appear, with a ready-made watershed, so that in later times 
what had happened before Bosworth Field had to seem some­
how much more remote than what happened afterward. Within 
a few decades, the Reformation, in England a series of events 
in which four Tudor monarchs were very closely involved, 
confirmed the sense of difference from the past. As a result, 
even now in the minds of many, "Tudor," "Reformation," and 
"Renaissance" are concepts so closely linked—or so richly 
muddled—as to be virtually synonymous; and much intellectual 
energy and resourcefulness that might have been better spent 
has gone into endless elaborations of allegedly significant non-
casual relationships among the three. The near-coincidence of 
the introduction into England of printing presses may have 
seemed to sixteenth-century Englishmen another aspect of the 
"Tudor" age. Almost inescapably, too, the new western and 
African explorations of the late fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries were closely bound up in contemporary English minds 
—and more than chronologically—with the Tudor dynasty; 
through the reigns of the first four Tudors, especially, and even 
in that of the last, with misgivings in the more farsighted of 
those minds because the English weren't keeping up with the 
Spanish and Portuguese. These two further associations—part 
of the habitual thinking (or non-thinking habit) of that time-
have left their mark in later generations. One sometimes gets 
the impression from writers in the tradition of the English 
language that Richard III or his son could not have commis­
sioned the Cabots or even that with a Plantagenet ruling in 
England, Columbus, Magellan, and Juan Ponce de Leon would 
have spent their days idly reading Amadis of Gaul and then 
(19)
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died unknown in the Middle Ages. The patronage extended to 
Caxton by two Plantagenet monarchs is overlooked. The con­
fusion—then and now—has extended so far as to make the 
institution of a Greek readership at Cambridge in Henry VIIFs 
reign causally relevant to the Oath of Supremacy and the 
Thirty-Nine Articles, and then to assume that these in turn 
are somehow contributing causal elements in the genius of 
Marlowe and Shakespeare. 
Shakespeare himself, however, although he accepted for 
dramatic purposes much of the official Tudor vilification of 
Richard III and celebrated, indirectly at least, the Tudor new 
age, was less susceptible than many to the false time-sense 
occasioned in England by the rough chronological coincidence 
of New Learning, Tudors, printing, American discoveries, and 
the Protestant reform. The watershed in Shakespeare's historical 
plays, insofar as there is one, is rather the time of Chaucer. 
Critics used to find the chief difference between the tone 
of 1 and II Henry IV and Henry V, on the one hand, and 
Richard II, on the other, in a reassuring schema of Shakespeare's 
evolving art: one can still find editors who urge their readers 
to notice the development of his dramatic craft from a certain 
ceremonial stiffness or formality in Richard II to the vitality 
or liveliness of I Henry IV, as though we could be sure that 
the tone or atmosphere of the former play would have been 
substantially changed if Shakespeare had known better, i.e., if 
he had written it three or four years later. The stage has, I 
suspect, always provided the refutation of this view: Richard II 
is as alive as the best of Shakespeare's plays. Its world, the atmos­
phere in which its action takes place, is simply not the modern 
world as Shakespeare knew it. It is, of course, closer to and more 
like Shakespeare's modern world than that of Macbeth, Julius 
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Caesar, or (above all) King Lear; but Richard's death at Pomfret 
seems to carry symbolically the weight of the death of an age, 
and Bolingbroke's usurpation initiates a new and a not alto­
gether amiable time. The ancient sacred kingship is ended; in 
the conflict between loyalty and expediency, loyalty's claims 
are henceforth muddy and muddled, and are based on abstrac­
tions and projections (like nations, countries, and "parties") 
rather than on relationships or symbols. One facet of the new 
man, the Renaissance homo politicus, finds its second-best Eng­
lish incarnation in Henry IV, who sacrifices everything except 
prudence to expediency—its best is Shakespeare's Henry V, who 
saves certain superficial human graces and certain personal 
eccentricities as well as prudence from the holocaust of relation­
ship to practical ambition and achievement. 
The time of Chaucer and Wycliffe, of John Ball and Wat 
Tyler, might indeed be seen as a more likely beginning of a 
new age in England than that of Colet, Erasmus, and Skelton. 
If there is some valid sense in which one can view Henry IV 
as a typical Renaissance prince displacing the last "medieval" 
monarch to rely (ineffectually) on a stable, feudally structured 
society, surely there are many senses in which Chaucer may be 
said to be the first English Renaissance poet. It is he, really, who 
gives us the picture of the last knight in Christendom; his real 
knight—as distinguished from the burlesque Sir Thopas—is not 
a buffoon, like Cervantes': he merits Chaucer's and the reader's 
respect, and he gets it; but one does not get the impression that 
his son or anyone else will re-enact the pattern of his life. The 
quests and the Crusades are equally archaic for Chaucer, as 
they are for Spenser, and the twenty-two-line portrait of the 
twenty-year-old squire is as characteristic a picture of the Renais­
sance gentleman as one could wish. He has almost all the notes 
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of the conduct-books: the external comeliness and harmonious­
ness; the strength; the martial ability (for its own sake: Urbanite 
English campaigning in Urbanite Flanders was not major war­
fare); the skill in horsemanship, in musical composition, in 
dancing, drawing, poetry, and writing in general; the propriety 
in dress; the courtesy; and if his loving is more active than 
Castiglione's Bembo would approve, Bembo makes allowance 
for excesses in youth. 
If the picture scarcely seems to fit Chaucer himself, many 
elements in his own life and work are characteristic in other 
respects of the Renaissance poet and man of letters: royal 
patronage; youthful military service; travels and diplomatic 
service; dedication to learning; reverence for classical authors; 
concern with contemporary learning in other vernaculars as 
well as in Latin; poetic experimentation; concern with, and 
practice of, translation; a distinctly urban and urbane approach 
to life; theological depth and awareness, combined with a clear-
eyed perception of institutional inadequacies and distortions; the 
prizing of proportion and balance in art, of courtesy, sincerity, 
and gentilesse in man. He was even hailed neoclassically by his 
contemporary, Eustache Deschamps, "as a Socrates in philoso­
phy, a Seneca in morality, an Aulus Gellius in practical affairs, 
and an Ovid in poetry." Professor Charles W. Dunn, after 
quoting these words, once wrote that "such effusive praise [is] 
rarely accorded to a writer within his own lifetime"; but the 
words are so characteristic of the complimentary mode of the 
Renaissance that one must rather think that few Renaissance 
men and women of any note could have escaped in their life­
times hearing something like them about themselves.1 And it 
is Chaucer, not Wyatt or Howard, who first translated into 
English verse a sonnet of Petrarch. 
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The kinship and respect that almost all English poets of the 
sixteenth century felt for Chaucer reflect their recognition that 
he had been the chief beginner of modern English letters, and 
thus a significant initiator of the new age in England. Indeed, 
the general respect for Chaucer may have been a continuing 
cause of sixteenth-century English inconsistency in judging or 
defining their present age with regard to the past. When the 
religious debates and bitterness had led most literate English­
men to repudiate the national learning and literature of the 
centuries just before the first Tudor's accession, Chaucer re­
mained a massive qualification or exception, and for many he 
must have occasioned serious doubts as to whether the present 
intellectual ambiance was that much more alive and healthy 
than—or different from—the one in which Chaucer had flour­
ished and won wide recognition. One may, at least, find a certain 
urbane irony in Sir Philip Sidney's famous statement: "I knowe 
not whether to mervaile more, either that hee in that mistie 
time could see so clearly, or that wee in this cleare age, goe so 
stumblingly after him." 
Similarly, many Englishmen of Sidney's time who were 
accustomed to think of pre-Tudor, pre-Reformation times as 
misty, dark, and culturally much inferior to their own, must 
have paused when they recalled the musical innovations of 
John Dunstable and the reputed role of that early fifteenth-
century Englishman in the development of what we now call 
Renaissance music (see Professor Lowinsky's paper below). 
In any event, the confusion and inconsistency about chrono­
logical and cultural self-definition occasioned in sixteenth-century 
England by the approximate coincidence of the elements men­
tioned above—the Tudor dynasty, western exploration and dis­
coveries, printing, the renewed interest in Greek studies, and 
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religious reform—make contemporary English evidence on the 
true nature of the English Renaissance uncertain and often 
paradoxical. Moreover, the confusion and inconsistency seem 
to have endured in much of the writing in English about the 
Renaissance, to the serious disadvantage, necessarily, of Renais­
sance scholarship in the English language. Two continuing 
circumstances, indeed, have reinforced the difficulty since the 
sixteenth century. One is that Shakespeare, however he may 
himself have seen the fifteenth century in relation to his own 
time, turned it forever into history with a genius and a finality 
that no literary giant has applied to the Tudor or any sub­
sequent era. The other is that for most English-speaking men 
and women, the Renaissance has never been nearly so inter­
esting or seemed nearly so important to the subsequent history 
of the world as either the Reformation or the beginnings of 
the extraordinary historical movement which was to spread the 
English language and English literature and institutions to every 
continent in the world. One small side effect has been that for 
most historians of English literature, few things have seemed 
more clearly certain than that Chaucer is (almost by definition) 
a medieval poet, or at most a premature dawn of the Renaissance 
in England. 
Outside England, of course, the chronological convergence 
was not operative in people's self-definition within history—not, 
at least, with regard to those circumstances of human life and 
thought which can be described properly as the Renaissance. 
Certainly Tudors instead of Plantagenets in London could make 
little difference to the self-awareness of men and women at the 
Sorbonne or in Urbino. In Italy—and it is still there that one 
naturally turns first for primary evidence on most aspects of 
the Renaissance—printing and Atlantic adventures and religious 
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revisionism of the sort that culminated in the Protestant Refor­
mation were scarcely substantive elements in the Renaissance, 
a complex of changes which predated all of them by at least 
several decades. 
One turns, then, to contemporary Italian evidence (and to 
pertinent Continental sources in general) with more assurance 
of finding a clearer sense of what was truly and importantly 
characteristic of the Renaissance, a less paradoxical awareness 
of what was directly relevant to the Renaissance as such, and 
what was simply contemporaneous with it or followed it closely 
in time. 
We must seek such direct evidence if we are to correct the 
"partialities," whether conscious or unconscious, of post-Renais­
sance scholarship; and in interpreting English testimony it is 
wise to let Continental Renaissance sources provide a corrective 
for whatever is insular or provincial in the England of the 
Tudors, at least. This the present collection of papers can help 
us to do. Moreover, the direct testimony of Renaissance men 
and women changes complexion and texture according to the 
habitual preoccupations and the range (both intellectual and 
imaginative) of the witnesses: philosophers do not often see 
their age or their own place within it as musicians and poets 
do; mathematicians, theologians, sculptors, and painters are 
likely to have different perspectives and different landmarks or 
points de repere within those perspectives. It is, then, eminently 
useful to have the testimony of many kinds of witnesses: this, 
too, is part of the intention of the present volume. 
One does well, also, to recall constantly that Gascoigne's 
suggested prayer for historiographers has two parts: the man 
who wishes to see the Renaissance must constantly test his 
vision for the blindness caused by partialities; and in listening 
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to the direct or indirect testimony of those who lived during 
that age, he must not trust too much "in every tattling tongue." 
The man of one book may be "proverbially formidable to all 
conversational figurantes," but he is formidabilis in more than 
one sense: it can be as risky to take all the eggs out of one basket 
as to put them all in one, and too much reliance on a single 
source or even a single kind of evidence has often been a con­
cealed trap to those seeking to understand a past age. To adapt a 
quip used by Professor Bush in his paper in this volume, Gold-
water and Galbraith cannot easily be shown to agree in their 
interpretation of what is most important about our own time, and 
the scholar of the future will have to balance their testimony 
with that also of witnesses as diverse as Yevtushenko, Charles 
de Gaulle, Picasso, Bertrand Russell, Orff, John XXIII, Sartre, 
and James Baldwin. Too much trust in any one of them—not 
that "tattling tongues" is an apt collective description—will give 
the scholar of 2450 an incomplete view of the way in which 
"men in the 1960V saw themselves and their times, if in some 
instances perhaps a better view than we shall have deserved. 
By at once correcting past partialities with scholarly breadth 
and precision, and using primary Renaissance sources with 
sensitivity and discrimination, the papers that follow contribute 
individually and conjunctively to a better understanding of the 
Renaissance as it appeared to many of the people who made it 
and experienced it. 
1. Charles W. Dunn, A Chaucer Reader (New York, 1952), p. xi; and 
see below, pp. 37 and 111. 
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PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISM

IN RENAISSANCE PERSPECTIVE

By

Paul Oskar Kristeller

IN A SENSE we cannot help seeing the past from the point of 
view of the present since we shall never get away from the 
present or from our place in it, and certainly historians have a 
right to impose their own modern categories on the past which 
they are trying to understand. However, certain aspects of the 
past may be overlooked or misunderstood because familiar things 
were called by different names (for example, literary criticism 
was once called rhetoric, and physical science was called natural 
philosophy) or because familiar words were once used with a 
meaning that greatly differs from the present one (for example, 
such terms as "humanist" or "liberal arts"). Hence, we may 
hope to gain a better understanding of the past if we try to 
recapture its categories, as far as that is possible, and to become 
conscious and critical of our own categories even where we 
cannot avoid using them. 
My topic is rather broad for treatment in a short space; in 
any event, the state of present scholarship (i.e., my own and 
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many other people's ignorance, to use a phrase of Petrarch's) 
and the difficulties and complexities of the topic itself preclude 
the full and adequate treatment that it clearly deserves. I shall 
limit myself to a few general points which are inevitably based 
on recent scholarly discussions as well as on my own reading in 
the period. I must apologize, then, if here I repeat to a certain 
extent what has been said before by others and by me: I can­
not create new basic facts for this paper, and it has not been 
my intention to recast radically my own previous conclusions. 
I should like to begin with the place which philosophy and 
humanism occupied within the framework of Renaissance 
learning and civilization. It is a question in which I became 
interested when I tried to understand the links that connected 
Renaissance humanism and Renaissance scholasticism, especially 
in Italy, with the academic, professional, and literary traditions 
of the later Middle Ages.1 Such a question is always difficult 
to answer for philosophy. For philosophy is often understood 
in such a broad and elusive way that it appears to be involved 
in any kind of reflective thinking that may be included in 
theology, or the sciences, or literature, or even in the actual 
conduct of life. If we limit ourselves to philosophy as a distinct 
intellectual and, as it were, professional enterprise, its definition 
and its relation to other disciplines are subject to great variety, 
depending on the historical period, on the specific school and 
tradition, and even on the orientation of individual thinkers. 
Also, ''humanism" seems to be exposed to similar difficulties 
as the term becomes the tool of popular discussion and the butt 
of scholarly controversies. The Renaissance did not use the 
term "humanism," but it coined the terms "humanist" and 
"humanities," and it is comparatively easy to make out from 
the documents what the period understood by the humanities, 
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namely, a cycle of studies that included grammar, rhetoric, 
poetry, history, and moral philosophy, and involved the study 
of the ancient Greek and Latin authors. The best known, and 
probably the earliest, document is the library canon composed 
by Nicholas V as a young man; and the same text also makes 
it clear that theology, jurisprudence, medicine, mathematics, 
and the philosophical disciplines of logic, physics, and meta­
physics were not included among the humanities. The testimony 
of this document has been confirmed by many others; and to 
my knowledge, it has not yet been refuted by contrary evidence. 
As soon as such counterevidence is forthcoming, I shall be glad 
to revise my interpretation of Renaissance humanism. In the 
meantime, I venture to be unimpressed when distinguished 
colleagues assure me that they do not like this interpretation 
or that some different views held by themselves or their 
predecessors are still true in a higher sense. Yet, if we take the 
Renaissance description of the humanities seriously, as I am 
inclined to do, we shall also understand why the work of the 
humanists spans the territory of several disciplines that have 
been distinct in modern times: humanists were classical scholars 
and historians, poets and prose writers, literary critics and 
political theorists, and they were philosophers, especially moral 
philosophers. The contribution each humanist made to any of 
these fields varies greatly in quality and quantity; yet it is 
important to realize that for a Renaissance humanist they 
formed a connected, if not unified, whole which he was in­
clined to consider as his proper domain. On the other hand, 
these disciplines have become quite distinct and even separate 
in modern times, and this has affected the scholarly study of 
their past history. Thus the historians of literature and literary 
criticism, of historiography and political thought, of educational 
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theory and practice, of classical scholarship and philosophy, have 
all been concerned with Renaissance humanism, but each of 
these groups of historians has tended to interpret humanism 
more or less exclusively in terms of the contribution it made to 
his particular subject, and largely ignored the other aspects of 
humanism and, above all, the broader conception underlying 
its peculiar range and combination of intellectual interests. To 
bring under a common denominator what we have learned about 
the humanists as writers, as classical scholars and copyists, as 
historians and philosophers, seems almost hopeless at the present 
hour, and to this we may add certain other aspects of their 
work that have found but scanty favor among modern historians, 
such as their theory and practice of oratory and of letter-writing. 
Yet this is obviously what we should aim for if we want to 
understand Renaissance humanism and its place and role during 
its own time. To this, we must add an objective study of the 
impact humanism had upon those subjects and traditions that 
were not a part of the humanities as then understood. In assert­
ing and defending the claims of their own studies, the humanists 
attacked their rivals in other fields, the theologians, the logicians 
and natural philosophers, the physicians, the jurists. This criti­
cism, though often unfair, was surely stimulating, and gradually 
the humanists contributed to the transformation of all other 
fields: they extended and improved the study of relevant classical 
sources, introduced different standards of historical criticism, 
new ideals of literary presentation, and an emphasis on new 
problems. Consequently, the humanists deserve a place also in 
the history of theology and jurisprudence, of the sciences, of the 
philosophical disciplines other than ethics, and even of the arts 
and of music. And of course, there were several individual 
humanists who combined their humanist training and interest 
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with professional competence in some of those other subjects. 
There were humanists who were also artists like Alberti, theolo­
gians like Erasmus and Melanchthon, jurists like Alciato or 
Cujas, physicians like Vesalius, or metaphysicians like Vives. 
Yet if we want to understand the full meaning of philosophy 
in the Renaissance, we must not limit ourselves to the work of 
the humanists as philosophers and especially as moralists. The 
Renaissance inherited from the thirteenth and fourteenth cen­
turies a different concept of philosophy that was rooted in the 
scholastic traditions of the universities. Since the thirteenth 
century at least, philosophy has been taught as a subject of its 
own, distinct from the liberal arts and from theology, and largely 
on the basis of the writings of Aristotle and of his commentators. 
The philosophical disciplines as taught included logic and 
natural philosophy, which were the most important subjects, as 
well as metaphysics and ethics. Natural philosophy contained 
several disciplines that have subsequently become sciences sepa­
rate from philosophy and from each other, such as physics, 
biology, and psychology, and hence its development has been 
largely studied by historians of science, whereas the historians of 
philosophy have concentrated on the other disciplines that are 
still considered as belonging to philosophy: logic, metaphysics, 
and ethics (historians of aesthetics must be satisfied with chance 
remarks, and otherwise turn to the treatises on poetics and 
rhetoric, on painting, architecture, and music for their sources). 
Metaphysics had obvious connections with theology, and was 
sometimes taught by theologians; but in spite of overlapping 
subject matter, it was a philosophical discipline distinct from 
theology, if not in conflict with it. To put it crudely, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics had a somewhat different content from the Scrip­
tures or Peter Lombard's Sentences. The course on ethics in­
C33) 
The Renaissance Image of Man and the World 
eluded also political and economic theory and the theory of 
passions as treated in Aristotle's Rhetoric, as we can see from 
many documents. It was in the field of ethics that the Aris­
totelian philosophers really competed with the humanists, and 
it is no coincidence that moral philosophy occurs twice in the 
canon of Nicholas V, once among the disciplines of Aristotelian 
philosophy, and once among the humanities. Whether the 
course on ethics at a Renaissance university was taught by an 
Aristotelian philosopher or a humanist depended on personalities 
and local arrangements. It did make a difference, of course, as 
to method and emphasis, terminology, and even the translation 
used, and this is an interesting subject that, in my opinion, has 
not yet been sufficiently explored. Yet it should be remembered, 
whereas it is often forgotten, that the bulk of the teaching and 
study of the philosophical disciplines other than ethics, and of 
the sciences then considered as parts of philosophy, was carried 
on through the sixteenth century by scholastic or Aristotelian 
philosophers, who include such distinguished figures as Pom­
ponazzi or Zabarella, and who may have been influenced in 
various ways by humanism, but who represent a different 
tradition. Until recently, these Aristotelians have fared rather 
badly with most historians of philosophy, and with many they 
still do. Even the historians of science have paid scanty atten­
tion to them. After they have discovered the scientific contri­
butions of the fourteenth-century Aristotelians at Oxford and 
Paris, most of them still blame the humanists for not having 
continued this tradition (which was not their tradition anyway) 
and fail to see that the tradition was actually continued by the 
Italian scholastics of the fifteenth and sixteen centuries—again 
a wide field for further study that has been barely touched.2 
To sum up, the conception and place of philosophy in the 
Renaissance are characterized by two competing intellectual 
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traditions, humanism and Aristotelian scholasticism, which partly 
overlap and quarrel, but largely coexist in a kind of division of 
labor. If we want to use contemporary analogies, we might say 
that there was a philosophy oriented toward the sciences, and 
another that was oriented toward the humanities, and actually 
the scholastics were philosophers and scientists, and the human­
ists were philosophers and scholars. If I seem to have given 
the impression in some of my past statements that I consider 
the Aristotelians as the "true" philosophers of the Renaissance, 
or the humanists as mere rhetoricians who were not truly 
philosophers in the professional sense of the word, I wish to 
retract, because my views have been exaggerated by others, and 
because I do not wish to endorse the present tendency among 
English and American philosophers to emphasize the sciences 
and to ignore the humanities. In terms of Renaissance studies, 
the scholastics and their role have been unduly neglected, and 
this may have been my reason for stressing their importance. 
Yet actually, both sides in the struggle have their merits and 
their shortcomings, and a philosopher should be in a position 
to view them in a detached fashion. To use ancient terms, if 
the scholastics stressed scientia and the humanists eloquentia, 
our aim should be to combine both of them with sapientia. 
Hence I feel in sympathy with the Platonist Pico della Miran­
dola when he defended the medieval scholastics against the 
humanist Ermolao Barbaro; for this was not a rejection of 
humanism by a traditionalist, but an effort to achieve a synthesis 
of what was valuable in both traditions on the part of one who 
had absorbed them both.3 I shall not attempt to discuss in 
this paper the relationships of Renaissance philosophy and 
humanism to the theology and religious thought of the period. 
These relationships are complicated, and they varied from case 
to case; and to do them justice, it would be necessary to dedicate 
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an entire paper to this subject alone. For our purpose it may 
be sufficient to say that the Renaissance treated the various 
philosophical, humanistic, and scientific disciplines as distinct 
from, though not necessarily opposed to, theology and, in doing 
so, merely continued and expanded a tradition well established 
in the Middle Ages at least since the thirteenth century. 
After having discussed the place which humanism and phi­
losophy seem to have occupied on the intellectual globe of 
their time, I should like to turn next to the historical role which 
the thinkers of the Renaissance assigned to themselves, which 
they aimed at fulfilling, and which they sometimes believed 
they had actually fulfilled. As you well know, the humanists 
looked with respect and admiration upon classical antiquity and 
more or less bitterly attacked the Middle Ages; they tried in 
many ways to imitate the former and to abandon the traditions 
of the latter. In countless statements most of which have been 
collected for us by Ferguson and Weisinger and other scholars, 
the humanists spoke of the ancient eloquence and poetry, letters 
and arts, learning and wisdom that were being reborn in their 
own time after a long period of decay and that were being 
brought back to light after the darkness of many centuries.4 
It is this very notion which underlies the customary division of 
Western history into antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern 
period, which produced the popular notion of the Dark Ages, 
and which led modern historians to give the name "Renaissance" 
to the period that marked the beginning of the modern age. The 
objective value of this whole conception has been challenged 
in recent decades by many medievalists and other historians; 
and we should be ready to admit, on the basis of our much 
increased knowledge, that the later medieval centuries were 
hardly so dark as to require a completely new light and that 
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the claims of the humanists, though perhaps justified to some 
extent and in certain areas, are quite exaggerated if taken in 
their broadest meaning and at their face value. Moreover, a 
comparison of the numerous statements in which the claim is 
expressed has shown that they vary greatly in emphasis, in the 
areas of culture for which a rebirth is asserted or demanded, 
and in the precise time and persons to which this rebirth is 
attributed. And it is easy to show that the claim often degen­
erated into an empty slogan when every renowned philosopher 
or physician was called another Aristotle or another Hippocrates, 
and when a rebirth was occasionally claimed even for Averroism 
or for Ockhamism. Finally, it has been shown that the notion of 
a revival of poetry not only goes back in Italy to the early 
fourteenth century (and this disposes, for good, of Burdach's 
attempt to derive the secular slogan via Cola di Rienzo from 
medieval religious conceptions) but it can even be found in a 
few ancient and medieval authors. St. Ambrose is credited by 
St. Augustine with a revival of eloquence, Lanfranc of Pavia 
and Canterbury is praised by his biographer for having restored 
Latinity to its ancient state of knowledge; and ever since 
Carolingian times, the political idea of the Roman Empire had 
been linked with the notion that ancient Rome had been 
renewed. But when all this is said, the fact remains that Renais­
sance literature, and especially humanist literature, is full of 
this notion which was applied by Vasari to the visual arts, by 
Machiavelli to politics, by the religious humanists to Christian­
ity, by Ficino to Platonic philosophy, and, at least by implica­
tion, by the humanist Aristotelians even to the philosophy of 
Aristotle. Hence, even if we are most skeptical (as I am not) 
about the achievements of Renaissance humanism and about 
its claim of having brought about a Renaissance of learning, 
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we must admit that the so-called Renaissance was at least that 
period in Western history when people were convinced that they 
were witnessing or bringing about a renaissance of letters and 
of learning; and in case we lack a better definition, we might 
as well define the Renaissance as the period in which there was 
the most frequent talk about the Renaissance of learning. 
Yet again, as in the case of the ideal of the humanities, a 
careful survey of Renaissance thought will show that the idea 
of a rebirth was not universally held by the philosophers or even 
by all humanists of the period, but that there were other im­
portant conceptions competing with it and partly opposed to it. 
The writings of the humanists are full of pessimistic remarks 
about the state of letters and learning in their own time, and 
many of them were convinced that the achievements of the 
ancients could never be equaled.5 Machiavelli insists that human 
nature is the same at all times;6 and although he ostensibly 
uses this as an argument for our ability to imitate the ancients, 
the notion has quite different implications, and the two are 
not necessarily connected. The view that human nature is always 
the same is also implied by Montaigne,7 and it has for him the 
same pessimistic implications as for Machiavelli, yet he does 
not link it with the idea of rebirth at all. There is constant 
change, to be sure, but it is not a change for the better; and 
if the present age seems to have overcome some of the errors 
and limitations of its predecessor, this merely means that it 
must expect to have its own errors corrected by a future age.8 
The scholastic Aristotelians certainly felt that they were con­
tinuing without a break the work of their medieval predecessors. 
And although the Platonic philosophers spoke at times of the 
revival of ancient Platonic wisdom,9 they were much more 
concerned with the steady continuity of human wisdom through 
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the course of Western history and with the universal diffusion 
of truth among all peoples and at all times. Marsilio Ficino 
believed that there was a continuous tradition of philosophy that 
began with the renowned writings attributed to Hermes Tris­
megistus, Zoroaster, Orpheus, and Pythagoras (writings which 
we know to be apocryphal products of late antiquity) and 
stretched through Socrates and Plato to the Platonic schools of 
later antiquity, and through the Byzantine, Arabic, and medieval 
Platonists down to Cusanus and to himself.10 Pico della Miran­
dola added Aristotle and his Greek, Arabic, and Latin inter­
preters as well as the Jewish cabalists to the list, and gave 
expression to the view that all of them, at least in some of 
their assertions, had a share in universal truth.11 These notions 
were widely held by thinkers of the sixteenth century, and it 
was in the Platonic tradition that a theologian in sympathy 
with it coined the term "philosophia perennis,"12 a term that 
has since been appropriated by other traditions but that seems 
to fit Platonism as well as any other school of philosophy. The 
Platonists' conception of the history of philosophy and of their 
own place in it seems to be as significant as the humanist idea 
of revival or rebirth, and it enjoyed a great vogue. It supplied 
the background for many later ideas on tolerance, on natural 
religion, and on natural law, and should be considered as one 
of the sources of later deism. 
Finally, Renaissance thought contains many germs of the 
modern idea of progress, which is fundamentally opposed to 
that of revival. Whereas most humanists were convinced that 
their own age was inferior to that of the ancients or at best 
could match some of their achievements, the question whether 
the moderns could surpass the ancients was raised already in 
the fifteenth century, and sometimes was answered in the 
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affirmative.13 As the sixteenth century went on, the voices in 
favor of modern superiority multiplied.14 Aside from contempo­
rary achievements in the arts and sciences, the invention of 
gunpowder and of the printing press and the discovery of 
America were most frequently cited as instances of modern 
progress. In this way, the ground was laid for the battle of 
the ancients and moderns; and whereas this controversy became 
most vocal in the seventeenth century, it has been recently 
shown that it had some of its roots in the sixteenth and even 
in the fifteenth centuries.15 In the field of philosophy, as in 
that of the sciences, there was a strong feeling, often rebellious, 
that a thinker should assert his originality and his independence 
of the ancient authorities, such as Aristotle and Galen. New 
ideas, new systems, had to be formulated, and it is especially 
clear with the philosophers of nature from Paracelsus to Bruno 
that they claimed and believed to be new and original in their 
ideas. Telesio, though full of respect for the Aristotelian tradition 
in which he had been brought up, tried to replace it with his 
work on nature according to its own principles;16 and Patrizi, 
although a professed Platonist, called his main work a "new 
philosophy" of the universe.17 Modern scholarship has again 
tended to show that these thinkers were not as new and original 
as they thought they were, but the historical fact remains that 
they aimed at being original (although they may not have 
achieved this aim completely), just as their predecessors aimed 
at being faithful interpreters of Aristotle or of Plato (although 
they may actually have been less faithful and more original than 
they realized). Francis Bacon, who challenged Aristotle by 
writing his Novum Organum, was an heir of this Renaissance 
tradition. And in Galileo there is already a strong feeling that 
there was a lot of knowledge and a lot of truth that had not 
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yet been known and that remained for the present and the 
future to be discovered and demonstrated.18 
Having discussed the views held by Renaissance humanists 
and philosophers of their role in history, I should like now to 
approach our problem from a third and last angle and discuss 
the tasks they assigned to philosophy in human life and the 
notion they had of the philosopher and of his mission. If we 
begin again with the humanists, it is quite clear from their 
writings that they thought of themselves primarily as moral 
philosophers and that they considered ethics as the most im­
portant, the only essential, part of philosophy.19 This attitude 
can be clearly traced from Petrarch to Montaigne, and it has 
significant implications. Only those problems that are of direct 
human concern are worth talking and writing about, and the 
problems of logic, of physics, and of metaphysics are unim­
portant since they have no bearing on us, on our conduct, and 
on our happiness. It is this attitude that has led some scholars 
to compare the humanists with the existentialists of our own 
day. On the other hand, the humanists maintained that the 
study of rhetoric and poetry, of history and of the ancient 
authors, which they advocated and cultivated, had a formative 
influence on the moral character and thought of the students 
and thus was of great human concern. This explains the human­
ist preoccupation with education and with the school which they 
actually subjected to a reform whose effects have been felt 
for many centuries almost until our own time.20 It is this human 
significance of their studies that led the humanists to call them 
"humanities," a term from which the name for their own pro­
fession and movement derived, as we have seen. This central 
concern for moral thought and for man also explains why the 
dignity of man was a favorite topic with many humanists, a 
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theme which was developed also by philosophers like Ficino, 
Pico, and Pomponazzi, whom we are reluctant to call humanists, 
although they were no doubt affected to a varying degree by 
the humanist learning of their time. On the other hand, it is 
well known that the praise of man's dignity also had its strong 
opponents, that is, not only the Protestant reformers, but also 
Montaigne who in many other ways may be considered a 
representative of humanism. 
If we want to understand more concretely the moral and 
philosophical ideals of the humanists, we cannot help paying 
attention to a question that has been much discussed both by 
the humanists themselves and by their modern interpreters, 
namely, the relative merits of the active and the contemplative 
life. Through a number of brilliant studies, we have become 
acquainted with a republican or civic humanism which flour­
ished especially in Florence during the first half of the fifteenth 
century and found its most eloquent representatives in Salutati, 
Bruni, Alberti, and Palmieri.21 These writers seem to advocate 
in their treatises the active life of the businessman, citizen, and 
statesman rather than the contemplative life of the mere 
scholar or philosopher. Other scholars have extended the picture 
into the sixteenth century and have concluded that the main 
trend of Renaissance thought was to abandon the medieval 
monastic ideal of contemplation and to put in its place the 
modern ideal of action, that is, an action enlightened by 
thought and experience.22 There are, I agree, texts which seem 
to confirm this theory; certainly Renaissance thought, following 
Cicero rather than the Greek philosophers, recognized the 
values inherent in the active life to a greater extent than had 
the thought of the preceding period, and no doubt this fact 
has its historical significance. Yet it is not true that the Renais­
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sance, or even Renaissance humanism, speaks with a single voice 
for the superiority of the active over the contemplative life. 
The Platonist philosophers and most of the Aristotelians clearly 
favor the life of contemplation and consider action merely as 
an imperfect image of thought. Pomponazzi does connect the 
goal of human life with the practical rather than with the 
speculative intellect, and this emphasis is doubly significant 
because it differs from that of Aristotle. Yet he does not main­
tain that the activity of the practical intellect is higher than 
that of the speculative intellect, but merely that it may be 
attained by a much larger number of persons.23 Among the 
humanists themselves, we find many who clearly favor the life 
of contemplation, not only Landino who was influenced by 
Ficino's Platonism, but also Petrarch and many others. Even 
most of the humanists who have been cited as the main witnesses 
of the active ideal seem to express at times a different view. 
Salutati wrote an entire treatise, which has been recently 
published for the first time, to prove the value and even the 
superiority of the monastic life.24 Alberti in his treatise on the 
family does speak with favor of the busy life of the merchant, 
to be sure, but in his other moral writings he insists that only 
the quiet life of philosophical reason can give us real satisfaction 
and enable us to withstand the blows of chance that are other­
wise beyond our control—views that are reminiscent of ancient 
Stoicism and that are encountered in the works of many other 
humanists.25 Even Leonardo Bruni does not consistently place 
the active life above that of contemplation, but rather sees the 
ideal in a combination of the two26 or states that the contem­
plative life is more divine, and the active life more useful,27 
and thus comes pretty close to the position of Aristotle himself.28 
I cannot help feeling that these apparent contradictions or 
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hesitations may be due to the occasion on which a given state­
ment was written and to the persons for which it was intended. 
A humanist rhetorician cannot help praising the active life when 
writing of and for a businessman or a statesman or even a 
prince (for the life of action is not limited to republics), and 
even Ficino would do the same in a similar context, as some 
of his letters clearly show.29 On the other hand, the life of 
contemplation would get its due share when the person addressed 
or involved is a monk, as in Salutati's case, or a philosopher, 
scholar, or scientist, as in most other instances. As a matter of 
fact, for the Renaissance thinker the life of contemplation is 
not primarily the monastic life. If it is true that the Renaissance 
reduced the importance of the monastic ideal, it opposed to it 
not only the ideal of the active businessman or statesman but 
also that of the philosopher and scholar who was not necessarily 
a monk or cleric. Speaking more broadly, I do not think that 
the respective claims of the contemplative and the active life 
have been settled once and for all by the Renaissance in favor 
of the active life. These are competing ideals which are rooted 
in human nature, and the contemplative life has had its ad­
vocates among the leading philosophers of all times, in the 
Renaissance no less than in the subsequent centuries or in our 
own time, and it is likely to have them also in future times.30 
Yet coming back to the Renaissance discussion, we must ask 
in each instance whether a writer is advocating the ideal of 
the active life only for others to whom he addresses himself or 
also for himself. It is quite clear that most humanists conceive 
of themselves primarily as scholars, whatever advice they give 
to others, and that Pomponazzi is conscious of being a philoso­
pher rather than a member of the ordinary crowd for which 
he may formulate a generous ideal but to which he feels 
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superior through his knowledge and his ability of reasoning.31 
An unqualified approval of the active life is rather rare in the 
Renaissance, and we would expect to find it only in those 
writers who would identify themselves wholeheartedly as states­
men rather than as scholars or philosophers. This is not the case 
of Leonardo Bruni who certainly was a statesman, but whose 
death was lamented, as his beautiful epitaph in S. Croce in 
Florence says, by history and eloquence, and by the Greek 
and Latin Muses (if not by philosophy).32 
If we turn from the humanists to the other, more professional 
philosophers of the period, we move still further away from the 
ideal of the active life. The Platonist Ficino believes in the 
superiority of the contemplative life, as we have seen; but, even 
more, contemplation, in the sense of metaphysical speculation 
and of the direct vision of God and of the intelligible world of 
ideas, represents for him, as for the ancient Platonists, the true 
goal and content of human existence.33 The true philosopher is 
for him the person who attains this knowledge and experience 
and conveys its substance to others through his teaching and 
writing. The Platonic philosopher is also called a theologian, 
not because Ficino happened to be a priest or had studied 
dogmatic theology based on Scripture and authority, but because 
the Platonic philosopher attained through reason and contem­
plation and through his philosophical authorities a truth about 
God and the intelligible world that was in basic agreement with 
dogmatic theology, but derived from independent sources.34 It 
was this wisdom acquired through contemplation that enabled 
the Platonic philosopher to withstand the power of chance, to 
choose the right course of action according to the circumstances, 
and to overcome the limitations of the external sensuous life 
by which the ordinary people are enslaved. The philosopher 
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will laugh and cry with Democritus and Heraclitus at their folly 
and misery.35 He knows that our ordinary thoughts are but 
shadowy dreams, and thus he alone is awake among so many 
sleepers.36 Yet unlike Plotinus and his other ancient models, 
Ficino is not convinced that the philosopher can permanently 
escape the plight of ordinary human existence. Man's quest 
and thirst for the infinite makes him forever restless during 
his earthly life. The philosopher attains the vision for a short 
while, but he cannot retain it. He is superior to other human 
beings because he knows our goal, and he is aware of the 
limitations and deficiencies of ordinary earthly existence, but 
in a way he surfers more than others who do not know what 
they lack. For this reason, Saturn is the star of the intellectuals, 
and their temperament is melancholy. This suffering will be 
overcome only in a future life when the vision of God will be 
attained forever and without limitations.37 
If Ficino's notion of the waking and restless philosopher 
reflects a vision that can be attained though not permanently 
fulfilled during our present life and still resembles in some of 
its undertones St. Augustine's restless search for God, Pom­
ponazzi's much more sober thought arrives in an unexpected 
way at a quite similar picture of the philosopher. He does not 
believe, with the Platonists, in the possibility of attaining during 
the present life a direct and, as it were, natural knowledge of 
God and the intelligible world. For him, as an Aristotelian 
philosopher, we have no other sources of knowledge but sense 
perception and the faculty of reasoning. His method does not 
consist in the approximative description of a valid knowledge 
previously and directly attained, as for the Platonists, but in 
the ever-renewed effort to follow a rational discourse and argu­
ment from given premises, wherever it may lead him. Hence 
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the strained and complex and even contradictory manner of 
his writing. In a strange and isolated passage, Pomponazzi 
suddenly expresses his troubled feelings and compares himself 
with Prometheus, the prototype of the philosopher who is 
eaten up by his worries and thoughts while trying to know the 
secrets of God, persecuted by the inquisitors, and held up to 
ridicule by the ordinary crowd.38 Clearly Pomponazzi was no 
less aware or proud of the philosopher's task than Ficino had 
been, no less convinced that he was called upon to overcome 
the illusions of the ordinary crowd, and that he had to pay a 
price in suffering for his greater knowledge. 
Finally we may compare with this what another philosopher 
who really was neither a Platonist nor an Aristotelian, though 
closer to being the former, had to say about the life and task 
of the philosopher. Giordano Bruno associates the philosophical 
life with the heroic love of which he treats at great length in 
one of his dialogues, the Eroici Furori. Like Pomponazzi, he 
uses a mythological figure to illustrate the struggle and suffering 
inherent in the life of reason. Commenting on a sonnet of 
Tansillo about Actaeon who was turned by Diana into a stag 
and torn by his own hounds, Bruno explains that this myth 
refers to the heroic love and to the heroic intellect. For Actaeon 
symbolizes the intellect as it is searching for divine wisdom 
and tries to grasp divine beauty. He is thus transformed into 
his very object, and pursued and torn apart by his own 
thoughts.39 
I do not wish to impose upon these occasional remarks and 
symbols a greater and wider importance than they have, but 
I find them striking and characteristic. They seem to show, as 
some of the other ideas we mentioned did, that for many 
thinkers of the Renaissance, philosophy had its own task and 
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mission distinct from the common moral ideals of ordinary 
human life, and that this philosophical ideal was conceived as 
valid for all times and not limited to the demands of a passing 
historical situation. I hope to have shown that in Renaissance 
thought the contemplative life did not lack its defenders, though 
the values of the active life may have been more widely and 
more explicitly recognized than in previous centuries. More 
generally, I intended to show that some of the views on philoso­
phy and its task that are commonly associated with humanism 
and with Renaissance thought were not held by all philosophers 
of the period, and not even by all humanists. I do not deny 
that these views were held by some humanists and that they 
are intrinsically and historically important, but I feel that we 
must interpret these views with greater subtlety and with many 
more qualifications than has frequently been done and must 
pay greater attention to the divergent opinions expressed by 
the humanists themselves and by their contemporaries. Yet I 
do not claim to have presented an adequate or definitive analysis 
of this complex problem, and I am convinced that a more 
careful and more comprehensive reading of the relevant sources 
may eventually lead to different and perhaps quite unexpected 
conclusions. 
If I may draw a further lesson from the ideas which I have 
been trying to survey, I should like to emphasize that philosophy 
and scholarship have a permanent task to fulfil at any time, 
beyond the immediate actual tasks which they may be called 
upon to perform within a given situation. When we are con­
fronted with opinions that may contain an element of truth 
(how else could they be seriously held by anybody?) but that 
are clearly exaggerated in the form in which they have been 
expressed, it is tempting and perhaps even inevitable to counter 
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one exaggeration with an opposite one. Yet in the long run it 
seems more satisfactory to aim, not at a mere compromise be­
tween given opinions, but at a synthesis in which the legitimate 
core of each different opinion is somehow included. Yet in 
formulating this ideal, I am already voting for the contemplative 
and against the active life, I must admit, and committing myself 
to the view, probably not shared by all of my colleagues, that 
this is the choice befitting a philosopher and a scholar. 
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THE RENAISSANCE:

THE LITERARY CLIMATE

By

Douglas Bush

BEFORE we ask how Renaissance writers conceived of themselves 
and their world and literature, we may for a moment glance at 
modern theories. Around 1900 there was one fairly simple, 
almost unquestioned concept of the Renaissance, or the Italian 
Renaissance. That concept was the composite product of a 
number of notable historians and thinkers, of whom Burckhardt 
had been the chief. It was also a natural product of the liberalism 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it stressed 
whatever elements in the Renaissance seemed to herald that 
movement: man's discovery of the world and himself; the over­
throw of authority by secular, naturalistic individualism; the 
conquest of asceticism by aestheticism; and so on. This is still 
the popular formula and, in less simple terms, it retains among 
scholars a degree, a widely varying degree, of validity. There 
were some early challenges. Greatly enlarged knowledge of 
the Middle Ages rejected the notion of an awakening after a 
long sleep; and, from a similar point of view, the picture of 
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neopagan Italy was toned down to admit the existence of order, 
orthodoxy, pietism. During this past generation, widened and 
deepened learning and discriminating insights have so greatly 
illuminated and complicated "the Renaissance" that specialists 
walk warily through a maze of qualifications, and amateurs like 
me are stopped in their tracks. Facing the complexities and 
contradictions of theories and evidence, one can only envy 
the feverish patient whose doctor said, "You may read either 
Galbraith or Goldwater but not both." 
In much modern discussion of the Renaissance the importance 
of the classical revival seems to have greatly shrunk, but a 
student of literature can hardly acquiesce in that change of 
focus. Moreover, the literature of half a dozen countries and a 
couple of centuries cannot be neatly packaged and labeled, and 
a short sketch may well emphasize the classics, the great 
common ground on which almost all writers stood. If to any 
moderns some formative ideals and principles appear obsolete 
and tedious, for leading minds of the Renaissance they were 
dynamic realities; and conceivably our own age would be better 
off if we could or would recover some of them. Any doubts 
concerning the fertilizing power of the classics—along with 
many other stimulating forces, to be sure—may be quieted by 
the thought of a few great names, Machiavelli and Ariosto, 
Rabelais and Montaigne, Cervantes and Shakespeare. If, as we 
go on, I draw mainly upon English examples, it is because 
they are most familiar to most of us and, in a large perspective, 
sufficiently typical of the Renaissance as a whole. 
Even if we knew no history, abstract logic would tell us 
that a classical—that is, an educational—revival would follow 
the barbarian invasions and develop with growing momentum. 
Its quickened flowering in Italy from the fourteenth to the 
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sixteenth century was the natural result of French influence, 
of increasing resources and knowledge, multiplying apostles 
and disciples, the contagion of enthusiasm and self-confidence, 
the opportunities and rewards open to humanistic scholars, and 
the generally favorable climate of the affluent city-states. The 
similar if slower process which had been at work in remoter 
parts of the old Roman world, such as Britain, was increasingly 
stimulated by Italian influence. Not to cite the many witnesses 
to early classical ardor in Italy, we may remember the excite­
ment of Erasmus when, having left Paris for a first visit to 
England, he encountered John Colet, Thomas More, and their 
group; or the contrast drawn by Rabelais' Gargantua between 
the illiberal time of his youth and the fever for learning that 
now possessed old and young. Earlier scholars and writers did 
not know that they were living in the Middle Ages; their 
successors were very much aware that they were men of the 
Renaissance—and, with their far greater knowledge, they had 
a far more historical view of antiquity. We might recall, inci­
dentally, that such early and learned interpreters as Bacon and 
Milton saw the European classical revival as a by-product of 
the Reformation; and in sixteenth-century England the phrase 
"the new learning" meant Protestantism, not the classics. 
Greek and Roman literature and thought had comprehended 
wide diversities and conflicts, and these were perpetuated, 
heightened, and complicated during the Renaissance; but in 
a brief and broad survey we may think, as at times Renaissance 
men could, of a unified Graeco-Roman culture—or rather, of 
a unified Graeco-Roman-Christian culture. For large-minded 
humanists the assimilation and re-expression of that culture 
meant not only continuity with a great past and the hope of 
a great future, it meant universal solidarity in the present. All 
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over Europe, boys and young men—prospective lawyers, states­
men, clerics, scientists—were studying the same body of material 
in much the same way. From the early fifteenth century down 
at least to Milton's tract, books on education were written— 
unlike most modern books on the subject—by the most eminent 
scholars of Europe as well as by humble pedagogues; and in 
all these, family likenesses far outweighed national or religious 
or individual differences. A common culture by no means 
extinguished such differences, but it could transcend them. 
Thus the best of all courtesy books, Castiglione's Courtier, 
embodied the most urbane ideal of the cultivated gentleman 
and lady and of life conceived and practiced as a fine art; 
whereas Sir Thomas Elyot's Governor, in its title and its 
earnest, unsophisticated text, embodied practical concern with 
the education of the ruling class. The one book is as Italian 
as the other is English, yet both derive from the Platonic and 
Ciceronian conceptions of the philosopher-king and the orator 
as representative of the ideal type of virtue, wisdom, and civic 
responsibility. 
The classics, in nourishing the rational man, nourished the 
critical spirit in scholars like Lorenzo Valla and in historians, 
philosophers, and scientists. Yet that critical spirit rather 
strengthened than sapped the idealism and universal solidarity 
I speak of. In a general way, it was felt that the clear-eyed 
ancients had seen and distilled the truth about all kinds of 
human experience. Erasmus' first book, his often-enlarged and 
very popular collection of classical adages, with comments, pre­
sented an attractive picture of a civilization signally endowed 
with sanity, wisdom, and pithy utterance; and in many books 
Erasmus carried on the critical spirit of Valla along with the 
practical piety of Colet. His very critical if not very pious 
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contemporary, Machiavelli, appears in a rarely winning light 
in the much-quoted passage from a letter written when he was 
out of office and occupied on his small estate: returning home 
at nightfall and exchanging muddy clothes for courtly attire, 
he would sit down in his study to discourse with the great men 
of ancient Rome and inquire into their motives, "and these 
men in their humanity reply to me, and for the space of four 
hours I feel no weariness, remember no trouble, no longer fear 
poverty, no longer dread death; my whole being is absorbed in 
them." Toward the end of the century, even so skeptical and 
critical a moralist as Montaigne gladly acknowledged his large 
and constant debts to Seneca and Plutarch—although these 
sages might not have acknowledged some of their disciple's 
doctrines. 
Without unduly idealizing the Renaissance or ignoring its 
many crosscurrents, one cannot contemplate such basic solidarity 
without thinking of the continual fissions and the esoteric 
advances in modern knowledge, which have caused so much 
concern over the failure of communication among and even 
within our many diverse disciplines. The Renaissance ideal 
of the many-sided amateur had numerous actual exemplars 
from Leonardo and Castiglione to Sir Philip Sidney and Bacon; 
the modern ideal, or the inevitable product of the modern 
world, seems to be the single-minded expert. A partly parallel 
contrast appears in the field of imaginative literature. In modern 
discussion no topic is more familiar than the problem of the 
artist's isolation from society. The Renaissance, to be sure, had 
its highbrow, middlebrow, and lowbrow divisions; many human­
ists and writers were more or less dependent on patrons and 
scorned the profane vulgar; and the gentleman-author did not 
breathe the air of the market place. Yet, in obvious ways and 
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for obvious reasons, there was far more cultural homogeneity, 
and the writer—Shakespeare, for instance—was much more in 
harmony with the relatively uniform outlook of his audience 
than modern writers are likely to be with their heterogeneous 
public. 
It is quite impossible to exaggerate the veneration that 
Renaissance scholars and most writers felt for the Romans and 
Greeks as superior races of beings, the supreme exponents of 
literary art, the supreme oracles of rational wisdom, the creators 
of the golden age of civilization. Deeply conscious, at least for 
some time, of their own inferiority, they strove to emulate the 
ancients in the hope of attaining a comparable degree of sweet­
ness and light. As modern scholars have shown, the humanists 
were fully, not to say overweeningly, aware of their role and 
achievement. From, say, Leonardo Bruni and Flavio Biondo in 
the earlier fifteenth century up to Louis Le Roy in the later 
sixteenth, they saw the revival of letters and learning as a dis­
tinct era in the long course of cultural and intellectual history; 
Le Roy, the professor of Greek, is a witness of special interest 
because his name is identified with the modernist gospel of 
progress. The earlier and even later humanists knew that to 
look forward they must first look backward—a long way back, 
beyond what they saw as a desert of monkery, scholastic logic, 
and bad Latin. Most literary revolutions start from a leap over 
immediate predecessors to older, richer, fresher sources of 
inspiration, and no revolution was more zealous or more con­
servative than the Renaissance return to the fountains, both 
secular and religious. As a main or initial clue we may take 
the motive of imitation, a motive which could often be mis­
taken but could also be profoundly right. From the naive, stub­
born, and touching Ciceronianism of the old man that Petrarch 
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tells about, we might jump up to the English Renaissance. In 
his Arte of Rhetorique (1553; 1560), Thomas Wilson expressed 
typical humanistic piety: 
Now, before we use either to write, or speake eloquently, wee 
must dedicate our myndes wholy, to followe the most wise and 
learned men, and seeke to fashion as wel their speache and 
gesturing, as their witte or endyting. The which when we 
earnestly mynd to doe, we can not but in time appere somewhat 
like them. 
Nearly a century later came Milton's Of Education, a program 
based, like the many earlier tracts of European humanists, on 
ancient models (though now with a large addition of science); 
and Milton, having brought his students to the point of reading 
the great tragedies and orations, said, in a spirit akin to Wilson's, 
"which if they were not only read, but some of them got by 
memory, and solemnly pronounced with right accent and grace, 
as might be taught, would endue them even with the spirit 
and vigor of Demosthenes or Cicero, Euripides or Sophocles." 
Milton's own career epitomizes, on a level of high civic and 
religious fervor, the full span of humanistic ideals, the combina­
tion of discipleship to the classics and public service. Yet, for 
him as for Ben Jonson and other writers of power, the ancients 
were "Guides, not Commanders"; and the output of the greatest 
classical artist of the modern world is the grand example of a 
poet working within a tradition and, with inspired originality, 
re-creating every classical genre he touched, from ode to tragedy. 
The first kind of imitation—with which Milton began—was 
naturally the writing of Latin verse and prose. This was no 
novelty. What the humanists added to medieval practice was 
a much more informed, more strict, and more conscious elegance. 
The impulse was powerful enough to endure in education up 
C59)

The Renaissance Image of Man and the World 
through the nineteenth century. In the Renaissance centuries 
it produced an enormous mass of neo-Latin verse and many 
famous names, such as the Italian Petrarch, Poliziano, Pontano, 
Mantuan, Sannazaro, Castiglione, Vida, and Alciati; the Dutch 
Secundus and Grotius; the Polish Casimir Sarbiewski; the 
Scottish George Buchanan; and the English Sir Thomas More, 
John Owen, Crashaw, and Milton. I might say that, in making 
a large commentary on Milton's Latin poems, I have read a 
ton of neo-Latin verse, with respect if not with passion. Most 
of it has long vanished below even the scholarly horizon, but 
in its own age it was for generations more important than the 
emerging literature in the vernaculars; Petrarch cherished his 
epic Africa (and his Latin treatises) more than the Italian 
poetry which gave him his lasting fame. Even Milton could 
debate with himself about whether to write his epic in Latin 
or, by writing in English, to forfeit his desire for a European 
audience; and we may remember that in speaking of the ques­
tion Milton cited the advice given to Ariosto by Cardinal Bembo, 
the arbiter elegantiarum of early sixteenth-century Italy. We 
cannot doubt (pace C. S. Lewis) that the writing of neo-Latin 
verse contributed much to the growth and maintenance of a 
universal European culture. Its influence upon the form and 
texture of vernacular poetry has not been fully studied, and 
would be difficult to disengage from classical influence, but one 
large external fact was the abandonment of most medieval 
genres for the classical epigram, satire, epistle, pastoral, ode, 
epic, comedy, and tragedy. 
Before Milton posed his question, Bacon had said that these 
modern languages would play the bankrupts with books, and 
he put his own writings into Latin—which reminds us that the 
progress of science would have been greatly impeded if scien­
tists had not used the international language. It would have 
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been at least equally calamitous if Erasmus had written in 
Dutch; as it was, he had more influence than any other writer 
of his age, more, probably, than all but two or three men in 
modern history. A few works of neo-Latin prose, unlike neo-
Latin poetry, survive in popular as well as scholarly repute, 
notably The Praise of Folly and Utopia; both books are con­
spicuous examples of the original and forceful adaptation of 
classical forms—and classical irony—to contemporary life and 
problems. In the seventeenth century, Robert Burton and Sir 
Thomas Browne planned to write their scientific works in Latin 
but shifted, happily, to English. We may remember that uni­
versity students read, wrote, and spoke Latin as a second native 
language; in such a climate it was difficult for anyone to have 
a provincial outlook. 
Even a glance at neo-Latin prose should not pass over one 
phenomenon. The slavish imitation of Cicero's style could, 
mainly in Italy and France, lead to the absurdities that Erasmus 
satirized in his Ciceronianus; Erasmus himself revered Cicero 
the moralist but abhorred devotion to the letter rather than the 
spirit of classicism. Yet the general cultivation of Ciceronian 
Latin, or, in broader terms, the study of rhetoric, must not be 
judged by its frivolous or pedantic excesses. Latin was both a 
practical and professional necessity and the key to ancient 
and much modern knowledge, thought, and literature, and 
writers needed a disciplined, civilized standard; moreover, 
rhetoric involved logic and close study of all the processes of 
thought and composition. Nearly a century after Erasmus' 
satire, Bacon censured Ciceronianism as one of the three chief 
"vanities" which had hindered the advancement of true learn­
ing; he was, as a sort of Jacobean John Dewey, condemning 
traditional literary education. When Bacon says, "Here there­
fore is the first distemper of learning, when men study words 
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and not matter," his hostile echo of a phrase of the Tudor 
humanist, Roger Ascham, has large reverberations. Ascham had 
said: "Ye know not, what hurt ye do to learning, that care not 
for wordes, but for matter. . . . " But the context of that 
saying goes far beyond good Latin as an end in itself. Ascham 
is speaking of style as the index and instrument of moral and 
social order or disorder. We might move up to a later classical 
humanist, Matthew Arnold, and recall Lionel Trilling's remark 
that whenever Arnold talks about style, he is really talking 
about society. Or there is that resolute nonconformist, the late 
George Orwell, who wrote specifically of language and style 
as the symptom of cultural and political health or disease. At 
the present moment the widespread and flagrant abuse of 
English reflects the state of our world. 
It may be stretching the letter, though not the broad idea, 
of "imitation" to include here the vast and valuable work of 
the army of translators in all countries who turned the corpus 
of Greek literature into Latin, Latin and Greek into the modern 
languages, and, finally, modern literature from one language to 
another. Most of the greatest translations in English were those 
made in the sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries: those 
of the Bible; North's Plutarch; Florio's Montaigne; the scholarly 
Philemon Holland's Livy and other historical works; Shelton's 
Don Quixote; Urquhart's Rabelais; and, in verse, Chapman's 
heroic versions of the Homer whom he worshiped as the 
supreme poet and teacher. A multitude of other translations, 
from Golding's Ovid to Sylvester's rendering of Du Bartas' epic 
of creation, were more or less important in their age. Transla­
tion was not, as it was to be in later centuries, a gentleman's 
elegant pastime; it had serious and solid motives. Translators 
labored with patriotic zeal to make the sources of knowledge 
(62)

The Renaissance: The Literary Climate 
and wisdom available to their unlearned countrymen and to 
enrich their own literature and language. A typical exemplar is 
Sir Thomas Hoby, the translator of Castiglione's Courtier, who 
in 1561 affirmed that in translation "Englishmen are much 
inferiour to most of all other Nations," and who urged Greek 
and Latin scholars to make translations, "And so shall we per­
chaunce in time become as famous in England, as the learned 
men of other nations have bene and presently are"; he found 
his own task difficult, but "I whetted my stile and setled my 
selfe to take in hand the other three bookes." One modern 
tribute paid to Hoby's work is that, if it had not been circu­
lating for forty years, Benedick and Beatrice could not have 
been born. Arthur Golding, carrying on a medieval and alle­
gorical conception of Ovid—a conception which by no means 
precluded aesthetic enjoyment—showed with full illustration 
that the Metamorphoses contained invaluable moral lessons for 
both sexes and all ages. The expressed motives of the biblical 
translators, from Tyndale onward, were, of course, the most 
earnest and exalted. Chapman was hardly less earnest in his 
ethical view of Homer, a view which led to continual coloring 
of his text; and I must quote from his preface to the Odyssey 
a sentence I am fond of quoting. Chapman thus contrasts 
Achilles with his ideal hero, Odysseus: 
In one, Predominant Perturbation; in the other, over-ruling 
Wisedome; in one, the Bodies fervour and fashion of outward 
Fortitude, to all possible height of Heroicall Action; in the 
other, the Minds inward, constant, and unconquerd Empire; 
unbroken, unalterd, with any most insolent, and tyrannous 
infliction. 
Translators, in England and elsewhere, were not always pre­
cisely faithful, and they might work more or less from inter­
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mediaries, as North did from Amyot, but, thanks to their period, 
their motives, and their gifts, they wrote with racy vitality and 
flavor, not in "translators' English.'' 
We arrive at the heterogeneous mass of literature in the 
modern languages and, first of all, at imitation of the classics 
in these. To say a word about prose style, in our own age we 
assume that prose just gets written; there are no schools of 
theory and practice—unless the title be given to those who 
preach that there is no standard of good English, that whatever 
anyone uses is right. But sixteenth-century Europe inherited a 
concern with rhetoric which had been active since the Greeks, 
and England had its full share. Some Tudor prose, in the Book 
of Common Prayer or the Bible or Sir Thomas North, is both 
homely and magnificent, but much of it is immature and 
undisciplined. One effort to tidy it up was Euphuism, an English 
version of a European phenomenon. Ciceronian English had 
barely reached a first maturity in Hooker when Continental 
anti-Ciceronianism came in and brought about a repetition 
of what had occurred in ancient Rome. The Ciceronian period, 
which was adapted for the rotund utterance of public and 
accepted verities, gave way to Senecan and Tacitean prose of 
either a loose or a clipped and pointed kind. The new mode, 
like contemporary metaphysical poetry, lent itself to the tenta­
tive exploration of private, everyday experience, and, as we 
might expect, it was first employed by the early essayists. Bacon 
is a link between this movement and the later effort of scientists 
to achieve a bare, exactly denotative prose suitable for exposition. 
In poetry, imitation could be disastrously wrongheaded. Of 
the many poets who dreamed of writing the great modern epic, 
one was the prince of lyrists, Ronsard, who complacently 
warned the readers of his epic that if they did not have the 
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ancients in mind, it would be a dead weight in their hands; 
but there was no "if" about it. In his short poems Ronsard's 
classicism—which included the Hellenism of his time and 
group—was an active inspiration and discipline. In general, 
since our interest is in the positive and vital elements of Renais­
sance doctrine and practice, we may slight the manifestations 
of a shallow and barren classicism, such as snob appeal, neo­
paganism, dilettantism, pedantic formalism; corresponding dis­
eases attend all movements in all ages—witness nowadays the 
aberrations of some myth-and-symbol criticism or some abstract 
painting. It was the fault of individuals as well as the creed if 
for three or four centuries Europe was littered with epics and 
dramas frozen from birth in rigor mortis. We may remember 
George Brandes' happy phrase about Voltaire, that the man who 
respected little in heaven or earth respected the uniform caesura. 
In formal ways poets in the vernaculars carried on to some 
degree the same program as the neo-Latinists (and a number 
worked in both media). In addition to taking over the classical 
genres, sporadic or systematic attempts were made in Italy, 
France, and England to introduce classical meters; this idea of 
order was, in the infancy of modern poetry and in the more 
moderate theories, less mad than to our hindsight it may now 
appear. As for the dramatic rules codified from Aristotle and 
Horace, they, as everyone knows, did not win much authority 
in England, where the strength of medieval and popular tradi­
tion and individual genius brought about the great efflorescence 
of unclassical drama. The chief or only English neoclassicist 
was Ben Jonson, and Jonson was no Malherbe. In English non-
dramatic literature the most representative poet was Spenser, 
who, though he naturalized some classical genres in England, 
can hardly be called a classicist. It is a commonplace that his 
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poetry is a confluence of classical, Italian, French, and native 
traditions, but these are only elements in a pot more pregnant 
than Donne's, though modern critics—as distinguished from 
scholars—prefer ignoring him to understanding him. Here, how­
ever, we cannot do more than recall a few familiar points about 
his artistic and moral attitudes and his background. 
We often think of the pastoral as the most artificial of all 
poetic kinds, yet it had enough vitality to last for two thousand 
years, mainly because at the start Theocritus and Virgil had 
exploited not only its idyllic attractions but its value as a vehicle 
for any personal or public subject a poet wished to treat. While 
The Shepherd's Calendar, as poetry, has only minor claims upon 
us, it was a manifesto of a new mode, and it is a microcosmic 
specimen of Spenser's eclectic approach to his art. The title 
came from a popular almanac; the poet enthroned Chaucer as 
his tutelary genius; in the tradition of Bembo and the Pleiade, 
he revived much archaic diction; his very diverse metrical ex­
periments included both rough popular meters and sophisticated 
elegance; and some poems were topical and satirical. At the 
same time, Spenser used the forms and themes and materials 
of classical and Renaissance eclogues (with a novel framework); 
and "E.K.," as editor of The Shepherd's Calendar, though often 
mistaken, was at pains to stress the new poet's awareness of 
decorum and to link motifs, allusions, and rhetorical devices 
with ancient, medieval, and modern conventions. Also, E.K. 
recognized the pastoral as the appropriate first flight for a 
poet—a reminder that Virgil's career was or was becoming an 
established model. 
The Faerie Queene is not so readily pigeonholed, and Gabriel 
Harvey's phrase about an early sample of it is the first comment 
on its eclecticism. In that, Spenser went far beyond his modern 
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predecessors. The Renaissance, though happy to follow Aristotle 
in most things, departed from him in setting up the epic rather 
than tragedy as the supreme poetic genre, and, as we have 
observed, many poets dreamed of being the modern Homer or 
Virgil. But the great heroic poems of the sixteenth century, 
Orlando Furioso, Jerusalem Delivered, the husiad, and The 
Faerie Queene, are all more or less unclassical and more or less 
alive. The Italian debate over the Orlando—was it or was it not 
an epic?—reached the judicious conclusion that if Aristotle had 
known it, he would have approved. Ariosto, by the way, might 
be called the Ovid of the Renaissance; along with many specific 
debts, he had his own large stock of Ovidian inventiveness, 
buoyancy, and irony, and, we must add, the predominant lack 
of seriousness of a pure Ovidian artist. Tasso made his poem a 
unified if still highly romantic tale. If Spenser went beyond 
Tasso and even Ariosto in variety of matter and tone, he did 
so too in weighted subtlety of texture and in moral and religious 
depth and complexity. That depth and complexity can only 
be assumed or asserted here, but, as we all know, during the past 
forty years a number of scholarly critics have been expounding 
a new Spenser, freed from the blight of nineteenth-century 
misconceptions. 
Spenser's prefatory letter to Ralegh, with its soberly ethical 
interpretation of the great heroic poets, Homer, Virgil, Ariosto, 
and Tasso, is one small and familiar expression of the didactic 
theory of literature which the Renaissance inherited and devel­
oped. Certainly a great deal of Renaissance writing, like a great 
deal of ancient writing, was far from being morally instructive. 
None the less, the ancient theory of literature, from Plato and 
Aristotle to Horace and Plutarch, was strongly ethical or openly 
didactic; even the rowdy Aristophanes declared it the function of 
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poetry to make good citizens. Much Renaissance criticism, more 
Horatian and practical than Aristotelian, proclaimed the ex­
pressly didactic view that poetry should delight and move and 
thereby teach, and that view was shared by many imaginative 
writers. Even Ariosto had his allegory or exemplum of the 
temperate man, and Tasso contrived an allegory ex post facto. 
Spenser's declaration of his purpose everyone knows; likewise 
his use of both allegory and ethical types. Spingarn long ago 
began his standard book with the statement that "the first 
problem of Renaissance criticism was the justification of imag­
inative literature." The didactic justification followed two main 
lines. On the one hand, there was the tradition of allegorical 
truth contained in fiction, a doctrine which had been active 
before Plato and which was widely expounded and applied in 
the Middle Ages, notably by Boccaccio (who did not apply it 
to the Decameron). Until the recovery of Aristotle's Poetics, 
with its aesthetic principle of ideal imitation, the imaginative 
reality which has a universal truth beyond particulars, allegory 
was the only theoretical basis available for the defense of litera­
ture. Nor was it quickly displaced by Aristotle. It was appealed 
to by almost all the Elizabethan defenders of poetry, even by 
the easygoing Sir John Harington in the preface to his version 
of Ariosto. The notable exception was Sir Philip Sidney, who 
passed by allegory and invoked Aristotelian doctrine. At the 
same time, Sidney was fully in accord with his fellows, and 
with Renaissance criticism at large, in his repeated emphasis on 
the moral value of examples of virtue and vice—a concrete 
emphasis which, like most of the essay, is more Platonic than 
Aristotelian. To us, for whom contemporary fiction and drama 
rarely provide any but bad examples, the Renaissance creed 
may appear distressingly naive; yet it did not cripple, and 
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it surely helped to nourish, much of our greatest writing. The 
rebellious, naturalistic Renaissance had an immeasurable belief 
in the efficacy of moral exempla and sententiae. 
Reference to allegory and ideal examples invites a word about 
one conspicuous medium for both, classical mythology. This 
vein had been freely tapped in medieval literature for narrative, 
allusion, and allegorical meaning; and in the Renaissance these 
uses were carried to a plenitude and richness never approached 
again until the romantic age. On the purely literary plane, the 
handling of myth was the great illustration of ut pictura poesis, 
and its quality was paralleled on acres of canvas. Italianate 
warmth and lusciousness of description, which left the highly 
pictorial Ovid far behind, spread over all Europe. If such 
sensuousness—which embraced much more than mythology-
was one kind of Renaissance idealism that might be called 
neopagan, much of it was not. The flesh and the senses offered 
temptations to be overcome; Circe had many sisters and cousins. 
But even in the briefest allusions, mythological figures and 
images had a universal value. In Shakespeare and almost all 
poets, the gods and goddesses stand for ideal beauty and grace 
or greatness; they can be, as it were, pagan counterparts of the 
angels, types of superhuman power and passion. And simple 
idealism may be undercut by irony. Helen of Troy, whose face 
launched a thousand poets, was the supreme incarnation of 
mortal beauty and youth and love, the supreme object of the 
naairal man's desire—and yet, for the impassioned Faustus, she 
was an illusion of the devil and could not make him immortal 
with a kiss. 
Behind such glowing visions, such symbols of the super­
human, were Ovid and other poets old and new and also the 
mythographers whose dictionaries of myth included traditional 
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allegorical interpretations. Boccaccio's handbook was still in use 
but mainly superseded by later and more learned ones like 
that of Natalis Comes; even Bacon wrote a book in which he 
allegorized myths, mainly in scientific and civil or political 
terms. Renaissance poets, such as Spenser, Chapman, and Jon-
son, used these works as modern poets have used The Golden 
Bough. It is not easy to draw a line between naive allegorizing 
and sophisticated symbolism, and Renaissance literature has an 
abundance of both. Finally, there was the effort to reconcile 
pagan fiction with moral and Christian truth; the one could be 
seen as a distorted version of the other. Hence classical myth 
could be freely employed in Christian settings; Christ, the good 
shepherd, could be Pan, the god of shepherds. The young 
Milton illustrates the general flexibility: in his fifth Latin elegy, 
on the coming of spring, his senses revel innocently in mytho­
logical and sexual images of nature, while in the Nativity the 
birth of Christ puts the pagan divinities to rout. 
We come, finally, to the ethical, religious, and metaphysical 
beliefs and ideas that were a common heritage. It seems to me 
logically clear and historically sound to take the medieval 
tradition of Christian humanism as the main road and to see 
on one diverging road the increasing number of non-Christian 
humanists, the indifferent or skeptical, and, on a diverging road 
on the other side, the increasing and much larger number 
of non-humanistic Christians, Catholic and Protestant. Much 
Renaissance thought and literature cannot be understood if we 
slight the continuing impulse to reconcile nature and grace, 
pagan reason and Christian faith. On the philosophic plane, no 
one labored more zealously than Ficino, whom Professor Kris-
teller has expounded, to fuse Platonic philosophy with Chris­
tianity. On a more practical level was Erasmus, the Christian 
humanist par excellence, whose double aim was imitation of 
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classical wisdom and of Christ, who found prime allies in Plato 
and Cicero, and who distilled the two great saving traditions 
in that inspired phrase, "Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis." Many 
teachers, scholars, and writers, from Vittorino da Feltre to 
Milton, carried on the ideal of "virtue and good letters." Modern 
writers have often spoken of studia humanitatis as if the name 
implied opposition to theology; sometimes it did, but in the 
orthodox view these studies were complementary, not antago­
nistic. As Cicero, the oracle and model of Renaissance human­
ism, had said, sapientia is the knowledge of things human and 
divine. Or, as Aquinas had said, grace does not abolish nature 
but perfects it. The ancient and basic conflict between Augus­
tine and Pelagius was revived between Luther and Erasmus; 
Erasmus, with his ideal of rational religion and of human 
capacities, was charged with Pelagian exaltation of man at the 
expense of God and grace. Yet the rational Erasmus, in the 
midst of his survey of human folly and corruption, could sud­
denly startle his readers with a paradoxical glance at the 
supremely irrational folly of Christ and true Christians; such 
ironic idealism rises above even the Socratic, and it is hardly 
fanciful to leap over a century from Erasmus to Cervantes. 
Granted a large variety of religious and irreligious, philosophi­
cal and unphilosophical minds and writings, we are looking at 
the orthodox. Every student of English literature at least is 
familiar with that all-embracing principle of order, the great 
chain of being; the same hierarchical principle ordered the 
levels of society and the mental faculties of man. With the 
Christian doctrine of obedience to God was merged the ethical 
psychology of Plato and Aristotle, rational control of the irra­
tional appetites and passions. What God is in the macrocosmic 
universe, God-given reason is in the human microcosm. More­
over, this is not merely reason in our sense: it is the Christian­
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ized Stoic faculty of "right reason," recta ratio. Plato had 
provided the two necessary conditions for this concept, the 
existence of ethical-metaphysical absolutes and man's ability to 
apprehend them. Thus, although right reason can be misled by 
human weakness and although the truths necessary for salvation 
are known only through revelation, the collective right reason 
of mankind has established the laws of nature. Hence Richard 
Hooker can make what may seem a very bold affirmation for 
a divine: "The general and perpetual voice of men is as the 
sentence of God himself. For that which all men have at all 
times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and 
God being the author of Nature, her voice is but his instru­
ment." These words explain the philosophic basis of Christian 
humanism, the rational Christian's acceptance of pagan thought 
as, with all its deficiencies, a partial anticipation and natural 
ally of Christian faith. 
For many writers these and related doctrines might have little 
or no actuality, but all writers were more or less conditioned 
by living in a world theoretically or vehemently committed to 
a Catholic or Protestant creed. And very few writers, whatever 
their practice, would have denied Christianity itself. Some took 
a fideistic line and, like Montaigne, kept their religious belief 
or profession and their reason in separate compartments. For 
example, Montaigne quoted a phrase from Seneca which Samuel 
Daniel thus versified— 
And that unlesse above himselfe he can 
Erect himselfe, how poore a thing is man-
But the idea that Daniel approved, Montaigne rejected as 
exhibiting human presumption in a situation that only grace 
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could repair. With the Catholic Montaigne would be Luther, 
Calvin, and the darkly Calvinistic Fulke Greville, Daniel's 
patron and friend, while on Daniel's side would be, say, such 
Christian Stoics as Chapman and Jonson. This is one small 
example of ideological complexities. 
We might well ask ourselves where the greatest Renaissance 
writer stood, although a paragraph or two cannot get very far 
into a question on which many books have been written. We 
may be hesitant about trying to pin down the personal beliefs 
and attitudes of a poet who spoke through dramatic characters, 
yet modern interpreters seem to be pretty well agreed that 
Shakespeare shared the Protestant orthodoxy of his fellow citi­
zens, however far his imaginative insight might carry him 
beyond popular fundamentalism. Through the history plays 
runs the conception of Providence opposing human wicked­
ness, a conception found in the sources and in most contempo­
rary English historians, such as Sir Walter Ralegh. Hamlet is 
sustained by the same belief, and sees himelf as heaven's 
scourge and minister; and Malcolm, about to lead an avenging 
army against Macbeth, declares that "the powers above/ Put 
on their instruments." Apart from the innumerable specific 
allusions to matters of belief, which often seem to have more 
than dramatic authenticity, few readers would deny a Christian 
tone in plays as different as King Lear and The Tempest. 
To say this is not to go along with the more extreme argu­
ments for "the Christian Shakespeare" that recent times have 
brought forth. 
A poet like Chapman, who urgently expounds an ethical 
creed, can not only borrow ideas and illustrations but versify 
many and long segments from his humanistic sources, ancient 
and modern. While we expect no such thing in the undoc­
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trinaire Shakespeare, still, as we all know, he contains a good 
deal of Renaissance ideology. Whether or not he assimilated 
Montaigne, his background is not what T. S. Eliot unhappily 
described as "the mixed and muddled scepticism of the Renais­
sance." The most famous example of Shakespearian philosophiz­
ing is, of course, the speech of Ulysses in the third scene of 
Troilus and Cressida, the locus classicus for the principle of 
order and degree and the great chain of being. As Harry Levin 
has pointed out, the speaker, not Shakespeare, but a "wily 
strategist" in a crisis, treats the ideas of order "as a set of norms 
which are currently violated. Far from reaffirming the status quo, 
he reveals the abyss that so closely underlay the surfaces of Eliza­
bethan awareness. . . . Thence Ulysses continues, envisioning 
the cosmos as an unappeased struggle for power. . . .  " These 
cautionary words are well said; but at least the norms were there. 
Many have thought that in writing this speech Shakespeare 
remembered the opening pages of Elyot's Governor and Hooker; 
at any rate he was writing in the tradition they represent. Similar 
ideas come up again, in the Archbishop of Canterbury's speech 
in the second scene of Henry V and the gardener's scene in 
Richard II (IILiv). 
The middle station of man in the great chain of being had 
large implications. As Pico della Mirandola had said in his 
famous discourse, the Creator gave to man at his birth the 
capacity to sink to the animal or rise to the divine. A main 
source of the strength of Renaissance literature is the active 
sense of the perpetual contrast or conflict between the bestial 
and the angelic impulses in human nature, between what man 
is and what he would or could be. It is on that theme that 
Burton begins the Anatomy of Melancholy. It can be more or 
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less comic, as in Shakespearian comedy or Rabelais or Cervantes, 
or it can be tragic, with or without religious motives. When 
the naturalistic Montaigne expresses his general satisfaction with 
himself as he is, he does so in the hierarchical terms: he has 
neither an angel's conscience nor a horse's conscience but a 
man's conscience. The deeply troubled Donne uses similar 
terms to describe himself: 
I am a little world made cunningly 
Of Elements, and an Angelike spright; 
But blacke sinne hath betraid to endlesse night 
My worlds both parts, and (oh) both parts must die. 
There is no need of illustrating the constant operation of the 
double vision in Shakespeare. 
This rapid sketch, a partial summary of what everyone knows, 
has perhaps recalled enough signposts to justify the claims made 
for the conscious respect for tradition, the conscious quest of 
order, the predominant sanity of the Renaissance in its literary 
expression. To say this is not to say that the literature was tame 
and timid. Many names have reminded us that in this age the 
theory and practice of imitation led into the richest and boldest 
creativity (and that had its theory, too). It might be argued 
that of all ages in history the Renaissance was the most healthy; 
one sign of health is that it produced most of the great English 
tragedies and almost all the great English meditations on death. 
In life and in literature the age contained, in a kind of dynamic 
equilibrium, active traditionalism and active originality, elegant 
refinement and brutal violence, invincible idealism and destruc­
tive skepticism, the fact of disorder and the ideal of order. One 
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grand reason for the health and sanity, the heroic dimensions, of 
Renaissance writing is that this was the last age in which the 
fullest drama of the natural man was enacted against the reli­
gious background of good and evil, heaven and hell. And if not 
all men had a religious sense of good and evil, few could avoid 
looking up to some beings higher than themselves and worthy 
of imitation, whether the Greek and Roman authors and states­
men or the heroes of epic and romance or the gods of mythology 
or Christ and the angels and saints. On whatever level such 
beliefs and attitudes existed, Renaissance men were more likely 
than those of other ages to recognize their kinship with both 
the godlike and the bestial. 
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THE IMAGE OF MAN IN RENAISSANCE ART:

FROM DONATELLO TO MICHELANGELO

By 
H. W. Janson 
SINCE the Renaissance is a vast and complex area, I shall 
confine my remarks to a particular section of it: the Florentine 
Early and High Renaissance. Or, if we are to express these 
limits in political terms, the span of slightly more than a 
century that began about 1400 with Leonardo Bruni's Laudatio 
Florentinae Urbis and the city's successful defiance of Gian­
galeazzo Visconti and ended in 1512 with the re-entry of the 
Medici into Florence and the crushing of the republican spirit 
in the city. I propose, in other words, to include in my dis­
cussion the Michelangelo of the "David" but not the Michel­
angelo of the Medici tombs. Such a limitation is not wholly 
arbitrary; it will permit me to cover only one chapter of my 
subject—the new image of man in Renaissance art—but perhaps 
the decisive one: the creation of the new image in the first 
half of the fifteenth century and that phase of Michelangelo's 
art which still reflects his awareness of this basic achievement. 
After 1512, it seems to me, such an awareness plays a less and 
less significant part in Michelangelo's work. 
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I must acknowledge a further limitation: I have tried to 
confine myself to works of art about which we have sufficient 
data to let us see them, to some extent at least, as the Renais­
sance itself saw them. For the period under consideration, this 
is quite a severe limitation. Viewed in isolation, statues and 
paintings are mute witnesses, and direct verbal testimony about 
specific works of art is rare indeed until the mid-sixteenth 
century, the time of Vasari. Nor can we take Vasari's words 
at face value when they concern works of art created a century 
or more before his day. The Renaissance view of art and artists 
underwent decisive changes during the second quarter of the 
Cinquecento,1 so that we must use extreme caution in accepting 
judgments or interpretations of Early Renaissance art by Vasari 
and his contemporaries. If we want to learn how the men of 
the period 1400-1512 viewed the artistic achievements of their 
day, we shall have to rely very largely on indirect testimony-
evidence gathered from the unself-conscious statements in ac­
count books and similar records, from relationships we can 
discover among the works of art themselves, from inferences that 
may sometimes be drawn about the link between art and the 
political, intellectual, and social climate. There is only a limited 
number of instances in which we can hope to reconstruct the 
contemporary attitude toward a work of art without getting 
entangled in the vague generalities of Geistesgeschichte. Let us, 
then, try to be as specific as the present state of our knowledge 
permits. 
In our quest of the new image of man in Renaissance art, 
we are primarily concerned with sculpture, for several good 
reasons. Most obvious is the matter of chronological priority: 
Early Renaissance art begins with sculpture—if I had to give 
specific dates, I should say between 1408 and 1416—while 
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Renaissance architecture makes its appearance in 1419 with 
Brunelleschi's designs for the Ospedale degli Innocenti and the 
Old Sacristy of S. Lorenzo, and painting has to await the 
emergence of Masaccio in the early 1420*5. How did it happen 
that sculpture can claim this priority? We must, of course, give 
due credit to the individual genius of Donatello, but this genius 
could unfold only in the particular circumstances created by the 
spiritual climate of Florence during those decisive years. The 
new civic and republican humanism of Leonardo Bruni and his 
circle that made its appearance about 1400 gave birth to a vision 
of Florence as the modern counterpart of Periclean Athens,2 
and inspired a communal effort to beautify the city which in 
intensity and cost was entirely worthy of comparison with the 
art patronage of Athens during the later fifth century B.C. In 
Florence, this campaign meant first of all the completion of the 
unfinished artistic enterprises of earlier days; it began with the 
famous competition of 1401-3 for a second set of bronze doors 
for the Baptistery, then spread to the cathedral (the Porta della 
Mandorla, the facade, and the Campanile) and to the niches 
of Or San Michele. All these were sculptural tasks of great 
scope, challenging the best talent available. The most ambitious 
task of all, to be sure, was to build the long-projected dome of 
the cathedral, but this took so much deliberation that it did 
not get under way until 1420. Thus, for almost twenty years, 
the sculptors were the main beneficiaries of this great surge of 
communal art patronage. They had to work in a medieval 
setting, it is true, yet they soon managed to explode this frame­
work and to create an image of man utterly unmedieval and 
attuned to the civic-patriotic humanism of the time. 
Even if the painters had shared in the new art patronage 
from the start, I rather think the sculptors would have been in 
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the van. For the image of man, in the most concrete, physical 
sense, is after all the central theme of sculpture anywhere and 
at any time; or at least of sculpture in the full meaning of the 
word, i.e., sculpture in the round and on a monumental scale, 
sculpture conceived as self-sufficient, free-standing statues rather 
than as the handmaiden of architecture. Sculpture thus denned 
had not been produced since the end of the Roman Empire-
all medieval sculpture is "applied sculpture," whether or not 
it be physically in the round. Of course, most of medieval 
painting, too, is "applied," since it appears on surfaces such as 
walls, windows, altar frontals, or book pages, whose primary 
purpose was not to serve as carriers for images. Still, through 
the icons of Byzantine art, the tradition of ancient panel 
painting (that is, painting on surfaces that had no other pur­
pose than to be painted on) survived throughout the Middle 
Ages and ultimately gave rise to the modern easel picture. The 
free-standing statue, on the other hand, survived neither in 
Byzantium nor in the medieval West (the last recorded instance 
is the statue of a Byzantine emperor made in the late eighth 
century). The reason is obvious: free-standing statues were 
"idols" par excellence. The early Christian fathers—I am think­
ing especially of a famous passage by Arnobius3—had expended 
great powers of rhetoric in trying to persuade their readers that 
the statues of the gods were not "real" but merely convenient 
depositories for the droppings of birds, yet the faith in the 
magic power of such statues would not die out. Only by plac­
ing sculpture in the service of the Church—and I mean this 
quite literally: by applying sculpture to church architecture-
could the Middle Ages take the curse off monumental statuary. 
A statue standing unabashedly on its own two feet without 
being imprisoned by its architectural context was unthinkable. 
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Not that all free-standing statues of ancient times were destroyed 
as idols in the Middle Ages; we know that a small number of 
them survived in public view, such as the statues on the Lateran 
in Rome, which included the equestrian monument of Marcus 
Aurelius (rechristened Constantine the Great) and the Spinario, 
or Thorn Puller.4 Occasionally such statues would turn up 
elsewhere as well. But no medieval artist dared to imitate them 
as free-standing figures; their poses or outlines were often bor­
rowed, but always with a change of meaning and with a change 
from free to applied status. Clearly, these statues, especially if 
nude, retained some of their old magic; they were still looked 
upon as "the seats of demons," good or bad. Of the large 
number of medieval accounts attesting this fact,5 let me cite 
just one, which I have chosen because it is so close in time to 
the Early Renaissance and can be linked to a fascinating visual 
example. About 1300—we do not know exactly when—there 
was discovered in Siena a nude Venus statue of the pudica 
type (the best-known example is the Medici Venus), inscribed 
with the name of Lysippus. The famous Greek sculptor, men­
tioned by Pliny and other Roman authors, had not been for­
gotten in the Middle Ages; the Sienese were delighted with 
their find, and after a while placed the figure atop the fountain 
in front of their city hall, a place of honor and responsibility 
that gave this particular statue something of the rank of a 
protective deity, like the tyche statues of ancient cities. It was 
thus quite natural that the Lysippean Venus should be held 
accountable for the fortunes of mid-fourteenth century Siena; 
and since these were largely misfortunes—we recall the plague 
of 1348—the city government decided, apparently in response to 
popular pressure, to get rid of the statue. A resolution passed by 
the city council in that year pronounced the figure inhonestum 
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(indecent) but did not specify what should be done with it 
after its removal from the fountain. According to a somewhat 
later account, the Venus was broken into pieces and buried on 
Florentine soil, so that she might transfer her evil qualities to 
the enemy.6 This Venus—or perhaps another one or the same 
type—appears on the Pisa Cathedral pulpit by Giovanni Pisano 
(Fig. i ) , in the astonishing role of one of the cardinal virtues.7 
(Shortly before, Giovanni Pisano had been in charge of the 
sculptural program of Siena Cathedral and thus must have seen 
the Lysippean Venus if she was discovered while he was there.) 
This is a case unique in all of medieval art, and I suspect that 
in order to account for it we must assume that Giovanni Pisano 
wanted to take the curse off the Venus by giving her a place 
in the Christian scheme of things, symbolically speaking, and 
by putting her to use in the physical sense as well, since she 
is combined with four other figures that form one of the sup­
ports of the pulpit. Let us note, also, that he has been careful 
to deprive her of all sensuous appeal and to concentrate expres­
sion in the face; whereas in ancient nude statues, it is the body, 
rather than the face, that speaks to us most eloquently. (The 
loincloth, amusingly enough, is a modern addition.) 
Against this background, it becomes understandable why the 
revival of the free-standing, self-sufficient statue was the first 
achievement of Early Renaissance art, an achievement that 
signals a radically unmedieval image of man. While ancient 
painting was barely known before the end of the Quattrocento, 
the free-standing statue was a primary symbol of that classical 
humanity whose modern heirs the Florentines of Leonardo 
Bruni's time had declared themselves to be. The other great 
visible symbol of the glories of antiquity was, of course, classical 
architecture, to which the young Brunelleschi devoted such 
(82) 
The Image of Man in Renaissance Art 
painstaking study in Rome before he emerged, toward 1420, 
as the father of Renaissance architecture. But by then the new 
image of man in statuary form had already been coined. The 
new style in painting, that of Masaccio, needed both these 
precedents in order to become a reality. 
Interestingly enough, sculpture maintains its priority even in 
the field of art theory, another great achievement of the Early 
Renaissance. Its founder, Leone Battista Alberti, was a humanist 
who came to the practice of art through his interest in art 
theory. He wrote three famous treatises, on sculpture, painting, 
and architecture; and that on sculpture has now been clearly 
established as the earliest, composed about 1430.8 It is entitled, 
characteristically, De statua, and deals almost entirely with the 
free-standing statue. Moreover, Alberti is at pains to explain the 
origin of sculpture, while the origin of painting has little interest 
for him. His thesis, briefly stated, is that sculpture came into 
existence when some of our distant ancestors whose imagina­
tions were so inclined became aware that certain tree trunks 
and clumps of earth suggested natural shapes (he implies the 
shape of human bodies). By modifying the tree trunks and 
clumps of earth, these people endeavored to make the resem­
blance more perfect, and eventually they learned how to achieve 
such a resemblance even if their material did not suggest it. 
Alberti's etiological theory, amazingly modern in its psycho­
logical implications, is not borrowed from the ancients.9 It repre­
sents, I believe, an attempt to establish a solid basis for his 
definition of sculpture as free-standing statuary rather than as 
"applied sculpture." At the time he wrote down these thoughts, 
he probably had already become a friend of Donatello, the 
actual creator of the new image of man; and it may be no mere 
coincidence that the first life-size free-standing nude statue 
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created since the end of antiquity, Donatello's bronze "David" 
(Fig. 2), dates from the same years in which De statua was 
composed. 
Let us now trace the road from Giovanni Pisano's Gothic 
"Venus'* to Donatello's bronze "David." It so happens that we 
can do this in some detail, and with enough testimony from 
contemporary records to lend conviction to our reading of the 
visual evidence. Our starting point is a pair of marble figures 
of 1408, the earliest known works—and very likely the first life-
size statues—by Nanni di Banco and Donatello (Figs. 3 and 4). 
Today they are physically separated: Donatello's "David" is 
in the Museo Nazionale, Nanni's "Isaiah" in the cathedral. 
But they were clearly meant to be companion pieces, dependent 
on each other in their complementary body curves. These curves 
are still Gothic, and this is hardly surprising, since both figures 
were intended to crown the buttresses on the north side of 
Florence Cathedral.10 Such statues—an entire cycle of prophets 
and apostles—had been planned long before, as we can see from 
the mid-fourteenth century representation of Florence Cathedral 
by Andrea da Firenze (Fig. 14); and all of these statues have 
the quality of curvilinear ornaments sprouting from the rigidly 
vertical buttresses to which they are anchored (and of which 
they are, in a sense, the outgrowth). Neither the "Isaiah" nor 
the "David" stands on its own two feet. They stand, rather, on 
their drapery, in the Gothic fashion. These folds are firmly 
united with the base, and both artists still rely on the material 
strength of the marble, not the inner balance of the bodies, to 
make their statues stand upright. Yet we also feel hints of an 
allegiance to ancient sculpture in the thrust-out right hip of 
the "Isaiah" and in his youthfulness, so different from the tradi­
tional image of Old Testament prophets in medieval art (who 
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are almost invariably old, and usually bearded.) Since tbe 
"Isaiah" was commissioned some months before the "David," 
Nanni made the basic decision in choosing this youthful type; 
Donatello had to follow his example, not only in the comple­
mentary body curve of his figure, but in representing David, 
too, as a youth. He might have shown him as a young king. 
Instead, he preferred the shepherd boy triumphing over Goliath. 
We know of only one earlier image of the victorious youthful 
David on a monumental scale, a fresco by Taddeo Gaddi of 
the 1330's (Fig. 6), which provided the iconographic precedent 
for Donatello's statue. Artistically, however, Donatello owes 
nothing to Gaddi. His figure, less weighty and less aggressively 
plastic than Nanni's, reflects the lithe elegance of Ghiberti's 
style in both drapery and posture. We also note that the "David" 
has a more assured stance than the "Isaiah," and that the mirror-
image symmetry of the two is not consistent in some details. 
David's right hand, which ought to hold the prophet's scroll, 
actually held the strap of the sling (the strap was of metal and 
is now lost, but the drill holes for its attachment can still be 
seen). As I have tried to show elsewhere, the symmetry of the 
two statues was originally complete; such departures from it as 
we observe today were introduced when Donatello recarved 
parts of his figure in 1416.11 As a matter of fact, we can still 
trace the "ghost" of the scroll on the bare patch of drapery 
over the right upper leg of the "David." Similarly, the odd bits 
of drapery below the left hand originally extended as far down­
ward as the drapery over the right leg of the "Isaiah," largely 
obscuring the left leg of the "David." Why these modifications? 
Before we can answer this question, we must ask another: Why 
weren't the two statues placed on their buttresses as intended? 
The "Isaiah" actually reached his destination, but the statue 
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was taken down again after a short while because it was found 
too small to be effective at such a height; and the "David" was 
simply put in storage for the time being. This decision was 
made by the Opera del Duomo, the public body in charge of 
the cathedral workshop, and it was a revolutionary one, unthink­
able before that time. Gothic cathedrals, north and south of the 
Alps, abound with statuary at all levels from the ground, but 
the scale of these figures is not governed by their distance from 
the beholder. After all, they were made ad majorem gloriam dei, 
so that their visibility to human eyes could not be a determining 
factor. Yet that is exactly what the decision of the cathedral 
workshop implies with respect to the "Isaiah" and the "David." 
Two years later, the Opera commissioned Donatello to make 
another prophet for one of the buttresses, a Joshua of brick 
and plaster, which was intended as a temporary figure, to be 
replaced by a marble version if its size proved to be right.12 
That statue, demolished in the seventeenth century because of 
its poor condition, was no less than eighteen feet tall, or three 
times the height of the "David" of 1408! Its effect must have 
been dramatic—it came to be regarded as one of Donatello's 
chief claims to fame13—but the task of replacing it with a 
marble version and of completing the entire series on the same 
scale was overwhelming. We shall return to this problem shortly. 
For the moment, let us note that in Florence, about 1410, we 
find the first colossal statue since antiquity, inspired not by the 
classical precedents then known, such as the remains of the 
colossal statue of Constantine on view at the Lateran, but 
by a thoroughly modern consideration, the eye measure that 
demanded such a huge scale because of the distance of the 
statue from the beholder.14 
C86)

PLATE I

FIG. 1. (left).—Giovanni Pisano. "Virtue." Detail of the marble pulpit, Pisa Cathedral. 1302-10. 
(Photograph: Alinari.) 
FIG. 2 (right).—Donatello. Bronze "David." Museo Nazionale, Florence, ca. 1430—32. (Photo­
graph: Alinari-Brogi.) 
PLATE II

FIG. 3 (left).-Nanni di Banco. "Isaiah." Florence Cathedral. 1408. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
FIG. 4 (right).-DonateWo. Marble "David." Museo Nazionale, Florence. 1408; modified 1416. 
( Photograph: Alinari-Brogi.) 
PLATE III

FIG. 5 (ZefO.-Donatello. "St. Mark." Or San Michele, Florence. 1411-13. (Photograph: 
Alinari-Brogi.) 
FIG. 6 (right).-Taddco Gaddi. "David." Baroncelli Chapel, S. Croce, Florence, ca. 1330-35. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
PLATE IV

FIG. 7 (left).—Michelangelo. "David." Accademia, Florence. 1501-4. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
FIG. 8 (right).—Donatello. "St. George." Museo Nazionale, Florence, ca. 1416. (Photograph: 
Alinari-Brogi.) 
PLATE V

FIG. 9 —Nanni di Banco. "Four Saints" ("Quattro Coronati"). Or San Michele, Florence, ca. 
1410-14. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
PLATE VI

FIG. 10 (JefO.-Donatello. "Beardless Prophet." Museo dell'Opera del Duomo, Florence. 1416-18. (Photograph: Alinari-Brogi.) 
FIG. 11 (right).—Donatello. "Bearded Prophet." Museo dell'Opera del Duomo, Florence. 1418— 
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Pic. 21.—"Head of Antinous." Museo Archeologico, Florence, ca. 125 A.D. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
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FIG. 22 (left).—Donatello. "Angel with Tambourine." Staatliche Museen, Berlin-Dahlem. 1429.

FIG. 23 (right).—Michelangelo. "David." Pen drawing, Cabinet des Dessins, Louvre, Paris. 1501.
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FlG
- 24.-Bernardo Rossellino. Tomb of Leonardo Bruni. S. Croce, Florence, ca. 1445-50. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
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FIG. 25.—Doorway of the Pantheon, Rome. ca. 115-25 A.D. (Photograph: Alinari.) 
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Meanwhile, however, a most interesting fate awaited the 
"David" of 1408. In 1416, the city government urgently re­
quested its transfer from the storerooms of the cathedral to the 
Palazzo Vecchio, the city hall, where it was placed against a 
wall in one of the great public rooms. We do not know who 
conceived this idea or what particular occasion prompted the 
request. An informed guess, however, would be that the sug­
gestion came from one of the humanists prominent in the city 
government, such as Leonardo Bruni, and that the occasion was 
some anticipated visit by an important political figure whom 
the city fathers wanted to impress, symbolically, with that 
Florentine resolution in the face of external threats which had 
enabled the city to resist Giangaleazzo Visconti at the turn of 
the century. That such was indeed the new role of the "David" 
is evident from the inscription attached to the statue once it 
was installed in the Palazzo Vecchio: "To those who bravely 
fight for the fatherland, the gods will lend aid even against 
the most terrible foes." The plural, "gods," is especially piquant 
in relation to an Old Testament hero; but Donatello had 
endowed the head of his David with a victory wreath from the 
very start and thus given him something of the cast of a classical 
victor. Now that the statue had become a civic-patriotic symbol, 
the victory aspect had to be emphasized, and it was for that 
purpose that Donatello recarved some portions of it. He removed 
the prophet's scroll as superfluous, and exposed the left leg to 
stress the assurance—indeed, the insouciance—of the hero's 
stance. One is almost tempted to describe this pose as a pre­
cocious instance of sprezzatura, that studied lack of conscious 
effort which played so important a part in Cinquecento art 
theory.15 
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In exposing the left leg of his David, Donatello superimposed 
his style of 1416 on a figure carved eight years before. It was 
these eight years that made all the difference; for in the mean­
time, he had re-created the free-standing statue. The occasion 
was again one of the great communal artistic campaigns, the 
filling of the empty niches on the exterior of the church of the 
Florentine guilds, Or San Michele. The plan had been con­
ceived many years before, but nothing much had been done 
about it until 1410, when the city government enjoined all the 
guilds to provide statues for their niches or forfeit the right to 
do so. Here, too, Nanni di Banco and Donatello worked side 
by side, and again a comparison of their work is instructive. 
Nanni's earliest niche holds the Quattro Coronati, patron saints 
of the stonecarvers (Fig. 9). Since these four martyrs, whose 
individual identity is obscure, formed a unit, the artist had to 
fill the niche with four statues rather than a single figure. Their 
style, especially that of the second, third, and fourth figure 
from the left, is strikingly reminiscent of classical statues—far 
more so than is the "Isaiah" of 1408. Still, Nanni could not yet 
free himself of the medieval habit of thinking in terms of 
"applied" sculpture: each statue is placed against a pilaster, so 
that it functions like the statues attached to columns on the 
jambs of Gothic church portals. And, in order to stress the 
dependence of the figures on their architectural setting, Nanni 
has taken a bite out of the niche floor, so to speak, reducing it 
to a semicircular ledge (and thus pinning the statues against 
the pilasters). About the same time, 1411-13, Donatello filled 
the niche of the linen weavers with a St. Mark (Fig. 5).16 
Here, at one stroke, we find ourselves in the Early Renaissance, 
although the niche itself is no less Gothic than that of the 
Quattro Coronati. This statue no longer depends on its setting 
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for support; it could stand with perfect poise and assurance 
anywhere. Unlike the earlier figures discussed here, it sustains 
itself on its own two legs, displaying that complex internal body 
balance, or contrapposto, familiar in classical statues (which in 
every other respect it resembles far less than do the Quattro 
Coronati). It is the first statue since antiquity constructed on a 
vertical line—the axis of gravity—linking the top of the head 
with the heel of the "engaged leg" (the leg carrying the main 
weight of the body), and the first statue since antiquity that 
can be said to have been conceived as a nude body subsequently 
covered with clothing: the drapery now no longer plays its own 
rhythmic game of curvilinear folds, but follows—and thus con­
veys to the beholder—the body forms underneath. This, then, is 
the earliest post-medieval image of man we know, an image of 
the human body conceived as a functional, articulated mech­
anism sustained by muscular power. Donatello makes this clear, 
apart from everything we have observed so far, by placing the 
statue on a cushion (the earliest case of its kind), an elastic 
support that yields under the weight of the body, with the 
engaged leg causing a deeper imprint than the free leg. What 
device could be better calculated to remove the flavor of "stoni­
ness" that still clings to the two prophets of 1408 and the 
Quattro Coronati? 
In his next niche statue, the "St. George" of ca. 1416, carved 
for the armorers' guild (Fig. 8),17 Donatello took a further step. 
The figure now begins to protrude beyond the front plane of 
the niche, because the engaged leg (the left one in this instance) 
is placed forward, so as to endow the statue with a sense of 
alertness, of readiness for combat, or prontezza (as the artist's 
contemporaries called it).18 With this physical tension goes a 
new psychological alertness, a strained gaze from under knitted 
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eyebrows—our first encounter with that calculated dominance 
over the beholder which, in the hands of Michelangelo, became 
the quality called terribilitd (see Fig. 7). Had Donatello been 
called upon at this point to produce a free-standing statue for 
the center of a courtyard or public square, he would have been 
fully capable of doing so. Public art patronage, however, did 
not yet afford him this opportunity. The closest he could come 
to it was to transfer something of the vigor of his "St. George" 
to the "David" of 1408 in the Palazzo Vecchio. 
Until now Donatello, unlike Nanni di Banco, had not intro­
duced any overt references to classical sculpture into his work. 
The contrapposto of the "St. Mark" reflects the stance of an 
ancient statue in a very general way, but it was only the princi­
ple, not the external appearance, that the artist had taken over. 
This situation was to change dramatically from about 1416 
onward: Nanni di Banco, in his last work, the "Assumption of 
the Virgin," above the Porta della Mandorla of Florence Cathe­
dral Qca. 1418-21), relinquished his classicism and achieved 
an utterly novel dynamic style,19 while Donatello during these 
years betrayed an ever keener interest in ancient sculpture. After 
the basic conquests of the "St. Mark" and the "St. George," he 
needed the inspiration of ancient art in order to arrive at a 
full definition of his new image of man. His main project of 
the decade following the "St. George" was a series of prophet 
statues for the Campanile of Florence Cathedral, a commission 
he shared with some lesser sculptors who followed his lead.20 
The Gothic niches of the Campanile were far more confining 
than were those of Or San Michele. Since they were not only 
tall and narrow but high above the street level, Donatello could 
not repeat what he had done in the case of the "St. George," i.e., 
let the statues protrude from their niches in order to establish 
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their rapport with the beholder. The four figures I shall discuss 
show him groping for a solution and finding it, triumphantly, 
in the end. Although these statues are amply documented, their 
individual identities remain in doubt; apart from one instance, 
the records refer to them simply as "prophets" without giving 
their names. We can thus call the earliest of the series only 
"the beardless prophet" (Figs. 10 and 15). The statue shows 
the conventional medieval type—an old man in long garments 
displaying a large scroll—except for the head, which is its most 
impressive feature. This clean-shaven, thoroughly individualized 
face with its sharply cut lines clearly reflects a republican Roman 
portrait such as the specimen in Fig. 16. A strange and in­
congruous union! Donatello must have felt this, for his second 
prophet (Fig. 11) represents a different alternative: the bearded 
head is not portraitlike at all—it recalls the type of the "St. Mark" 
—but the whole concept of the figure no longer suggests the 
traditional prophet type. The scroll has almost disappeared; 
it is rolled up and held in the left hand, whose main function 
is to support the right arm, which reaches up to the chin. This 
gesture, here meant to convey deep meditation, is thoroughly 
familiar in classical art as a gesture of mourning. There are 
countless examples of it in funerary sculpture and in repre­
sentations of captive barbarians.21 Donatello interpreted it as 
expressing concentrated thought; his aim must have been to 
give this prophet the appearance of an ancient philosopher, and 
he has come astonishingly close to matching the spirit, if not 
the detail, of classical statues of philosophers (which, in all 
likelihood, were not known to him). The third prophet (Figs. 
12 and 17), nicknamed "Zuccone" (bald-head), is an intensified 
synthesis of the previous two. The scroll is now tucked away 
beneath the right hand, the great mantle descending from the 
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left shoulder strongly suggests a Roman toga, and the sleeveless 
undergarment is just as obviously of classical inspiration. In the 
fascinating ugliness of the head, we find qualities reflecting 
the two great periods of Roman portraiture, the republican and 
the third century A.D. (compare Figs. 16, 18). Here, then, is 
an integrated, and radical, reinterpretation of a biblical prophet. 
But what thoughts was the "Zuccone" meant to evoke in the 
contemporary beholder's mind? Clearly he is not a philosopher 
like his meditative predecessor. Instead of being withdrawn into 
the world of his thoughts, he seems to address the crowd down 
below—note that his mouth is partly open. This impression is 
recorded in the Renaissance anecdote that Donatello, while at 
work on the "Zuccone," used to shout at him, "Speak, speak, 
or the plague take you!" The statue thus suggests a figure from 
the world of antiquity, but a figure devoid of idealization or 
classical balance. What was the type that Donatello wanted to 
revive and to equate with the prophets of the Old Testament? 
There can be only one answer: the "Zuccone" is the biblical 
counterpart of a Roman republican rhetor, a kind of Cato 
preaching civic virtue, liberty, and patriotic fervor. He is, in 
short, the tangible embodiment of the historic vision of Leonardo 
Bruni and his circle, with its exaltation of the free cities of 
ancient Etruria, of republican Rome, of the city republic of 
Athens. In the guise of a religious subject, Donatello has created 
a monument to the political ethos of Florentine humanism. No 
wonder the statue won lasting popularity almost at once, a 
popularity reflected in the large number of anecdotes that came 
to cluster around it. The final member of the series, later dubbed 
"Jeremiah," 22 repeats the same idea; because of the exposed right 
shoulder, he comes even closer to the appearance of an ancient 
hero, and his forensic spirit is equally pronounced (Figs. 13 
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and 19). The two figures were always linked in the popular 
imagination of Florence. Characteristically enough, that they 
represented biblical prophets seems to have been forgotten 
soon after they were put on public display. From the early 
Cinquecento onward, the sources refer to them as portrait statues 
of Francesco Soderini and Giovanni di Barduccio Cherichini. 
This, of course, is nonsense, factually speaking, but the story 
fits the character of the statues very well indeed. It must have 
arisen during the brief interval between the expulson of the 
Medici and their return, when the city was governed once more 
according to its traditional republican institutions, under a 
Gonfaloniere who was a descendant of the Francesco Soderini 
supposedly portrayed by the "Zuccone" or the "Jerermah-" More­
over, Francesco Soderini and Giovanni di Barduccio Cherichini 
both were conspicuously involved in the banishment of Cosimo 
de' Medici from Florence in 1433. Three-quarters of a century 
later, their anti-Medicean politics earned them the status of 
heroes of republican virtue, and identification with Donatello's 
statues. 
Discounting the gigantic "Joshua" of ca. 1410 (which, apart 
from its size, probably did not look very different from the 
"David" of 1408), Donatello by the end of the third decade 
of the century had not yet produced a statue that was free­
standing in fact as well as in spirit. This, it seems, became 
possible only about 1430. At that time the artist received two 
commissions for such works, one public and one private. The 
former, unfortunately, is lost: it was a figure of "Dovizia" 
(Wealth), a female personification analogous to Fortuna or 
Tyche, atop a column in the center of the Mercato Vecchio, 
the old market square of Florence. In the seventeenth century 
it was replaced by a baroque statue, since it had been badly 
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damaged by wind and weather (the material was either marble 
or limestone). We do not even have an adequate visual record 
of its appearance; it was placed too high above the ground for 
anybody to sketch it in detail, and general views of the old 
market give us only a vague suggestion of what the "Dovizia" 
looked like. From contemporary records, however, we know that 
the figure enjoyed great popularity, and that it must have been 
done about the same time as the Prato pulpit, or ca. 1430. The 
column form was, of course, the classic way of displaying a 
free-standing statue, a method well remembered in the Middle 
Ages, for there were countless representations of pagan idols 
on columns in medieval art.23 
The other commission, from an unknown but surely private 
source, produced the famous bronze "David" (Fig. 2), the first 
free-standing bronze statue since antiquity and the first life-size 
free-standing nude.24 Its pose contains reminiscences of the 
"David" of 1408, but the most daring—and still rather enigmatic 
—aspect of the figure is its nudity. It has been accounted for 
in a number of ways; iconographically, it could be the nudity 
of humility,25 or the nudity of the "athlete of virtue," an early 
Christian concept identifying the athletic contests of Greece 
with the quest for Christian virtue.26 Be that as it may, the 
most striking fact about the bronze "David" is not that it is 
nude but that it is nude in the classical sense; Donatello here 
recaptures the full sensuous beauty of the nude body, the 
element that had been so conspicuously absent from Giovanni 
Pisano's copy of the Lysippean Venus. It is part of this classical 
quality of the bronze "David" that the body is more eloquent 
than the face, which by Donatello's standards seems oddly 
impersonal and emotionally neutral (Fig. 20). It reminds us 
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of the Antinous heads in Roman art (Fig. 21). Perhaps it is 
no mere chance that Hadrian's favorite, too, was often repre­
sented nude, although Donatello probably did not know such 
statues. There is yet another likely motivation for the nudity 
of the bronze "David": its date coincides with that of Alberti's 
treatise De statua, which deals at length with the structure and 
proportions of the nude body.27 
Much as one would like to think that Donatello actually 
saw (and adapted to his and Alberti's conception) an ancient 
life-size statue of a nude youth, the classical inspiration of the 
bronze "David" probably reached Donatello by a less direct 
path, through small bronze statuettes of Etruscan or Roman 
manufacture. These, we know, were available and highly appre­
ciated in the Early Renaissance, before excavations in Rome 
during the sixteenth century brought to light ancient marble 
figures of monumental scale in such quantity as to redefine the 
Renaissance appreciation of classical sculpture. The immediate 
ancestors of the bronze "David" in Donatello's oeuvre are the 
three bronze statuettes of nude angel putti which Donatello did 
in 1429 for the central tabernacle of the font in the baptistery 
of Siena Cathedral.28 The finest of them (Fig. 22) was stolen 
and is now in the Berlin Museum. From the appearance of 
this enchanting little figure—its height is fourteen inches—we 
would never surmise that it was made as a piece of architectual 
sculpture in miniature. Completely free and balanced in move­
ment, turning on its base with spontaneous joie de vivre, it has 
all the unself-conscious, natural state of nudity that is the 
heritage of the classical putto. There can be little doubt, even 
though we have no matching example, that its source of in­
spiration was an ancient small bronze. Here the nudity, being 
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that of a child, is non-controversial, while that of the "David" 
undoubtedly needed justification along the lines I suggested 
above. 
We do not know the original location of the bronze "David." 
The statue enters the known records only in the 1460's, when it 
stood in the courtyard of the Medici Palace in Florence. After 
the expulsion of the Medici in 1494, it came to share the fate 
of the marble "David"; transferred to the courtyard of the 
Palazzo Vecchio, it, too, became a public monument, a civic 
symbol like the earlier figure. At that time the bronze "David" 
so impressed the French ambassador that he requested in 1501 
to have a replica made and offered to pay the cost of the cast­
ing.29 It was in response to this wish that the young Michel­
angelo made his first "David," a bronze statue, now lost, which 
followed the lines of Donatello's. We know its appearance from 
one of the master's drawings (Fig. 23). 
What had happened, meanwhile, to the project of those 
colossal statues for the buttresses of Florence Cathedral? After 
Donatello's provisional "Joshua" of ca. 1410, he and Brunelleschi 
were paid for some small-scale models,30 but that is the last 
we hear of the matter for several decades. A marble block of 
the right size was eventually procured, but no Florentine 
sculptor of the later Quattrocento was capable of carving an 
eighteen-foot statue from it, and the attempt was abandoned 
once more. Finally, in 1501, the cathedral authorities turned 
this huge block over to Michelangelo, who made it into his 
famous marble "David" (Fig. 7), the companion or replacement 
of Donatello's "Joshua" on the north side of the cathedral. Yet, 
like the "David" of 1408, Michelangelo's "David" never reached 
its intended location. It, too, was taken away from the cathedral 
authorities by municipal action and erected in front of the 
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Palazzo Vecchio—the third, and most impressive, civic-patriotic 
symbol of the Florentine republic.31 Artistically, too, it sums up 
the entire long development that began in 1408, combining the 
colossal size of the "Joshua," the nudity of the bronze "David," 
the conversion from a religious to a civic purpose first experi­
enced by Donatello's marble "David" in 1416, and the prontezza, 
the agressive alertness, of the "St. George." 
In closing, we must refer once more to Leonardo Bruni, the 
most important of the intellectual godfathers of the new image 
of man. It is an oddly symbolic circumstance that Bruni's tomb 
in S. Croce (Fig. 24) should be the earliest complete formu­
lation of a Renaissance funerary monument and the model for 
countless later ones. The new image of man that we saw 
emerging in the statues of Donatello also demanded a new 
image of man in relation to death, but the latter emerged only 
in 1445-50, while Donatello was absent from Florence.32 Had 
he been available at the time of Bruni's death in March 1444, 
he surely would have been asked to carve the great humanist's 
tomb; under the circumstances, the commission fell to a younger 
and lesser master, Bernardo Rossellino, only recently established 
in Florence. His chief qualification, it seems, was that he had 
worked in Arezzo, Bruni's home town, and thus was well known 
to the Aretines, who took a great interest in the monument 
honoring their most distinguished native son.33 The importance 
of the Bruni tomb rests less on the quality of its sculpture than 
on the concept of the entire design; and this we cannot credit 
to Rossellino alone. He must have had at least the advice of a 
far more important artist, charged by the Florentine authorities 
with the task of seeing to it that the Bruni tomb was fully 
worthy of the deceased. This man, it has been suggested, was 
Leone Battista Alberti, and I believe this hypothesis, although 
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generally disregarded nowadays, has a good deal of plausi­
bility.34 Bruni himself had no faith in funerary monuments. 
In his will, he requested burial in S. Croce under a plain marble 
slab. We know from a famous letter he wrote in 1429-30 to 
Poggio Bracciolini about the tomb of another humanist, Barto­
lommeo Aragazzi, that he thought nobody with any faith in 
his own fame should want a conspicuous tomb, since deeds 
alone insure everlasting memory.35 Yet it is exactly the idea of 
fame that dominates the design of the Bruni tomb and dis­
tinguishes it from all its predecessors. Medieval tombs were 
based on the juxtaposition of time and eternity: man's fleeting 
presence on this earth as against the destiny of his immortal 
soul. The former aspect is conveyed by the effigy of the deceased 
on its bier and the inscription stating his name, his rank or 
office, and the date of his death; the latter aspect by religious 
imagery such as the Resurrection of Christ, the Man of Sorrows, 
Christ in Majesty, the Madonna, and so forth. Of all this, there 
is barely a hint in the Bruni tomb; the only religious element 
is the Madonna with angels in the lunette, which certainly 
does not dominate the monument as a whole. There is, to be 
sure, the effigy, but Bruni looks as if he were peacefully slum­
bering, and various details record the state funeral specially 
arranged for Bruni. According to the description by Vespasiano 
da Bisticci,36 it was a ceremony "in the manner of the ancients," 
with the corpse dressed in the same silk robe Bruni had worn 
in life, and with a copy of his famous History of Florence placed 
in his hands. (That is clearly what the heavy tome on the 
chest of the effigy is intended to represent.) The climax of the 
funeral was the crowning of Bruni's head with a laurel wreath; 
and that, too, is shown in the effigy. Moreover, the inscription, 
composed by Carlo Marsuppini, Bruni's successor as secretary 
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of the republic, conspicuously omits all the usual data: we learn 
from it neither the last name of the deceased nor his station in 
life and the date of his death. All it tells us is: "After Leonardo's 
passing, History grieves, Eloquence is silent, and the Muses, 
'tis said, Greek and Latin alike, cannot restrain their tears." 
The tablet on which these words are inscribed is held by two 
winged genii, rather than by angels, and two more such genii, 
nude this time, support the family coat of arms above the 
lunette. It seems to have escaped attention that the framing 
architecture, which unites all these sculptural features so har­
moniously, is also meant to convey a message to the beholder. 
Tombs in niches had been customary for a long time; what is 
new here is the shape of the niche and its framework—two 
classical pilasters supporting an equally classical entablature, 
above which rises a round arch. There is a specific source in 
ancient architecture for this design, and its choice is highly 
significant: the doorway of the Pantheon in Rome as seen from 
the interior of that structure (Fig. 25). The motif was surely 
meant to be recognized by the contemporary beholder, for in 
the eyes of the Quattrocento the Pantheon was a uniquely 
famous monument combining the highest aspirations of both 
antiquity and Christianity. To Alberti, the Pantheon represented 
the perfect temple and thus also the perfect church. (In his 
treatise on architecture, completed by 1452, he strenuously argues 
in favor of church plans based on the circle and against the 
traditional basilican plan, declaring basilican churches imperfect 
because in antiquity the basilica had not been a religious type 
of building.)37 The Pantheon, moreover, was dedicated to all 
the immortals—the gods of old as well as the martyrs of the 
Christian faith. (In the early Middle Ages, it was consecrated 
as S. Maria ad Martyres, and the remains of martyrs were 
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gathered there by the wagon load from the catacombs.) The 
archway of the Bruni tomb thus suggests to the beholder that 
Bruni is about to enter the realm of immortality, in both the 
classical and the Christian sense. The moment of Bruni's passing 
from this earth, when his mortal remains are still above ground 
but surrounded by the accoutrements of undying fame—the 
book, the wreath, the inscription—has thus been eternalized by 
showing the effigy, as it were, on the threshold of the Pantheon. 
The medieval juxtaposition of time and eternity, of body and 
soul, has lost its force. That this concept (though not its artistic 
execution) originated with Alberti seems likely not only in 
view of what he says about the Pantheon in his architectural 
treatise but also because the doorway of the Pantheon was one 
of his favorite motifs as a church architect: he used it for the 
main portal of S. Maria Novella in Florence and again, on an 
even grander scale, as the central feature of the facade of 
S. Andrea in Mantua. By introducing the motif into the design 
of tombs, Alberti accomplished two objectives at once. He gave 
the Renaissance tomb a new, unmedieval significance, and he 
raised it from the level of "church furniture" to that of monu­
mental architecture, endowing it with a stability and grandeur 
fully expressive of its "fame-centered" meaning. 
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PAOLO TOSCANELLI

AND HIS FRIENDS

By

Giorgio de Santillana

THE RENAISSANCE remains a mysterious thing. It is an age of 
hazy outlines, illuminated by flashes of passionate affirmation, 
an epoch of conflict and contradiction, an epoch in which there 
is the Council of Trent as well as Erasmus and Montaigne, in 
which the new astronomy comes into collision with the all-
powerful, and advancing, astrology, in which the renascence 
of mathematics allies itself with the resurgence of magic. The 
sixteenth century is unbelievably far from us by its presupposi­
tions, its mental habits, its superstitious respect for ancient 
authority, by the very structure of its intelligence which was 
ready to accept not only belief but knowledge ex auditu, from 
hearsay. Something of this bewildering texture begins to appear 
in detail when we bring into focus men and activities hitherto 
barely known. 
I should like to discuss an enigmatic personage of the fifteenth 
century who was called by his contemporaries Master Paul the 
physician. He was a quiet man. We know so little of his life, 
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his thought, and his personality that we have to reconstruct 
them by hints and clues. He is, nonetheless, the invisible knot 
that ties together a number of prodigious personalities—the very 
men who may be said to have invented the Renaissance and to 
have started the scientific revolution. 
Not too much has been written about him, because so little 
is known. About fifty years ago, a big book was written about 
him by Uzielli which contained everything, including what is 
disputable, and built him up into a very important figure indeed. 
Then later, in his great History of Magic and Experimental 
Science, Lynn Thorndike undertook rather acidly to cut down 
to size the "Toscanelli myth," as he called it. And then in 1961, 
a new study came out by Eugenio Garin, the well-known 
Florentine scholar, in his Renaissance Studies, which is really 
a brief reappraisal. Garin's authority as a cultural historian 
stands so high that it is rather chancy to go and revise the 
question just after him. On the other hand, there is without 
doubt a slight slant to his thought because he is also an authority 
on the intellectual history of modern Italy: his strong progres­
sive convictions have developed into a penchant for historical 
materialism, quite understandable if you have to deal with 
certain overripe subjects. And so Garin presents Toscanelli the 
technician and businessman, the healthy representative of the 
dynamic Florentine entrepreneur class which was reaching at 
that time its apogee. Surely, in fact, one may wonder why Garin 
did not bring out a certain episode in his late life in 1469, when 
he was already more than seventy years old. After the death of 
his brother, Toscanelli had to pick up the family fortunes and 
to steer the family firm through the adventures of the Gold 
Rush of Florence; by which I mean the alum strike in the Tolfa 
hills which changed so many fortunes around. He did it very 
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successfully. This is the kind of thing that would make a Marxist 
happy. Garin is far too subtle to let himself be drawn into a 
trap of that kind: he goes on to characterize his subject in his 
more old-fashioned interests—but there is no denying that he 
enjoys setting up Toscanelli's likes, the technicians, against the 
orators who have adorned and also afflicted Italian culture in the 
centuries from then till now. 
Let us look at Toscanelli, then, first by way of his Florentine 
friends. 
The chief character in that group is, no doubt, Filippo 
Brunelleschi, the master who brought forth Renaissance archi­
tecture. Both as artist and as technologist I have to take him for 
granted. I should like simply to present him as an innovator, 
and a radical innovator at that. 
With him, as I have tried to show elsewhere, we have for 
the first time the master engineer of a new type backed by the 
prestige of mathematics and the "recondite secrets of perspec­
tive." (Galileo's slightly tongue-in-cheek description of his own 
achievements with the telescope is certainly valid here because 
the man is the inventor of perspective.) Brunelleschi is a man 
whose capacity is not supposed to have been due to long experi­
ence and trade secrets but to strength of intellect and theoretical 
boldness; a man who can speak his mind in the councils of the 
city and is granted patents for his engineering devices. His 
judges are no small people either, if you come to think of the 
group of regents that then ran the cathedral works. The regents 
and their advisers are men like Niccolo da Uzzano, Niccolo 
Niccoli, Poggio, Traversari, Palla Strozzi, and, not least, the 
young Cosimo de' Medici. Men of affairs, most of them, wearers 
of the "lucco," the red cape of the Council of the Republic, 
humanists and statesmen all, involved in the European issues 
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of their day, sponsors of the unification of the eastern and 
western churches, hosts of the last true ecumenic council, when 
Pope and Patriarch of Byzantium and their retinues, assembled 
within its walls, made Florence for the time the capital of 
Christendom. 
Certainly we have here, then, something which is reaching 
world dimensions in general acknowledgment, and new types of 
men are arising. Donatello may be acquainted with the Latin 
classics while Brunelleschi is not; but still, it is Brunelleschi 
who stands as a qualified intellectual of a new type. It is only 
a century later that the fateful distinction emerges between 
pure and applied art. By that time the pure artist himself is 
hardly an intellectual. 
Finally, this complex of achievements by a well-known 
group of great talents—Manetti, Ghiberti, Donatello, Masaccio, 
Uccello, Luca della Robbia, with Brunelleschi as leader—found 
a literary expounder of comparable talent in the person of 
Leone Battista Alberti to give their ideas full citizenship in the 
robed world of letters and humanism, something that only 
Galileo was able later to achieve by himself. It will have been 
a fragile and fleeting conjunction, no doubt; it will end up in 
mere academicism, and in theories about art, and just about 
the time when science breaks forth with its own ideas of method 
and truth; but as long as it lasts, in the period of creation, 
it is a true conjunction, two in one. Leon Battista Alberti 
only paraphrases Filippo's words—we know that—when he says 
of the new art of architecture, "If it ever was written in the 
past, we have dug it up, and if it was not, we have drawn it 
from heaven." (This is a very typical, concisely expressed 
Renaissance position that leaves both possibilities open.) That 
"social breakthrough" of the new science of Galileo effected 
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through the telescope, we find here in an early counterpart or 
rather in its first rehearsal. Everyone in 1450 was aware that 
a boldly speculative theory had preceded the complex of achieve­
ments, until the "cupolone," the great dome of the cathedral, 
rose unsupported in its greatness; "ample enough," says Alberti, 
"to hold in its shade all the land of Tuscany." 
So there is in Toscanelli's time the feeling of revolution. I 
have tried elsewhere to characterize such a feeling phenome­
nologically: it is the resolute assumption of responsibility that 
forms the criterion. And that is why, in the moment of the 
Galilean crisis, we know there is a revolution because Galileo 
assumes the responsibility, in the face of the doctrine of the 
Church, to consider himself the only authority, or, if you like, 
the most authorized consultant, in a matter in which that 
authority has not been formally assigned to him. 
To return to our present task: we are trying to define one 
of those rare points where art and science undeniably join. 
Brunelleschi created his theory of perspective by experimental 
means. He built the earliest optical instrument after the eye­
glasses, the last one before the telescope—his famous perspective 
tablet. It had the new element of measurement in it, and it 
presupposed the establishment of a system of co-ordinates. To 
quote Krautheimer: "Plans and elevation drawn to scale were 
fundamental innovations in architectural tooling that he was the 
first to introduce in Florence." Seen from our point of view, 
these remarks of the historian of art seem an almost bizarre 
understatement. The introduction of measurement in its proper 
place in a theoretical treatment of reality is an innovation in 
intellectual tooling which is probably the most decisive factor 
of the scientific revolution. It advances step by step into our 
own time, and its originality has to be traced in the early stages. 
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The vibrating strings of the Pythagoreans, the angular measure­
ments of the astronomers, the measurements that transfer the 
study of aesthetic proportion to protective techniques—all are 
stages that we should work back into. And after that, of course, 
the way was open for the adventures through the theory of light 
and for the camera obscura. Here, implicitly, a new theory of 
space is born and a new geometrization of space and light, the 
new conception of central perspective which places man in an 
isotropic, in non-Aristotelian, space. Anyone who has been to 
visit casually the Pazzi Chapel in Santa Croce in Florence, 
which is Brunelleschi's most typical work, after having been in 
a Gothic cathedral, knows that he is facing an entirely different 
world of space and that the escape in some symbolic direction 
is denied to him; he is inside central perspective. And Copernicus 
is, in a way, the one who brings true central perspective to the 
universe, by placing "the lamp of the universe in the center." 
All of this implies, indicates, or in various ways announces the 
moving of the study of reality from imaginary or symbolic into 
real space. 
And now we come to Master Paul the physician. Born in 
1397, Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli was Brunelleschi's junior by 
twenty years. He came of a family of rich merchants. Their 
house was near what is now Palazzo Pitti, on the other side of 
the Arno. There is a tablet to mark its site. We even have the 
census that was taken in 1400 of their estate. The Toscanelli 
family was described as having in town nineteen servants, two 
horses, and a mule: the three-car garage, so to speak. In other 
words, they were rich and influential Florentine businessmen. 
From his childhood, young Paolo knew Brunelleschi. As soon 
as he came back (in 1425) from Padua, where he had been 
studying for the doctorate, he and Brunelleschi were guests at 
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a dinner in the garden of a friend, where they sealed their 
friendship; and thereafter they became inseparable for the next 
thirty years. As Toscanelli used to say later when he was an 
old man, "This was the greatest association of my life." He 
added, "You should try to understand what Brunelleschi has 
done because what he did takes great intentness of mind, more 
knowledge than you think, and also great circumspection." 
These words are quite significant of both men. Brunelleschi—or 
Maestro Pippo, as they called him—was (like Leonardo) a "man 
without letters/' that is, he did not know Latin. In fact, his 
only books seem to have been Dante and the Bible. But he was 
a scientific and engineering genius, and he readily absorbed 
the geometry that Toscanelli gave him. Toscanelli had to be 
sent to Padua to study medicine; he came back with the title 
of Doctor of Medicine and was generally called "the physician." 
Actually, the curriculum included mathematics. You may notice 
that Copernicus went down to Italy and got the title of Doctor 
of Medicine. And in fact, if Toscanelli stands in the back­
ground as a medical man, a cartographer, an astrologer, he is 
essentially a mathematician; and one of such considerable 
achievements that the great expert of the time, Regiomontanus, 
in writing to him calls him a "second Archimedes." This is, of 
course, a rhetorical or humanistic compliment because neither 
writer nor recipient can be considered in the line of work of 
Archimedes, but it is a set way of expressing admiration. 
It was a wonderful conjunction, that of the architect and 
the geometrician, so early in the century, planning together the 
first great feat of modern engineering, the cupola of the cathe­
dral rising unsupported on its base without scaffoldings or 
centerings toward the sky. And in the lantern of the cathedral, 
once it was built, Brunelleschi had an aperture made for his 
Cm) 
The Renaissance Image of Man and the World 
friend to project a beam of light down on a sundial on the floor 
of the cathedral. It was the greatest sundial in the world, then, 
because the beam was 240 feet long. On that sundial, on that 
"gnomon" as they called it, Toscanelli measured again with 
great precision the precession of the equinoxes and the inclina­
tion of the ecliptic so as to consecrate, so to speak, the double 
value of the cathedral. 
In those years lies the beginning. 
If one were to assign a high point to the Renaissance, one 
might suggest just those years—the decade, say, between 1428 
and 1438, which began with the state visit of Prince Pedro 
of Portugal to Florence, where he was received with unsur­
passed magnificence and a spectacular procession but also was 
given all the maps and geographical material that he had been 
asking for, and ended on the ecumenic council which brought 
together for the last time eastern and western Christendom and 
insured the passage of Greece into Europe. 
It is not without significance that Melanchthon, the repre­
sentative of the new culture, was to say of Florence a century 
later, and in carefully measured words, that it was for him the 
center of world learning. For after all, in a world in which 
philosophy and theology held such a high place, Paris or even 
Oxford might have preserved valid claims for the rank. And 
Florence was not even a university town. It might have been 
chided as intellectually irregular. Yet it is the center which 
not only brought to Europe the high and subtle speculations 
of Neoplatonism but also the texts of Archimedes; it brought 
forth venture capitalism, and with it a new class of technicians 
who went ahead in a most venturesome way. It is they who 
discovered America by mistake, gave it its name by another 
mistake, built the new cupola, as scholars insisted bitterly, by 
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guess and by God, or as humanists said, "with their false and 
lying geometry," tried Leonardo's machines, and with the new 
geometry of space opened the way for that other mad venture 
whose author was to get at last his richly deserved comeuppance 
—I mean Galileo himself. If we think of the rigor and prudence 
of the Paris doctors, we must agree that this is a different view 
of intellectual leadership. 
To return to Toscanelli and the geometrization of space, we 
should not forget that if in youth he was the junior adviser of 
Brunelleschi, he became later the senior guide, philosopher, and 
friend of many, including the great theoretician of perspective, 
Leon Battista Alberti, the man for whom was coined the title 
of uomo universale. Of them all, Toscanelli was the only one 
with a real scientific training. He was something, if I may say 
so, of a quiet Kepler—if a quiet Kepler can be imagined—and 
it is only when one thinks of it that one is grateful for Kepler's 
engaging and irrepressible gift of gab. 
It is to Toscanelli that Alberti dedicated his dialogues, the 
Intercsenales, or Table Talks, those witty conversations which 
came into so many hands and were to be a model for Erasmus. 
A singular choice: it is not the treatise on perspective he offers 
him, but a commentary on society. "As you are a doctor of 
bodies," wrote Alberti, "so I am trying to be a doctor of souls." 
The hazy figure of the master is outlined here in the direction 
of worldly wisdom and knowledge of men, as befits a doctor. 
So far we remain within the cultural circle of Florence. But 
now we have to go far afield. 
One of the most commanding figures of the fifteenth century 
is Nicholas of Cusa, or Cusanus, or the Cardinal of Cusa, the 
great German prelate. His influence was immense in northern 
Europe. It sparked the thought of men like Copernicus and 
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Kepler, and, not least, Bruno, for he was the first one to suggest 
responsibly the infinity of the universe and the mobility—at least 
some kind of mobility—of the earth. One wonders about this 
man finding himself such an Italianate German and yet such 
a misfit at the Court of Rome where he was actually prime 
minister. One wonders what Aeneas Sylvius, the elegant and 
worldly man of letters who reigned over the golden age of 
humanism as Pope Pius II, must have thought of his friend's 
involved speculations. He may have decided that Nicholas was 
too good an administrator and diplomat to be wasted on such 
subtleties, but it apparently enhanced his authority to philoso­
phize thus paradoxically in the obscure manner of the "ultra­
montanes." 
There is no doubt that with Nicholas, German philosophy 
has entered the scene full-fledged, with some of its powerful 
characteristics well in evidence, and he makes one think very 
much of that future continuator of his work, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. 
The central fact about Cusanus, which has been too often 
overlooked because he scored no achievements in science proper, 
is that he is an imaginative mathematical temperament who 
has taken up in the raw stage the modern idea of mathematics 
as a "science of the infinite." This idea, in itself, undercuts 
radically the conventional and rather simple-minded notion, 
entertained by the scholastics, of mathematics as the science of 
magnitude, that is, "of the more and the less." He does not 
deal simply with irrelevant sizes; he deals with the essence of 
things, because at the core of things there is understood to be 
the infinite. If mathematics is the science of the infinite—and 
this is indeed what the great Greek mathematicians had dis­
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covered in their own way and what Aristotle had tried to cover 
up—why, then, one's metaphysical emotions are apt to respond. 
To a mind with a medieval training, infinity participates in the 
divine essence, and should be understood to be somehow at the 
core of all things. Mathematics ceases to be a science of mere 
abstractions and becomes a possible avenue to a true knowledge 
of reality. Yet there is one side to these speculations which 
strikes any scientific reader as helpless. Anyone, indeed, who 
reads Cusanus critically will get the curious impression of an 
inadequately fused intellectual enterprise. There is, no doubt, 
a creative intuition in the play with mathematical concepts; 
then there appear new, technically advanced ideas which are 
not followed up but left to die on the vine. The developments 
about the relative position and the mobility of the earth around 
its orbit are one instance. It is as if Cusanus were led on by a 
thought that he has not fully mastered. We experience such 
"double takes" in reading Plato, too, but then we know that he 
was trying to adjust into his speculations the advanced work of 
contemporary mathematicians like Eudoxus which he had not 
fully grasped either. 
Now who is there back of Cusanus? Philosophers have 
answered a little too easily by saying the Pythagorean tradition. 
Surely. It is back of everything and very clearly at the back 
of such a man. But there is nowhere in Pythagorean tradition 
this idea of mathematics as the science of the infinite, nor are 
there those technical developments about relativistic geometry. 
This is what philosophers have overlooked, and this is also 
where the historians of science may help. 
For Nicholas had one bosom friend of his student days and 
later, one with whom he had "thought together" during the 
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formative years in Padua, to whom he was to dedicate more 
than one of his works and in particular his artless little treatise 
on the squaring of the circle—and that friend was Toscanelli. 
It was still Toscanelli who, when his friend Nicholas lay 
dying a lonely death on the road in the little town of Todi, 
almost two hundred miles away, hurried to his bedside, at 
sixty-seven years of age, to share the last vigils. 
So those curious seeds of a new mathematical thought, which 
the cardinal seized upon with his powerful imagination but 
could not develop adequately, may well have come from 
Toscanelli himself. From whom else? There was no one else 
around. And, in fact, there are some significant confirmations. 
If the historians of thought have not seen it hitherto, it is 
because they misread both men. Because the cardinal's mathe­
matics was dismissed disdainfully by Regiomontanus as in­
significant—which is a technically correct judgment—they did 
not see that the man's imagination was that of a creative analyst 
in the modern sense. 
On the other hand, because Toscanelli is etched in history 
primarily as a doctor of medicine and a practical consultant in 
so many fields from applied geometry to cartography because 
he is kept in the background, because his advice was asked in 
the matter of buildings and crops and maps and horoscopes and 
financial computations, because he did not participate in the 
lofty metaphysics and the luminous transcendental vaporings 
of Marsilio Ficino nor in the orotund declamations and the 
golden Platonic eloquence of the Florentine academy; he has 
been adjudged a modest technician and, at best, an outstanding 
medical man. And it is very true that Toscanelli gave out 
results and kept his thoughts to himself, as contemporaries 
witness. In fact, he wrote nothing at all beyond letters. And 
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those letters are lost—all except the one that Columbus got 
hold of. But it is quite a letter, as is well known. 
And so it was forgotten that he was also a thinker of strange 
thoughts. 
Those thoughts could not very well be grasped by Ficino, the 
official philosopher, for all that he wrote of Paolo with high 
praise and indeed adulation. They were very special thoughts. 
We shall deal with them in a moment. I am trying to see from 
many angles this constellation of minds which really gives rise 
to the intellectual Renaissance from Florence to Germany. 
There is one feature which has made Toscanelli famous; and 
although this particular fame is not wholly deserved, it will 
serve to make up for what he has missed otherwise. I speak of 
his letter to Portugal concerning the chances of a discovery of 
a new world. 
Here again, we come into one of those high points of a 
cultural life in which everything seems to tie up with every­
thing, in which the mobile tissue of time becomes almost 
tangible. 
In the year 1474, Marsilio Ficino wrote to Bandini that he 
had concluded his great book on Platonic theology—which was 
to come out only later, in 1482, the year of Toscanelli's death. 
On the twenty-fifth of June of that same year, 1474, at the 
height of the reign of Lorenzo il Magnifico, in the slightly 
corrupt splendor of that court which was shooting its last 
sparklers, Paolo Toscanelli, or Paul the physician as he usually 
signed, wrote a letter to a Portuguese ecclesiastic called Fernam 
Martins concerning the possibility of a route to the East by way 
of the West and joined with it a map he had constructed of 
the possible route. This Canon Fernam Martins, the recipient 
of the letter, he had met ten years previously at the bedside of 
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the dying Cardinal of Cusa in Todi. Thus fate works in strange 
ways. 
We have the letter as it was transcribed by Columbus him­
self on the flyleaf of a book. So he must have given it deep 
consideration. Was it the first cause of his enterprise? Was the 
underestimated distance of Asia, derived from Strabo's wrong 
data, an incentive to his voyage? Italian scholars, proud of having 
this Genoese navigator guided by a Florentine cosmographer, 
have made a great to-do about it. I myself doubt that it was as 
decisive as often suggested. Philologists think in terms of classical 
authors, but technicians have their own sources of information. 
Columbus had quite reliable maps really—not on the Spanish 
side, of course: he had that of Fra Mauro of Venice, he had 
the Genoese map of 1457, the Catalan map of 1375—and they 
all gave the correct distances within about 10 per cent; so I 
take it he knew what he was doing. He knew, then, what an 
adventure it was to set out on a voyage on an unbroken ocean— 
except for a chain of islands, he hoped—which would take him 
from Spain to China. 
But there is more in a culture than is inscribed in its rational 
decisions. If Toscanelli acted on Columbus, it was because, as 
a recognized expert in the stars, he gave him a sense of the 
urgency of fate. This is the true tension of the Renaissance: 
this context of political in-fighting and prophetic vision, of 
heroic vocations and cunning cynicism, of magic, astrology, 
prophecy, and great new scientific ideas all in one. 
In the margin of his own copy of Pierre D'Ailly, Columbus 
transcribes the lines of Scripture: "The heavens proclaim the 
glory of God." He is haunted by the power of the cosmos and 
by a sense of his own calling. Columbus is a man who is quite 
well inside his own culture; and when he combines Pliny and 
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Pierre D'Ailly and Albumasar, he does exactly what an educated 
man of his time would have done. For right at the time when 
Pico della Mirandola wrote so passionately and rationally against 
astrology and protested against the camouflaging of the Virgin 
Mary as a constellation, Columbus was transcribing with his 
own hand a famous text of the Arab astronomer Albumasar: 
"There ascends in the first aspect a virgin holding two ears of 
wheat in her hand . . . and she holds a child to her heart." 
The great prophetic theme of the return of Virgo, which 
inspires Virgil's Fourth Eclogue and is echoed through the 
Middle Ages, reappears here in full force. But how transformed. 
Witness the Latin lines of John of Garland in his Stella Marts: 
Ut Albumasar testatur 
Inter Stellas declaratur 
Virgo lactans puerum. 
"As Albumasar witnesseth, a virgin is declared among the stars, 
nursing a child to her heart." 
It is a most considerable mix-up. 
Albumasar, around this time, had become a name to conjure 
with. The first printed editions of his Introductorium and of 
his Great Conjunctions were not to come out until 1489, but 
there were enough manuscript copies around to spread alarm and 
despondency in Florence already in 1460, and the talk was all 
of comets and cataclysms. Albumasar, as they called him, or 
rather Abu Mashar, for that was his name, was an Arab astrol­
oger who died in 886. He is not accounted technically an 
astronomer. He shines indeed as an astronomer so little that 
my friend Willy Hartner, the immensely scholarly and rigorous 
historian of astronomy, dismisses him as a vapid chatterer and 
O19)

The Renaissance Image of Man and the World 
wonders how Tycho Brahe himself could have quoted him at 
the side of Al Battani. The answer, I dare say, lies right in 
Hartner's paper which traces this unknown reference. Why did 
people mention him? Tycho was a great technician of astron­
omy, but he was also a Renaissance man. So, once he had made, 
by measuring parallaxes, his epoch-making discovery that comets 
and novae are in outer space, he thought nothing of quoting 
Abu Mashar for a confirmation, although the man had no con­
cern with parallaxes. This is not the only time that astrology 
has lent a helping hand to science. Up to the time of Kepler, 
astronomy and astrology are so closely intermingled that a man's 
thought moves freely between them. Allow me to remind you 
in my turn of that locus classicus in Troilus and Cressida. 
And so here we come to another crucial case. Those lines I 
have quoted of John of Garland in his Stella Marts are part of 
the new Christian enterprise to refer all constellation properties 
to the Virgin Mary seen as Virgo, in other words to build up a 
spiritual astrology inside orthodoxy. And this in turn is due to 
Abu Mashar, who had announced the exaltation of the Virgin 
with Child in the heavens. This could not but strike a deep 
chord in the hearts of a civilization which still believed in Virgil 
as the prophet of the advent of Christ—the prophet of the 
Gentiles: 
Incipe, parve puer, cui non risere parentes.1 
That a Moslem should come now bringing Virgil's nova 
progenies explicitly as a child suckling at Virgo's breast is surely 
one of the more amusing cross-purposes of history. It could 
have provided a good finale for Comparetti's classic work on 
Virgil in the Middle Ages. 
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But in truth, the infidel still managed to serve the purposes 
of infidelity. We should see what he was saying. He is not 
really announcing, like Virgil, the return of Virgo, or Justice, 
to earth. This had happened about Anno Domini, with other 
great signs in heaven: Virgo had come to one of the four 
crucial points of the ecliptic, the vernal equinox. This was 
"earth" in the traditional archaic language. The next "return" 
would be when she reached a solstitial point, a further quarter-
turn of the precession, another four thousand years away from 
us. Rather, Abu Mashar was speaking of Venus coming to a 
particular aspect in Virgo; and he was using the Oriental 
symbolism of portraying Venus in this position (for it was 
Venus who was the protagonist) as a mother with child. This 
came straight from Babylon: "Inanna with the child in her 
lap," as the Babylonian hymn puts it; and Inanna is a name 
for Ishtar. In another symmetrical position, close to Sirius, she 
was Ishtar the Harlot, Venus Pandemia, an abandoned woman. 
There are some comic repercussions to this so remote theme. 
Father Kugler, the great historian of Babylonian astronomy who 
wrote a generation ago, still could not countenance the sea-
change of the Lady Ishtar into a woman of loose conduct. It was 
contrary, he said, to the avowed respect of the Babylonians for 
moral principles and motherhood to have their chief female 
deity first impersonate the divine mother with child and then 
a trot. He suggested the protagonist of this transformation scene 
must be Sirius the Dog, so essentially associated with Venus in 
the Sothic cycle, which is marked by their joint heliacal rising. 
Alas, Fr. Kugler let himself be carried away by his moral fervor. 
Venus is standing in her own right in both positions. 
These things still hurt, apparently: the great feminine prin­
ciple seen as both mother and demon, the devil himself, the 
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"Frau Venus" of Tannhauser. This it was that came with the 
expounding of the doctrine by those who knew: dreadful 
ambiguity in heaven itself, Venus dominant under the cloak of 
Virgo. This it was that the interpreters of heaven were explain­
ing quietly to some, denying to others. Not the least of the 
tensions of that strange fifteenth century is laid between the two 
poles of Venus Anadyomene rising from the sea and the Virgin 
worshiped in ascetic meditation. 
Without those tensions, how could we understand the Church 
desperately trying to Christianize astrology and hugging this asp 
to her breast? How could we understand the furious and apoca­
lyptic reaction of Savonarola, the sacking and the burning, 
Botticelli abandoning his pagan imagery for prayer, Pico della 
Mirandola forsaking his learning, his esoteric knowledge, his 
wonderful idea of man in the cockpit of the universe, to attack 
astrology and end his life in passionate renouncement? 
The doctrines of Fate and Freedom were strong drinks to be 
mixed for an age of transition. Think of Leonardo's great series 
of drawings of the end of the world in storms of wind and fire, 
of Columbus' memory of Blessed Joachim of Fiora. Toscanelli, 
the "cosmographer," as they called him, is doing his part in a 
wise and statesmanlike way. He refused the astrology of nativ­
ities and death signs—we have his own statements on that—but 
concentrated on cycles of change and renewal, and quietly an­
nounced the imminent discovery of a new world. He defines, 
in a way, the Renaissance itself, in what it has of nascent and 
renascent. In his letter to Martins, he dreams of wonderful 
distant cities and unknown civilizations in the spirit of Sir 
Thomas More. He imagines rivers in that new world with as 
many as two hundred cities along their banks. But unlike Sir 
Thomas More, he is writing before, not after, the event. With 
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his authority he is now telling Columbus that something un­
precedented is bound to happen—he is giving him a sense of 
impending fate. 
I trust I will not be misunderstood. The historian of science 
must see what is living and operating at a given time, in order 
to find the true context of ideas. The main context of the 
Renaissance is the changing idea of the cosmos, but a cosmos 
first and last it had to be; and what is there that holds the key 
to the comos except astrology? It stays in that key position until 
it is replaced by celestial mechanics—and replaced only in a 
manner of speaking, for the cosmos does not last long without 
it. Descartes is in the offing. Astrology, then, dominated medicine 
and physics as the most comprehensive science. Notice the 
curious relationship you find in Ficino's work; Ficino is officially 
against astrology, as was his pupil Pico—but he cannot help 
believing in it all the same. Ficino cannot ignore astrology for 
the simple reason that Neoplatonism cannot do without it; and 
Plato himself, the late Plato of astro-theology, had been leading 
great philosophies back to the Babylonian cocoon. So it is very 
hard to imagine Ficino not able to believe in astrology, Pico 
himself not able to believe in astrology. Although Pico attacked 
it violently, he attacked it as an ambiguous dangerous presence, 
not as a vain pseudoscience. Astrology tied up heaven and earth 
in one system, which led men to search for regularities, for the 
laws of periodicity and change. He who thinks that there is 
only trash in the books of Albumasar, of Guido Bonatti, of 
Cardan, of Abu Ezra, of Pietro d'Abano, of al-Kalisi or Cecco 
d'Ascoli—or, may I add, in the writings of Father Athanasius 
Kircher himself, although he lived in quite another century—is 
in for a surprise. Those men were among the first minds of their 
times. They certainly had more to say than many humanistic 
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philosophers, so called. They were philosophers in the key of a 
great techne, as the Greek would have said, fully formed 
specialists. In their work we find documents of half-lost religions, 
remarkable fragments of psychology of the unconscious, im­
portant data of geography—for one had to relate exactly places 
to celestial time—as well as ideas about physiology, about his­
torical cycles, about the character of nations and men, and, of 
course, some of the best professional astronomy of the time. 
Kepler is their last offshoot. 
It would be well if we could know more about Cecco d'Ascoli. 
The God-fearing souls have shied away from him because he 
was burned by the Inquisition, the rationalists have forgotten 
about him because he believed in astrology. The misunder­
standing goes on. We have lost the key to those poems of his 
which are true cryptograms, and they are certainly not devoid 
of some important meaning. He did not like Dante; and it 
cannot be for the reason that he alleges—that Dante was a 
"man of little faith." But he must have had a singular faith of 
his own, and a strong one, if it allowed him to face the stake, 
like Giordano Bruno, instead of submitting. We may get a hint 
of it in his scornful lines: 
Qui non si canta al modo del poeta 
Che finge immaginando cose vane 
Ma qui resplende e luce onne natura 
Che a chi entende fa la mente leta. 
"Here we do not sing after the manner of the poet, who 
invents, imagining vain things, but here shines in dazzling 
light every nature [i.e., essence] which fills with joy him 
who understands." 
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There could be no clearer statement of the dichotomy between 
the two cultures—except in certain bitter remarks of Leonardo. 
What is attacked here, as early as 1325, is not so much the past 
as what is coming, the literary humanism of the Renaissance, 
man divorced from the cosmos. 
And this in turn should finally give the clue to Toscanelli's 
philosophical personality. Modern critics have ignored or mini­
mized many remarkable things that were said insistently about 
him with great respect and veneration—that he was pious and 
ascetic, that he kept strict chastity and abstained from eating 
meat. They thought this too goody-goody. They were wrong. 
For these traits prove Toscanelli to have been a true Pythagorean 
of the old observance—not simply one of those romantics fasci­
nated by the magic of number, but one in whom there lived again 
the thought and behavior of the ancient sect. Landino called 
him "a venerable image of antiquity." He is indeed an original 
Pythagorean in his strange combination of mathematics, induc­
tive research, practical interests, and a worship of the colossal 
machinery of cosmic cycles. Where did he get his data? From 
Arab astronomy, from lost sources, by word of mouth. There is 
such a knowledge that scholars a little too deliberately ignore. 
It is seeded here and there by what I have once called the 
"Jetstream of Time." When we find similar behavior in Leo­
nardo da Vinci—including the vegetarian obsession—and strange 
bits of information about ancient traditions which are in no 
text but reappear at odd points in the Renaissance, notably in 
Jerome Cardan, we have at least some clue as to where they 
came from. 
Men who had those ideas were careful, as was Toscanelli 
himself, who never talked about his theories. What he gave 
to the public were results. The only piece of his own that we 
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have is his computation of the comet of 1460. It is an excellent 
computation, as Celoria has shown, and agrees with the figures 
of Regiomontanus quite perfectly. Above is written in a shaky 
hand—probably his, and these are the only words we have in 
his own hand—"The immense labors and grievous vigils of 
Paolo Toscanelli on the measurement of the comet." ("Immensi 
labores et graves vigiliae Pauli de Puteo Toscanelli super men­
suram comete.") That is all. It is like an invocation. The 
measure was the thing. These measures in heaven were for 
him the important cesuras of the universe, and who should 
contradict him on that? Professor Bush has quoted Brandes* 
remark that Voltaire respected very few things in heaven and 
earth but he respected the uniform caesura. Well, we all love 
Voltaire—at least, I love Voltaire—but his tragedies are terrible, 
and you cannot say that the uniform caesura saved him. The 
master astrologer's caesuras might have still more meaning. 
Allow me to think it significant that a man who sparked so 
many new ideas in his own time should be the one in whom 
the most ancient frame of ideas had been reborn: that the new 
scientific thought should have as its precondition the rebirth of 
a cosmology going back to the gray dawn of antiquity. It is only 
now that we are beginning to form an idea of the scope and size 
of the cosmology that was shaped between 5000 and 2000 B.C. 
and was inherited only in fragments by historic civilizations as 
we know them. It is hard to imagine the immense intellectual 
effort it entailed, hard to measure its philosophical scope, which 
is clothed in myth and only symbolically, technically expressed 
in its planetary and precessional cycles. It is a lost world coming 
gradually into view, like a lost continent emerging from the 
ocean. But Plato still knew about it, at least parts of it, if we 
are to understand something of his clear technical implications. 
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Nor is Toscanelli the last to have searched for it, for after him 
comes Johann Kepler, his most legitimate successor and, like 
him, a passionate defender of astrology, although he was a 
Copernican. Let me conclude, then, with some words of Kepler 
that Toscanelli would have signed gladly himself: "The ways 
in which men came into the knowledge of things celestial 
appears to me almost as marvelous as the nature of those things 
itself." As Brunelleschi had started out as the earliest archeolo­
gist—for that is what he did in his twenties when he and 
Donatello went to Rome and started digging like men possessed: 
the Romans thought they were looking for treasures, but they 
were digging in the ruins of Rome for the secrets of the ancient 
architects—so Toscanelli had revived remote doctrines of cos­
mology and found there his inspiration. Nascent or renascent, 
let us remember Alberti's words: "If they were written, we have 
dug them up, and if they were not, we have snatched them 
from heaven." 
In the search for the hidden sources of ancient knowledge, 
for the meaning of "prophetic language," even Isaac Newton 
himself was to spend the latter half of his life. Who are we, 
then, to assess casually the "immense labors and the grievous 
vigils" of the man whom the Florentines called Maestro Pagolo, 
or Paul the physician? 
1. Or maybe Norden is right in reading "qui non risere parenti," the 
child has not yet laughed to its mother, a great theme in cosmological 
tradition. 

MUSIC OF THE RENAISSANCE

AS VIEWED BY RENAISSANCE MUSICIANS

By

Edward E. Lowinsky

THE QUESTION OF TRADITION AND INNOVATION in the Renaissance 
has exercised a great many minds in the last several decades. 
The views differ in different fields. They differ even in the 
same field. In the words of Erwin Panofsky, "During the last 
forty or fifty years the 'Renaissance problem' has become one 
of the most hotly debated issues in modern historiography."1 
It is this state of affairs which laid the accent, in this volume, 
on the conception that the man of the Renaissance had of 
himself and of his civilization. This should provide us with a 
valuable corrective of whatever views we hold of the epoch. 
The self-appraisal of an epoch forms an integral part of its 
historical essence. It is not all the evidence, but it is so significant 
a part of it that we cannot afford to neglect it if we are to 
arrive at a balanced view of its character. 
In speaking of the views of the musicians writing in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, we use the term "musician" as 
referring, in the first place, to writers on music. However, 
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whereas many prominent medieval theorists were mathemati­
cians, most Renaissance writers concerned with music were 
practical musicians. Tinctoris, Gafori, Aron, Coclico, Vicentino, 
Zarlino were composers and singers or choirmasters as well as 
theorists of music. 
What a change of scenery in the field of Renaissance literature 
on music as against the Middle Ages: the stage moves from 
the quiet monastic cell, in which most medieval works on music 
were conceived, to the noisy places of musical performance, the 
choirloft, the rehearsal rooms of town musicians, the house of 
the boy choristers, the humanistic gymnasium, the private con­
cert halls of nobles and patricians. For these are the places in 
which the new writers on music, whether they be churchmen 
or laymen, are working. Choirmasters and composers, singers 
and instrumentalists, acousticians and connoisseurs, school teach­
ers, humanists, and that new breed of men who were not players 
or singers or composers but who judged the art and skill of all 
of them, the critics—they all were now beginning to write about 
music. The printing presses of Naples, Venice, Milan, Bologna, 
Rome, Lyons, Paris, Leipzig, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Witten­
berg, and Basel were kept busy by their industrious pens. 
The gulf between theory and practice, painfully obvious in 
medieval theory, was closed in Renaissance writings on music. 
At no time, before or later, was there more intimate contact 
between theorists, composers, performers, connoisseurs, critics, 
and the public than in the hundred years between Tinctoris and 
Vincenzo Galilei, spokesman for the Florentine Camerata—one 
hundred years that mark the high tide of the musical thought 
of the Renaissance. Galilei, humanistically inspired,2 introduced 
—and Monteverdi codified—a split between "old" counterpoint 
obeying a complex system of rules and "modern" music, affect­
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oriented and striving for monodic dominance of the poetic word, 
between prima and seconda prattica. This resulted in a split in 
baroque theory between a "forward" and a "backward" look, 
which the theory of music has not overcome since. 
In comparing medieval views on music with those of the 
Renaissance, we must not commit the error of treating medieval 
theory as one static body of unchanging views. For one thing, 
the new spirit of criticism and experimental science in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the recovery of Aristotle, 
the contact with Arab civilization, and the rise of the universities 
could not fail to make their impact on the arts and the theory 
of the arts.3 For another, the medieval theorists, many of whom 
were mathematicians—music having been assigned to the mathe­
matical disciplines of the quadrivium—were trying constantly to 
keep their theories, rooted as they were in mathematical tradi­
tion, in touch with the musical reality of their days. Minstrels 
and folk singers, jongleurs and instrumentalists, who gained 
favor in high and low circles alike, knew nothing of their 
theories and cared less, neither did their audience. Composers 
of polyphonic art music, on the other hand, had to break away 
from a system restricting the use of consonances to fourths, 
fifths, and octaves. The task of the medieval theorist, therefore, 
was one of constant accommodation between Pythagorean dogma 
and musical reality. It could not fail that in this process one 
group of theorists would incline toward mathematical dogma­
tism, another toward musical reality; and this picture was compli­
cated by the various positions taken toward the constant flux of 
new developments in the polyphonic art music. It is this unceas­
ing, stubborn, yet fruitful, tug of war which was pushing slowly 
but surely toward a frontier where new problems arose that 
could not be solved any longer in the framework of medieval 
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attitudes, an evolution which proceeded in a constant up and 
down of advance, reaction, and new advance. 
The historian's purpose must be threefold: to define the 
character of the new, to do justice to its embryonic develop­
ment, and to fix the date of its birth. The theme of this volume 
favors the first and the last objectives, but we shall suggest, at 
least in occasional side glances, the existence of evolutionary 
trends of Renaissance attitudes within the matrix of medieval 
thought. 
The frequent union of practical musician and theorist in one 
and the same artist gives the Renaissance writers on music a 
special authority on the questions we wish to ask of them. Do 
they themselves recognize the existence of a "renaissance in 
music," a conscious departure from the past, an intended revival 
and restoration of the art, an inspiration in ideas of antiquity, 
a discovery of new means of musical organization brought about 
by a new aesthetics, a new philosophy of music? An attempt at 
presenting the contemporary evidence faithfully and impartially 
means to present conflicting evidence. For the Renaissance writ­
ers on music speak not with one voice but in a polyphony of 
voices not devoid of dissonance and discord. 
THE CLASH OF OLD AND NEW 
Did the musicians, the writers on music, and the aestheticians 
of the epoch consider the music of their time as new? This is 
the first question to which we need an answer. 
In a famous passage of his work De arte contrapuncti, written 
in 1477, the Flemish theorist of music, Johannes Tinctoris, who 
lived for the greatest part of his life at the court of Naples as 
singer, composer, teacher, and writer, said: "Although it seems 
beyond belief, there does not exist a single piece of music, not 
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composed within the last forty years, that is regarded by the 
learned as worth hearing."4 In other words, Tinctoris, writing 
in 1477, dates the beginning of "modern" music from 1437 or, 
say, roughly, 1435. As leaders of the new generation of com­
posers, he mentions Ockeghem and Busnois; he singles out their 
teachers, the Englishman Dunstable and the two composers of 
the Burgundian era, Binchois and Dufay. 
Tinctoris states this view also in his treatise on proportions. 
There he speaks of the music of his day as an ars nova and 
sketches the background of this new art in these words: "The 
fountain and origin of this new art lies with the English, whose 
leading master was Dunstable. His French contemporaries were 
Dufay and Binchois who were immediately succeeded by the 
moderns"—moderni5 is the word used by Tinctoris—"Ockeghem, 
Busnois, Regis, and Caron, who of all those whom I have heard 
are the most outstanding in composition."6 
Comparing the Franco-Netherlanders with the English of his 
day, Tinctoris gives his preference to the former, observing 
that "they freshly create new works day by day, whereas the 
English—and this is a sign of a terrible lack of talent—use one 
and the same style of composition."7 
For us today, novelty, originality, individuality have become 
unquestioned criteria in judging intellectual and artistic achieve­
ment; indeed, in some cases they may have become a fetish of 
contemporary art. In Tinctoris' day, these criteria were by no 
means generally accepted. The medieval view of the divine 
origin, and hence of the artistic perfection, of the Gregorian 
chant still had eloquent protagonists in the Renaissance. The 
most prominent of these was Johannes Gallicus, a Carthusian 
monk and important writer on music, who died in 1473, and 
whose education is summarized best in his own words: "France 
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bore me and made me a singer. Italy, however, under Vittorino 
da Feltre, a man imbued with Greek as well as Latin letters, 
made me a musician and grammarian, such as I am."8 
Here is what Gallicus says on the Gregorian chant: "Who, 
I pray, would not know that no mention of Plain Chant exists 
before the advent of our Saviour, and that this angelic and 
solemn style of singing was given to us Christians more by 
the Holy Spirit than by humans?"9 The belief in the divine 
perfection of an art must needs lead to a belief in one single, 
immutable art form and to opposition against any new form of 
art. This view was held widely in the Middle Ages. It was still 
shared by Johannes Gallicus, who inveighed against the new 
polyphony that brought about a new art of mensural notation 
with an infinity of new notes, signs, ligatures, and the like. 
The new art that filled Tinctoris with admiration causes 
Johannes Gallicus to erupt in a veritable philippic: "In various 
cyphers and diverse signs and characters they frivolously per­
form all day long new and vain songs crazily devising stupid 
inventions in their proportions which they do not understand. 
Indeed, those familiar with these so-called mensural compositions 
often fill them with cyphers and novel fancies so that even 
their own creators have trouble in performing them; neverthe­
less they praise them, glorying in so vile an enterprise as if 
they had achieved a great thing. What good, o singers, is this 
your madness! Shall this noble science of ours be subjected to 
your cyphers? Far be it! Sing, I pray, sing! Break your tones10 
as you please, think out daily new sweet and tintillating songs, 
waste your time on longs, breves, semibreves, minims! And even 
though you knew all this perfectly, but nothing else, I should 
not call you true singers, let alone musicians."11 
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The sharp divergence of views as to the value of what 
Tinctoris calls "ars nova" and Gallicus "novae phantasiae" is 
based on a radical disagreement concerning the function of 
music. Gallicus upbraids the singers of his day for taking more 
pleasure in singing for the people than for God, for letting 
their vanity, as he says, "seduce, bind, inebriate them with 
their frivolous songs, for talent goes where the mind directs it. 
But no one has served well two masters, as God himself has 
testified."12 
Although disciple of a humanist, albeit a "Christian humanist" 
(Vittorino da Feltre), Gallicus, the Carthusian monk, espouses 
the extreme view of medieval orthodoxy that might be para­
phrased in the words: "musica ancilla theologiae." If it is 
music's single function to please God, and if God through the 
Holy Ghost has inspired Pope Gregory to write down the divine 
chant, the cantus angelicas, as Gallicus calls it, then the musi­
cian's function is limited to the performance of the chant, and 
all writing of new compositions (with the whole intricate 
enterprise of mensural music) is nothing but frivolity, the more 
so since, with its many notes in many voices, it obscures rather 
than illuminates the sacred word. When Gallicus speaks of 
restoration, he means, in theory, a return to Boethius; in prac­
tice, a return to the pristine simplicity of the chant,13 although 
he disclaims any intent to deal with theory as such except when 
necessary. When he finds that the patres antiqui did not use 
more than fifteen notes, he rejects the attempts to expand the 
range of the tone system in these words: "But such frivolity 
did not please Father Gregory."14 
In the center of Tinctoris' manifold writings on music stands, 
solidly fixed, "Man."15 This is why secular and liturgical music 
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mingle in his treatises in easy and equal companionship; this is 
why, in all musical questions, the ear and artistic judgment 
reign supreme. Tinctoris, throughout his treatise on counterpoint 
—to select the central part of his work—uses not only phrases 
like these: such a procedure "offends the sophisticated ear";16 
or, in this procedure "the ear of the listener finds a modicum of 
sweetness";17 but, also, "in the judgment of my ears."18 
It is, of course, a truism that music, at all times, and also 
during the Middle Ages, was an art of the ear. That medieval 
theorists refer to the ear surely needs no documentation. To 
regard medieval music as governed by mathematics alone would 
be as wrongheaded as to consider Renaissance music as a matter 
of the ear alone. At all times there is a lively tension and 
interplay between the sensual and the intellectual, in music as 
well as in the other arts. The question is, What happens when 
demands of the ear conflict with those of mathematics? It is, 
however, not only a matter of which element prevails in case 
of conflict, but also how these elements are regarded. Medieval 
theorists speak of "the ear" as an objective entity—much as the 
scholastic speaks of "the Soul" or "the Intellect"—the Renais­
sance theorist not only distinguishes between a common ear 
and a sophisticated one, he begins to speak of "my ear." Personal 
experience now becomes a valid point of departure. Moreover, 
the Renaissance writer introduces a notion peculiarly absent in 
the medieval literature on music, the concept of aesthetic judg­
ment. Finally, it is in the Renaissance that the conflict between 
the ear and mathematics in matters musical is not only openly 
acknowledged but often no less openly resolved in favor of the 
ear. These are fundamental differences. To gloss over them 
means to obscure the historical process, to do injustice to the 
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individuality of two great epochs, and to deprive the history of 
theory of all power to account for the undeniably radical changes 
in the evolution of music itself. 
For Tinctoris the chief distinction of the music of his day 
lay in its new wealth of consonances. Spreading over a full 
three octaves—exceeding the medieval range by three half tones 
—"modern" musicians had at their disposal no fewer than 
twenty-two consonances. Few commentaries are as revealing as 
that by Tinctoris when he sets out to justify this new abun­
dance of consonances in modern compositions as against the 
"six" consonances of Boethius. They are, he says, approved in 
"Aristoxenian fashion by the judgment of the ear."19 Now, in 
medieval and Renaissance theory alike, Pythagoras stood for 
the doctrine that music was subject to numbers, Aristoxenus 
for the opposing doctrine that the ear, not mathematical 
proportion, was decisive in matters of music. 
One would have to go far afield to find a medieval theorist 
who would, in the crucial matter of consonances, give prefer­
ence to Aristoxenian views over the time-honored Pythagorean 
sanction of consonance by mathematical proportion. This would 
already have been difficult because Aristoxenus had been thor­
oughly discredited by Boethius, whose authority in matters of 
music was unquestioned throughout the Middle Ages. Boethius 
had castigated Aristoxenus variously as the man "who left all 
judgment up to the ear,"20 "who permitted everything to the 
judgment of the ear."21 To him, he opposed Pythagoras, who 
"having left behind the judgment of the ear, having proceeded 
to the underlying causes, mistrusting any human ear"—now 
follows a description of the unreliability of the sense of hearing— 
"and setting no store by instruments"—here follows a catalogue 
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of reasons for the unreliability of instruments—"inquired how 
one could explore the true cause of consonance through reason 
in a solid and reliable fashion."22 
These words find their echo quite generally in medieval 
treatises on music.23 Pythagoras is extolled, Aristoxenus is 
ignored or dismissed a "lending too much credence to the sense 
of hearing."24 The fear of the eleventh-century [Pseudo-]-
Bernelinus, "lest we leave this only to the judgment of the ear, 
and seem to approach Aristoxenus while being condemned by 
Boethius and the Pythagoreans/'25 is characteristic of the 
medieval outlook. 
We must recall this to appreciate the quiet revolution 
manifested in Tinctoris' words: "approved in Aristoxenian 
fashion by the judgment of the ear."26 
Obviously, the Renaissance writers on music, a quarrelsome 
lot by any standards, did not suddenly agree on acclaiming 
Aristoxenus as their new patron saint—and this for many 
reasons: the immense weight and authority of the "official" 
tradition; the undiminished poetic glamor and philosophical 
appeal of the idea of music as an echo of the "harmony of the 
universe" and a sounding image of mathematical proportion; 
that Aristoxenus was identified not only with a general philos­
ophy of music but with certain practical procedures such as equal 
temperament, which was a controversial issue throughout the 
Renaissance;27 and last (but not least), the intellectual temper 
of men like Zarlino—to name the most important figure—who 
strove toward a harmonious compromise between the opposing 
doctrines. 
When the center of gravity in theory shifts from mathematics 
to the sensual and aesthetic aspects of music, one may expect a 
concomitant reversal of the medieval view which placed theory 
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on the top of the pyramid and practical music at the bottom. 
Indeed, Tinctoris now assigns the leading role in musical culture 
to the composer. In a gesture, the symbolic value of which 
cannot be missed, he dedicates his treatise on modes28 to the 
two greatest composers of his time, Johannes Ockeghem and 
Antoine Busnois, chapelmasters of the King of France and the 
Duke of Burgundy, respectively. More novel yet is the recogni­
tion given to musical performers. The medieval theorist took, at 
best, a condescending view of the performer. Boethius had 
declared: "Physical practice is like a servant, but theory reigns 
like a lord." Following him, medieval theory reserved the title 
musicus for the speculative theorist; the cantor, on the other 
hand, was he who merely sang without deeper understanding 
of the foundations of music. He was, therefore, no better than 
a bird, a mere beast: "Nam qui facit, quod non sapit, dimnitur 
bestia." This is the conclusion of Guido of Arezzo's famous 
jingle on the difference between musicus and cantor. 
All of this was in line with medieval philosophy, which 
distinguished between the artes liherales and the artes serviles 
or mechanicae. Since only the soul was considered free, any art 
exercised by the body was a servile, a mechanical, art.29 Thus 
musical performance was on a par with navigation, hunting, 
weaving, which were, to the unceasing vexation of the artists, 
considered equal to drawing, painting, and sculpture. 
It is, therefore, not customary for a medieval theorist to 
mention, let alone praise, musical performers. It is even rare, 
indeed quite exceptional, to find him discussing individual 
composers. 
Tinctoris, on the other hand, made it fashionable for musical 
theorists to discuss and analyze specific works of specific com­
posers and to mention and praise the merits of individual singers 
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and instrumentalists. One may say that he created the begin­
nings of the concert review when he not only published a list 
of the greatest singers of his age30 but proceeded to define the 
qualifications of a good singer in this order: art, rhythm, style, 
vocal rendering, and a good voice.31 
If a good voice may be regarded as a physical attribute, art, 
rhythm, style, and vocal rendering have to do with matters of 
artistic judgment and execution. With this definition of good 
singing in which intellectual and physical attributes are mingled, 
Tinctoris brushes aside as meaningless both the traditional dis­
tinction between an ars liberalis and an ars servilis and that 
between the musicus and the cantor. This is evident, also, from 
Tinctoris' definition of musicus in his famous dictionary of 
musical terms. Although he still quotes Guido's rhyme, he 
explains that a "musician is he who assumes the office of singer 
after careful rational investigation through benefit of thought."32 
Tinctoris boldly undertook to merge the opposites of an old, 
invidious comparison into a new harmonious synthesis.33 
Tinctoris also singles out great instrumental virtuosos for 
praise. The famous lutanist Pietro Bono, favorite at a number 
of Renaissance courts, is extolled for his skill in improvising 
embellishments on a given theme; the German Orbus, for his 
ability to play two, three, or four parts on the lute.34 
A direct line leads from Tinctoris, Neapolitan by choice, 
to Luigi Dentice, native Neapolitan nobleman, who in his 
Dialoghi of 1553, written in the vernacular, describes a concert 
in the house of Donna Giovanna of Aragon, gives the names of 
the performers, their voices and instruments, and confesses that 
only few solo singers who accompany themselves on an instru­
ment can please him, "because all of them are deficient in one 
or another regard: either in intonation, or in pronunciation, or 
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in their accompaniment, or in their embellishment, or in their 
use of crescendo or decrescendo where needed: things acquired 
partly by art and partly by natural talent."35 
The sophistication with which connoisseurs now judge the 
performer's art extends to the cultivated layman. Dentice is 
followed by the Florentine mathematician Cosimo Bartoli. In 
his Ragionamenti accademici, published in 1567, but written a 
good twenty years earlier, Bartoli gives accounts of the musicians 
of his time—composers, singers, instrumentalists—that are aston­
ishingly acute in musical judgment. Interestingly enough, Bartoli 
agrees closely with Tinctoris' estimate of the rebirth of music; 
but writing seventy years after him, he dates it one generation 
later. He writes: "I am well aware that in his day Ockeghem 
was, as it were, the first to rediscover music then as good as 
dead, just as Donatello discovered sculpture in his; and that of 
Josquin, Ockeghem's pupil, one may say that he was a natural 
prodigy in music, just as our own Michelangelo Buonarotti has 
been in architecture, painting, and sculpture; for just as Josquin 
has still to be surpassed in his composition, so Michelangelo 
stands alone and without a peer among all who have practiced 
his arts; and the one and the other have opened the eyes of all 
who delight in these arts, now and in the future."36 
THE NATURE OF THE NEW 
We have returned, in a somewhat surreptitious fashion, to our 
point of departure, Tinctoris' praise of the music of his day as 
a new art and his dating of the origins of this new art as about 
1435. What is the nature of the new art? 
Writing in 1477, Tinctoris was witness to the first evolution 
of modern harmony and counterpoint, i.e., that harmony and 
that counterpoint which, in their essential outlines, have domi­
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nated musical thought for almost half a millenium. In this sense 
"modern harmony" is the art of concord based on the triad, and 
"modern counterpoint" is the art of combining two, three, four, 
five, and more voices in such a manner that the greatest melodic 
and rhythmic freedom of each single voice may be obtained 
in a carefully regulated harmonic sound texture. The classical 
medieval technique of finishing one voice-part before adding 
another, in which the harmonic sound was the result rather than 
the clearly intended aim, gave way to a new compositional 
technique in which all parts of a composition were conceived 
and designed simultaneously in constant relation to one an­
other.37 Naturally, the harmonic result of the medieval technique 
could not help but turn out to be haphazard, with dissonances 
emerging often by chance. In the new technique of the Renais­
sance the euphony of the whole was planned in advance; and 
the treatment of dissonance, for the first time in polyphonic 
composition, was carefully designed as to the degree of sharp­
ness, its preparation and resolution, and its timing. 
Comparison of a three-part chanson by the mature Dufay 
(1400-74) with one by Machaut (1300-77) would show that 
Dufay designs the parts in close association with one another so 
that a euphonious harmonic whole results, whereas Machaut 
lets them run merrily alongside one another, concerned only 
that they should, at the conclusion of phrases, come together in 
a perfect consonance or a triad, allowing any sort of dissonance 
or parallel motion in octaves and fifths along the way. This 
unconcern with regulated harmony struck the Renaissance ear 
as so barbarous, and the Renaissance mind as so insufficient to 
the demands of art, that Tinctoris could deny, with assurance 
of complete approval, the existence of any music worth hearing 
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before 1430, roughly speaking, when, for the first time, harmony 
was made a primary goal of polyphonic organization.38 
Tinctoris was fully aware of the new principles governing 
the ars nova of his time. Indeed, his treatise on counterpoint is 
the classic document of the new harmonic art and the new 
treatment of dissonance, and should more properly be called a 
treatise on harmony and counterpoint. Its three books deal in 
turn with consonances, dissonances, and eight rules of counter­
point. It is with pride that the Flemish-Italian theorist compares 
the richness of his twenty-two consonances with the poverty of 
the six consonances of Boethius.39 To be sure, a long line of 
development led from Boethius to Tinctoris. Prosdocimo de 
Beldemandis, for example, in his small treatise on counterpoint 
written in 1412,40 comes very close to Tinctoris' repertory of 
consonances even though he does not present it in such syste­
matic form; and he was preceded by many others who lib­
eralized Boethius' restricted scheme. But there is a significant 
distinction between Prosdocimo's and Tinctoris' explanation of 
the "imperfect" consonances. Prosdocimo, commenting on the 
intervals of the third and sixth and their "equivalents," the 
tenth and thirteenth, says: "they are called imperfect because 
the consonance which they render to the human ear, while good, 
is not perfect, but imperfect."41 Tinctoris, playing on the double 
meaning of perfectio as "perfection" and as "cadence," i.e., the 
ending—and therefore the perfecting—of a musical phrase, says: 
"Perfect are those [consonances] through which, as the prin­
cipal ones, and therefore more apt for this function, the cadences 
of each composition are constituted"—and now he enumerates 
the ten perfect consonances from the unison to the triple octave. 
"Imperfect are those through which, being less important and 
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not fit for this function, no cadence can be effected in a 
composition,"42 and now follows a list of the two thirds, two 
sixths, and their composites in the second and third octaves 
(twelve imperfect, and thus twenty-two consonances altogether). 
Tinctoris throws overboard the whole notion that the ear 
distinguishes between perfect and imperfect consonances in the 
literal sense of these words. Holding fast to his point of depar­
ture, his own sense of hearing, and knowing full well the 
importance which thirds and sixths have in the composition of 
his day, he preserves the old terminology, while giving it a new 
definition. Thus he appears to be the first theorist who dismisses 
the traditional notion of "imperfect" consonances. But he does 
it in such a quiet way—and this distinguishes the Fleming from 
the fierce Spanish temperament of Ramos (of whom we shall 
hear presently)—that it went practically unnoticed. 
Johannes Gallicus, Tinctoris' immediate predecessor, considers 
the thirds and sixths—and here he proves himself more old-
fashioned than many a medieval writer—as not even worthy of 
the name of consonance; he calls them "dissonantiae compassi­
biles,"43 ("tolerable dissonances"). Gallicus justifies his unusual 
classification in the orthodox medieval manner on the grounds 
of mathematical proportion.44 In an earlier chapter, he speaks 
of the three perfect consonances, eulogizing the octave as 
a God-like consonance based on the perfect relationship of 
multiple ratio 1 :2 . Fifth and fourth, based on the super-
particular ratios 2 : 3 and 3 : 4 —about which presently—lose in 
perfection to the same degree as they gain in distance from the 
simple multiple ratio of the octave. While this reasoning puts 
him squarely in the camp of the Pythagoreans and the ancient 
Greeks whose musical philosophy he wishes to restore and to 
apply to the "angelic" music of the Gregorian chant, it removes 
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him effectively from the company of his contemporaries, par­
ticularly the composers of the despised counterpoint. 
Although Tinctoris' theory of consonance is couched in the 
traditional form of a theory of intervals, i.e., consonances con­
sisting of two tones only, two qualifications should be made. 
First, in the medieval view an interval is a static phenomenon. 
Since the mathematical proportion for any interval is fixed, the 
character of the interval is likewise fixed. In Tinctoris' view 
the character of consonance can change according to its context. 
A single major sixth, for example, reckoned as dissonance by 
previous generations of musicians, strikes Tinctoris' ear still 
somewhat roughly; but set in a series of sixth chords and fol­
lowed by the proper endings (of an octave or a tenth), the 
interval can be used with excellent results.45 This again is a 
courageous acknowledgment of the superiority of the ear over 
mathematics in matters of music. Secondly, Tinctoris actually 
does treat the harmonic phenomenon of the triad, even though 
only indirectly. Discussing further the relative character of the 
sixth, he says that it can be transformed to unqualified sweet­
ness when appearing in company of a third voice with either 
third and tenth, or, much better yet, with fifth or twelfth, i.e., 
as a triad in open position with the root in the bass.46 
The new wealth of harmony described by Tinctoris was 
based not only on the different sensibilities of the Renaissance 
ear but also on the boldness of the Renaissance mind deter­
mined to recognize as consonances intervals such as the thirds 
and the sixths—felt to be consonant by the ear although accord­
ing to Pythagorean mathematical theory no simple, i.e., multiple 
or superparticular, ratio existed for them.47 A multiple ratio is 
the relationship of two numbers the larger of which contains a 
multiple of the smaller ( 1 : 2 , 1 : 3  , and so on). A super­
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particular ratio is the relationship of the two succeeding num­
bers. The relationship of a tone to its octave corresponds to the 
multiple ratio i : 2 ; a fifth corresponds to 2 : 3  , a fourth to 
3 : 4  , both superparticular ratios. Now Renaissance theory—and 
I shall return to this later—put up the superparticular ratio 4 : 5 
for the major, and 5:6 for the minor, third,48 although from 
the Pythagorean (or strictly mathematical) point of view, these 
were not exact ratios but mere approximations. Zarlino codified 
the so-called senario—that is, the series of proportions from 1 : 2 
to 5 : 6—as the mathematical origin of all harmony.49 
This change in the mathematical formulas for the so-called 
imperfect consonances signified at once the spirit of criticism 
that dared deviate from the sacrosanct code of Pythagorean 
proportions and the belief in the reality of the theory of pro­
portions as a life-giving principle of harmony. The theory of 
proportions was not rejected as opposed to experience; it was 
adjusted to experience. If one reads Zarlino's chapter "on the 
proprieties of the senary" and observes his procedure in sound­
ing together all the intervals born from these relationships (i.e., 
octave, fifth, fourth, major third, minor third), "out of which 
emerge such harmony that the ear derives highest pleasure from 
it," one perceives that the Renaissance with regard to Pythagoras 
and Aristoxenus underwent Hegel's dialectic evolution of thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis. One also understands now why Zarlino 
calls the great Venetian composer Adrian Willaert, a native of 
Flanders and the professed model of his theoretical work, not 
a "new Aristoxenus," but a "new Pythagoras."50 For, once the 
adoption of the Aristoxenian principle of the ear's leadership 
had brought about the acknowledgment of the thirds and sixths 
as consonances, and once the Pythagorean principle of the 
relationship between numerical proportion and consonance had 
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been translated into the new "senario," the old marvel of the 
union of mathematics and harmony was not only revived but 
miraculously increased. 
Unquestionably, Zarlino considered the synthesis of Pytha­
gorean and Aristoxenian principles as a triumph of this theory. 
No doubt it satisfied the deepest aspirations of the Renaissance 
mind at its point of balance and maturity. 
This interpretation is corroborated by Zarlino's mediating 
stand in the age-old question on the pre-eminence of reason 
over the senses or vice versa. Zarlino emphasizes the importance 
he attaches to his position in this problem by reserving its 
treatment for the last chapter of his work. His thought can 
best be summarized in his own words: "Senses without reason, 
reason without senses are equally powerless to deliver a solid 
judgment on whatever scientific problem; such judgment be­
comes possible when the two are joined together."51 This is 
Zarlino's significant modification of the position of Boethius,52 
who declares the senses to be the obedient servant, but reason 
the judge and master. 
Unlike Ramos, Zarlino did not trumpet his disagreement 
with Boethius, Guido, and the whole complex of medieval 
theory all over the world. But that he considered his own 
philosophy of music as a triumph over that of his predecessors, 
and inspired by the God of Music, he hinted unmistakably in 
the miniature illustration adorning the initial of his Proemio. 
The letter "M" with which his work begins stands for "Music" 
as well as for "Marsyas" who is shown lying on the ground, 
helpless, as Apollo begins to flay him—a hint the more significant 
as Zarlino seems to have been himself responsible for the publi­
cation of his first and greatest work: no printer's name is 
mentioned, and the printer's privilege of the Venetian Republic 
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is granted to "Gioseffo Zarlino da Chioza." Besides, Zarlino 
underscores his intention by reserving the "Marsyas" miniature 
for the beginning of his work. Wherever else a chapter begins 
with the letter "M,"53 we see Mars holding Venus in passionate 
embrace, while the treacherous net descends upon the lovers. 
Who is the Marsyas whom Zarlino wishes to be flayed? 
Indubitably, Nicola Vicentino, who also opens the first chapter 
of his work, L'antica musica ridotta alia moderna prattica, Rome, 
1555 (about which later), with a large historiated initial show­
ing a differently conceived scene of Apollo's flaying of Marsyas. 
The victim stands tied to a tree, with his arms raised above his 
shoulders. Apollo holds a knife in his right hand, in his left 
the skin of Marsyas' right arm. Behind Marsyas, on a branch 
of the tree, hangs his instrument, the panpipes; in Apollo's 
corner stands, slightly tilted, a stringed instrument, half viola da 
gamba, half lira da braccio, with only three strings. In the 
background is a round tempietto, a shrine undoubtedly dedicated 
to the god of the muses. 
That Zarlino had Vicentino in mind when he opened his 
work published three years later with an initial depicting the 
same scene may be concluded from the fact that the last chapter 
of the third book offers an explicit and spirited rebuttal of 
Vicentino's ideas (see note 104). 
BEGINNINGS OF AN AESTHETICS OF MUSIC 
If Tinctoris' treatment of consonances marks the beginning 
of the Renaissance concept of harmony,54 his treatise on counter­
point contains also the first formulation of aesthetic principles. 
His eight rules of counterpoint culminate in the demand that 
"variety should be most diligently searched for in all counter­
point, for as Horace has it in his Poetica:55 'a harper is laughed 
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at who always blunders on the same string.' As in the art of 
speech, in Cicero's opinion,56 variety pleases the listener greatly, 
so also in polyphonic music diversity stimulates the listener's 
soul to intense enjoyment. Hence Aristotle, in his Ethics,57 did 
not hesitate to assert that variety is a very pleasing thing and 
the nature of man stands in need of it."58 
If variety, adopted as a conscious principle of aesthetics to 
govern all aspects of composition, is noteworthy in a fifteenth-
century treatise on music, even more remarkable are the refer­
ences to Horace's De arte poetica, to Cicero's De oratore, and 
to Aristotle's Ethics. Far from presenting the vanity of a Renais­
sance musician trying to impress his colleagues with learned 
quotations, these references are a serious and novel attempt to 
lift the discussion of musical composition from the level of a 
craft to that of an art that shares in the principles of other arts. 
Without mentioning it explicitly, Tinctoris, in elaborating upon 
the idea of varietas, introduces also the principle of decorum, 
well known from rhetoric and poetics, when he observes: "How­
ever, in all of this a sense of proportion is highly necessary . . . 
for the number and character of varieties that are suitable to a 
chanson are not the same ones that suit a motet, nor do those 
that are suitable to a motet befit a Mass."59 
If Tinctoris was interested in the ideas of ancient Greek and 
Roman writers on rhetoric and literary style, we may certainly 
assume that he was curious about ancient Greek music. But 
two great obstacles confronted him and his contemporaries: no 
monuments of Greek music were known in his day, and Latin 
translations of Greek authors dealing with music were not as 
yet (when musicians still knew no Greek) generally available.60 
In the dedication of his Proportionate to King Ferdinand of 
Sicily, Tinctoris pays tribute to the great tradition of Greek 
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music, he enumerates the names of famed Greek musicians, but 
then goes on to say: "Yet, we have no written tradition informing 
us how they performed or composed, but it is very likely that 
they did so with great elegance."61 
However, there is one aspect of Greek music that fascinated 
Tinctoris as well as all other Renaissance musicians—curiously 
enough, it is one that almost all music historians of the last one 
hundred years have met with embarrassed silence, if not out­
right contempt.62 This is the Greek theory and Greek legends 
concerning the psychological, and often miraculous, effects of 
music. Tinctoris himself wrote a treatise entitled Complexus 
effectuum musices,63 which he dedicated to Beatrice of Aragon. 
With the thoroughness peculiar to his Flemish turn of mind, 
he enumerated twenty effects of music, describing each one of 
them in a separate chapter and proving their truth with a 
whole corpus of quotations in which Solomon and David, St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas find themselves in the 
company of Aristotle and Vergil, Horace and Ovid, Cicero and 
Quintilian. He concluded his treatise with these words: "He 
who studies these effects will never regret having applied his 
talent to this branch of the [musical] discipline. On the con­
trary, he will, with burning enthusiasm, daily increase his study 
of that music, which kings, which other princes, and which 
free men have used, and which brought them commendation 
and glory! This is the music approved and taught by Lycurgus, 
Plato, Quintilian. He who follows their teachings shall never 
fail the art nor shall the ornament of art ever fail him."64 
Franchino Gafori who, as a young man, spent two years in 
Naples with Tinctoris and later served at the court of Milan 
together with Leonardo da Vinci, and who followed Johannes 
Gallicus in proudly cultivating a humanistic Latin style, opened 
his Theorica musicae of 1480, his first publication, with a 
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long and elaborate chapter on the effects of music.65 Whereas 
Tinctoris still distinguished between Christianity and the falsa 
religio66 of the Romans, Gafori relates the miracles effected by 
Orpheus, Amphion, Arion, Timotheus, and countless other 
Greek musicians with the religious awe of the true humanist. 
Even that hard-bitten Spanish skeptic Bartolomeo Ramos, 
whose sarcastic attacks on Guido of Arezzo, patron saint of 
medieval music, aroused the ire of generations of theorists, 
especially his own, when it came to these wonder stories, said: 
"However fabulous and incredible they appear, there is no doubt 
that music works miracles."67 Mentioning by name the legendary 
Greek musicians, he remarked: "It was these whom the ven­
erable antiquity so admired that they were said to move wild 
beasts through the sweetness of their song, to capture the hearts 
of men, to revive the dead, to bend to mercy the spirits of the 
underworld, to draw trees from the mountains."68 And he 
added: "Without a doubt, music has immense effect upon and 
mighty power over the human soul, whether to calm or to 
rouse it. If in our time music does not work so many miracles, 
it is to be attributed not to the art, whose perfection exceeds 
that of Nature, but to those who use the art badly. If those 
excellent [Greek] musicians whom we remembered above were 
called back to life they would deny that our music was invented 
by them—so inept, unharmonious, and dissipated has it been 
rendered through the corruption of certain singers."69 
The fascination of the Renaissance with the "effects" of 
music, as mirrored in a vast literature of writings on music70 
as well as in a special poetic genre, the laudes musicae,11 is 
much more than a curiosity to be excused with the naive 
credulity of this humanistic age for anything ancient;72 it is in 
essence a symbol of the transformation of music from a hand­
maid of theology to the most human art imaginable because it 
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affects man's soul more profoundly and more immediately than 
any other art.73 The fabled effects upon stones, trees, animals, 
and even the ancient deities are only an extension of the effect 
that music exercises over man. This is the significance of the 
ever-repeated legends of Orpheus' victory over the furies and 
the gods of the underworld,74 or of Timotheus' power over 
Alexander in alternately rousing him from table to warring 
passion and calming him again to convivial merriment.75 
The preoccupation with the "effects" of music is unquestion­
ably connected with one of the most fateful changes in the 
orientation of the musical art. If Timotheus could arouse con­
trasting passions in Alexander, he did so by the use of contrast­
ing musical means. To duplicate the ancient effects meant to 
the Renaissance composer that he had to rediscover the varying 
musical means that would produce these effects. 
In other words, should music have the power of tuning man's 
soul to cheer, it had to express cheerfulness; should it arouse 
him to war, it had to express warlike feelings; if it was to lead 
him to melancholy, it had to express sadness. Already Ramos 
was stung by the failure of contemporary music to equal the 
effects of Greek music. In the opinion of an ever increasing 
number of Renaissance musicians, this failure was due to the 
lack of expressive power in the music of their time.76 
If the composers were to succeed in developing the expressive 
vein of music, they would have to free themselves increasingly 
from technical considerations blocking their free invention. This 
is, I believe, the chief reason for the emancipation of Renais­
sance polyphony from cantus-firmus technique, from the stric­
tures of canonic writing, from the artifice of rhythmic pro­
portions. In a cantus-firmus work the composer selected a 
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pre-existent melody, liturgical or secular, for the tenor part 
while using the other voices to build a contrapuntal edifice over 
this foundation. Hence the composer's imagination was restricted 
not only in the tenor part, but in the conception of the whole, 
since all parts are tied to the tenor. In a composition based on 
simple or multiple canon, the invention of melody was deter­
mined and restricted by the need to have that same melody 
imitated in other voices without violating the laws of harmony 
and counterpoint. In a work based on the play with rhythmic 
proportions, each voice may go under its own time signature, 
or the single voices themselves may engage in changing meters 
while constantly conflicting with the meter of all other voices. 
Here the rhythmic life of the music is mathematically predeter­
mined and thus the composer has no freedom to adjust his 
rhythm to expressive purposes. The place of these techniques in 
shaping musical form was now taken over by the poetic text, 
the composer's imagination being directed more and more by 
the pictorial and emotional content of the words.77 
It is this change of which Adrian Petit Coclico in his 
Compendium musices of 1552 speaks when he admonishes the 
young musician "not to waste his time on the lengthy writings 
of musical mathematicians, who contrived so many categories 
of augmentation and diminution signs, from which proceeds no 
enjoyment, but quarrel and discord in plenty, and through 
which a thing clear in itself is rendered obscure. Rather let 
them apply all mental energies to sing ornately, to place the 
text well, for Music is created by God not for quarreling, but 
for its sweet sound. In truth, the musician is he, and is held to 
be he, who rather than chatter and scribble a lot on numbers 
and proportions, on signs and note values, knows how to sing 
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tastefully and sweetly, giving each note its appropriate syllable, 
and how to compose so as to render joyful words in joyful tones 
and vice versa, etc/'78 
One hundred years earlier, Johannes Gallicus, the Carthusian 
monk, had issued a similar warning against the artifices of an 
overly complex counterpoint, but his alternative was a return 
to the simplicity of the plain chant and to the cultivation of 
music for the single purpose of the divine service. Now, Coclico, 
a Flemish Catholic turned Protestant, condemned the mathe­
matical intricacies of Netherlandish polyphony with no less 
zeal, but the alternative is a music designed to please a human 
audience, as far as performance is concerned, and to express 
the emotions of the text as far as composition is concerned. 
If the composer was to express the emotions of the words, 
he needed, in the first place, emotional texts. In the fifteenth 
century the Mass, with its ancient hallowed unchanging words, 
had been the mainstay of religious music; the late fifteenth and 
the sixteenth centuries turned increasingly to the motet, in 
which the composer was free to select any part of the Old or 
the New Testament as well as any part of the Breviary, 
and even secular texts, for polyphonic settings. The emotional 
language of the psalms, the impassioned tone of the love poems 
in the Song of Solomon, the most moving scenes from the Old 
Testament—David weeping over Jonathan, David lamenting 
Absalom, Job's despair, innocent Susanna condemned to death— 
and even, from the Aeneid, Dido's lament; all of these are new 
topics in Renaissance music; and their representation elicited 
new tones from the old lyre.79 
By common acclaim of his contemporaries, Josquin des Prez 
Qca. 1440-1521) exceeded all other composers in the art of 
endowing the old counterpoint with the novel spirit of expres­
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siveness. All writers of his time remark on this, none more 
poignantly than the Swiss humanist, musician, and theorist of 
music, Henricus Glareanus. In his Dodekachordon, published in 
1547 but completed in 1540, he pays this tribute to Josquin: 
"No one has more effectively expressed the passions of the soul 
in music than this symphonist, no one has more felicitously 
begun, no one has been able to compete in grace and facility 
on an equal footing with him, just as there is no Latin poet 
superior in the epic to Maro. For just as Maro, with his natural 
facility, was accustomed to adapt his poem to his subject so as 
to set weighty matters before the eyes of his readers with close-
packed spondees, fleeting ones with unmixed dactyls, to use 
words suited to his every subject, in short, to undertake nothing 
inappropriately, as Flaccus says of Homer, so our Josquin, where 
his matter requires it, now advances with impetuous and pre­
cipitate notes, now intones his subject in long-drawn tones, and, 
to sum up, has brought forth nothing that was not delightful to 
the ear, nothing, in short, that was not acceptable and pleasing, 
even when it seemed less erudite, to those who listened with 
judgment."80 
And in commenting on one of Josquin's most expressive 
works, his lament of David on Jonathan, Glareanus remarks: 
". . . Throughout the motet there is preserved what befits the 
mourner, who is wont at first to cry out frequently, then to 
murmur to himself, turning little by little to sorrowful com­
plaints, thereupon to subside or sometimes, when passion breaks 
out anew, to raise his voice again, shouting a cry . .  . by the 
gods, he has everywhere expressed the passion in a wonderful 
way, thus, at the very beginning of the tenor at the word 
'Jonathan/>>81 
When Tinctoris compared polyphonic music to rhetoric and 
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poetics, he did so on a level of abstraction, discussing the gen­
eral principle of variety and its proper use in various genres of 
music. Glareanus, however, in comparing Josquin with Vergil, 
does so with regard to the power of the poet and the composer 
to express emotion in verse or in tones. 
I should like to draw attention to a fleeting phrase in 
Glareanus' eulogy of Josquin: "nothing . . . that was not . . . 
pleasing, even when it seemed less erudite.'' Josquin was un­
excelled in his mastery of contrapuntal artifice. But often when 
concentrating on problems of expression, he relaxed his atten­
tion to problems of contrapuntal complexity,82 and some of 
Josquin's most expressive works, such as his cycle of passion 
motets, are written in a polyphonic style of great simplicity.83 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SECULAR AND THE SACRED 
Music, to acquire, increase, and refine its power of expressive­
ness, had to engage in a double process of loosening old ties, 
removing old rules, and adding new sonorities and new ways 
of organizing sounds. This explains why the sixteenth century 
is the age of experimentation par excellence. 
It is not surprising that many of these experiments were 
inspired by the continued study of Greek musical theory. The 
Greeks' use of the chromatic scale with its succession of two 
semitones and the enharmonic scale with its succession of two 
quarter-tones intrigued the humanists of the Renaissance as 
well as the musicians, connoisseurs and amateurs as much as 
the professionals. 
To introduce the chromatic and enharmonic genders into the 
polyphonic music of the time, the whole edifice of medieval 
musical theory had to be razed and a new structure put in its 
place. It is not by chance that the first man to experiment with 
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the Greek genders was the same one who attacked the venerable 
tradition of Guido of Arezzo's system of solmization, deriding 
the founder of medieval theory with a tone of anticlerical 
irreverence unheard of in the Middle Ages as "perhaps a better 
monk than musician."84 I refer to Bartolomeo Ramos, who 
replaced Guido's six-tone system with one of eight tones and 
thus made superfluous the whole complicated system of muta­
tions,85 who used a complete chromatic scale, recognized thirds 
and sixths as consonances, assigning them the simple ratios of 
4 : 5 and 5 : 6  , introduced significant changes in tuning, had 
already a notion of practical temperament,86 and advocated a 
rich use of chromatic notes in performance on the part of the 
singers, thus revitalizing the old practice of musica ficta. 
One could hardly imagine two reformers of more opposed 
temperaments than Tinctoris and Ramos. The Fleming, a clear­
headed and resolute thinker, was nevertheless conciliatory and 
diplomatic in method. When he infused the old terms with 
new meaning, he was perhaps not following the Evangelist's 
direction about new wine and old bottles. He did so well with 
the old bottles that much of the novelty of the contents remained 
one of the best preserved secrets in the history of music theory. 
Ramos, on the other hand, was a pugnacious man. "I don't fear 
a fight," said he, "if it will be waged in the presence and under 
the arbitration of Reason."87 But aside from a keen mind, he 
also had a sharp tongue. When he attacked Hothby, for example, 
he added insult to injury by concluding his argument with words 
that reduced the opponent to a mere shadow of Guido: "But I am 
not surprised, for he is a follower of Guido. I wish to destroy the 
head, so that the whole body of errors becomes a corpse and can­
not live any longer."88 Nor could his antitheological attitudes fail 
to make enemies. He refuted the validity of the venerable argu­
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ment that the perfection of the ternary meter lay in the trinity 
of the divine persons and the intellective soul with the observa­
tion, "It is a defect to want to prove something in mathematical 
disciplines through analogy."89 What Ramos wanted was obvi­
ously a theory of music as an autonomous field of secular learn­
ing freed from all theological ties and consideration. For this 
the time was not ripe. 
It is not surprising then that the counterattack was opened 
and sustained by churchmen scandalized by the unrestrained 
vehemence of Ramos' fulminations against Guido and the whole 
system of medieval theory. Nicolaus Burtius, who published the 
first pamphlet "against a Spanish prevaricator of the truth"90 
in 1487, called himself on the title page, not only a professor 
of music, but also a student of pontifical law. A priest himself,91 
he dedicated his treatise to the pauperibus clericis ac religiosis, 
and he cites the authority of Mater Ecclesia for the retention of 
the diatonic and the rejection of the chromatic and enharmonic 
genders that Ramos wished to revive.92 For Guido's teaching, 
including the whole system of solmization denounced by Ramos, 
he claims nothing less than divine inspiration—nay, command.93 
John Hothby, the most objective of Ramos' critics, was a 
Carmelite; Gafori, a priest. The lone defender of Ramos, loyal 
to the end, was the keen-minded, mordant Bolognese, Giovanni 
Spataro, the first layman to become choirmaster of the Basilica 
of San Petronio. If the heat with which this controversy was 
conducted has been incomprehensible to music historians from 
Ambros on, it is, I believe, because it has not been realized that 
implied in it was the much larger issue of music as a secular 
art and discipline versus music as a servant of the liturgy. As 
art, Ramos thought, secular music ought to be the equal of 
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church music. As theoretical discipline, music ought to be built 
on a rational foundation free from theological considerations. 
This was the new position, and Ramos himself was quite 
clear about this aspect of his struggle. When he proposes to 
substitute for Guido's tone system his enlarged system of three 
octaves based on C, he does so "that it be of utility not only 
to ecclesiastical, but also the more curious secular music."95 
The old theory from Gregory to Guido is the law of Scripture, 
his new theory is the law of grace; many practice music with­
out benefit of the former, but his new system embraces both arts, 
sacred and secular, and both laws, that of the Scriptures and 
that of nature.96 
Nothing could show more clearly in which direction Ramos 
was moving than this opposition of the law of nature to that 
of the Scriptures. 
Burtius, too, was keenly aware that the struggle was con­
cerned with more than the question of solmization syllables. 
He recognized that the whole foundation of church music 
was beginning to shake under Ramos' onslaught. This is why 
he dedicated his treatise to the clergy, and why he harped 
constantly on Ramos' arrogance in the face of ecclesiastical 
tradition: "If Gregory wished to use only these seven Latin 
letters [a, h, c, . . .] and repeat them as often as needed, and 
if Ambrose and Augustine preferred to follow in his footsteps 
rather than in foreign ones, why don't you blush to pervert 
this order and deprave it with your arrogant censorship? Are 
you perhaps more saintly than these pillars of the Church or 
more cultivated or more experienced? . . . The doctrine of 
that pious monk, spread throughout the world, will last forever, 
notwithstanding your malice, partly because of the Church's 
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approbation, partly because of tbe marvelous invention of the 
notes."97 
Although Ramos had to leave Bologna, although his teachings 
were condemned by a formidable array of authorities, although 
Ramos himself never published anything else after the treatise 
of 1482, not even the second part of it that he had promised in 
this work, the movement that he had set into motion could not 
be stopped. For some time it seemed to go underground. The 
most important writings dealing with the new theories were 
not published,98 the most astonishing compositional experiments 
remained isolated or in manuscript99—but both the writings and 
the experiments prove that the fermentation once begun never 
ceased. That it succeeded finally in transforming the whole 
fabric of music is proven by the appearance, in 1555, of one 
of the most radical treatises on music of all times: Nicola 
Vicentino's L'antica rnusica ridotta alia moderna prattica.100 
This treatise, a systematic theory of composition and per­
formance, not only advocates the use of all chromatic semitones 
and of quarter-tones in imitation of the Greeks and describes 
a new instrument built by its author that had thirty instead of 
twelve tones to the octave, it embodied the first aesthetics of 
expression, so radical in its application that it permitted any­
thing prohibited before, as long as it served the cause of ex­
pression. Even the leap of a tritone, the interval generally 
tabooed in musical theory, was admitted by Vicentino for the 
sake of expressing an extraordinary conceit.101 
Needless to say, Vicentino was attacked no less violently than 
was Ramos. But the time was farther advanced and Vicentino 
had what Ramos lacked, a powerful patron, and a cardinal at 
that, in Yppolito d'Este of Ferrara. The strongest opponent of 
Vicentino was Zarlino, the celebrated Venetian theorist, who, 
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three years after Vicentino, published the most comprehensive, 
balanced, and judicious treatise of the century: the Istitutioni 
harmoniche. It is significant for the great changes described 
that Zarlino and Vicentino agree on the principle of text ex­
pression as the guiding consideration for the composer,102 that 
they disagree only on the extent to which this principle should 
be carried. Zarlino upheld a concept of intrinsic musical beauty: 
he allowed presentation of strong emotions only as long as the 
music "does not offend the ear"—a statement that is curiously 
remindful of one by Mozart, two hundred and twenty-five years 
later, to the effect that "passions, whether violent or not, must 
never be expressed to the point of tedium, and music, even in 
the most dreadful (dramatic) situation, should never offend 
the ear, but should still please even then, hence should always 
remain music."103 For Vicentino there was no such considera­
tion. Zarlino opposed the extremes of Vicentino's theory, his 
chromaticism, his microtones, his new intervals, and his dis­
sonance treatment.104 
ALBERTI AND TINCTORIS: A COMPARISON 
In conclusion I should like to suggest the strong parallel 
between developments in Renaissance music and Renaissance 
painting by comparing Tinctoris's book on counterpoint with 
Alberti's tract on painting.105 
Significant is the coincidence between Tinctoris* ars nova, 
the birthdate of which is fixed by him as circa 1435, and Leon 
Battista Alberti's epoch-making treatise Delia pittura, the date 
of which is 1436. As Tinctoris, in the struggle between the 
superiority of mathematics versus the ear, decides for the ear, 
so does Alberti for the eye when he, in the beginning of his 
treatise, writes: "In all this discussion, I beg you to consider me 
not as a mathematician but as a painter writing of these things. 
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Mathematicians measure with their minds alone the forms of 
things separated from all matter. Since we wish the object to be 
seen, we will use a more sensate wisdom."106 
Alberti's treatise presents the first theory of perspective which 
Erwin Panofsky has defined as the "perfect unification and 
systematization of three-dimensional space."107 In this new 
concept of pictorial space, to quote another art historian, "the 
new role of the spectator in relation to the picture . . . reflects 
the growing humanism of the period."108 
The new Renaissance polyphony unifies the various inter­
vallic layers of counterpoint into one coherent harmonic body; 
all musical phenomena must find their justification in the ear. 
Man takes a central position in both the new visual and 
musical art. Like Tinctoris, Alberti dedicates his work to a living 
artist, Brunelleschi; like Tinctoris, he quotes ancient authors, 
praises ancient art, and stresses the effects of painting upon 
man. "Painting contains," he says, "a divine force which not 
only makes absent men present . . . but moreover makes the 
dead seem almost alive. . . . Plutarch says that Cassander, one 
of the captains of Alexander, trembled through all his body 
because he saw a portrait of his King. . . . They say that 
Phidias made in Aulis a god Jove so beautiful that it consider­
ably strengthened the religion then current."109 
Alberti, like Tinctoris, stresses the principle of variety: "In 
food and in music novelty and abundance please, as they are 
different from the old and usual. So the soul is delighted by all 
copiousness and variety. For this reason copiousness and variety 
please in painting."110 Alberti discusses the uses of variety in 
the number and difference of personages, of poses and motions, 
and of color. The principle of selection is decorum or con­
venienza. "The painting ought to have pleasant and graceful 
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movements, suitable to what is happening there. The move­
ments and poses of virgins are airy, full of simplicity, with 
sweetness of quiet rather than strength. . .  . In men the move­
ments are more adorned with firmness, with beautiful and 
artful poses. In the old the movements and poses are fatigued. 
m
. . . "  As they praise variety, both Albert!112 and Tinctoris113 
also warn against repetitiousness. Of course, in all of this Alberti 
precedes Tinctoris as Renaissance painting precedes Renais­
sance music in the portrayal of emotions of which Alberti says: 
"We painters . . . wish to show the movements of the soul 
by movements of the body. . . .  "1 1 4 
While the representation of the reality of man and the world 
receives attention of unprecedented intensity in Renaissance 
painting and music, while eye and ear attain to a position of 
unrivaled dominance in their respective arts, the ancient idea 
of mathematical proportion was by no means set aside; on the 
contrary, as Panofsky has pointed out, "the theory of proportions 
achieved an unheard-of prestige in the Renaissance. The pro­
portions of the human body were praised as the visual realization 
of musical harmony."115 But Panofsky shows that this theory 
was thoroughly revolutionized by "three forms of subjectivity" 
for the first time legitimized by the Renaissance: organic move­
ment, perspective foreshortening, and the regard for the visual 
impression of the beholder. "Organic movement introduces . . . 
the subjective will and the subjective emotions of the thing 
represented; foreshortening the subjective visual experience of 
the artist; and those 'eurhythmic' adjustments which alter that 
which is right in favor of that which seems right, the sub­
jective visual experience of a potential beholder."116 
It is uncanny how precisely these changes are echoed in the 
music of the Renaissance. To start from the end: the change 
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of the Pythagorean proportion 64 : 81 for the interval of the 
third to 64 : 80 = 4 : 5 can hardly be better described than a 
"eurhythmic" adjustment which alters that which is right in 
favor of that which sounds right. The subjective auditory experi­
ence of the artist led from polyphony as an organization of 
several layers of intervals, loosely connected, to a unified organi­
zation of harmony,117 and from there, in slow stages, to tonality, 
a system in which all harmonies are related to a single harmonic 
point, the tonic, from which they receive their relative position 
in the harmonic space.118 Finally, "the subjective will and the 
subjective emotions of the thing represented" that led a Michel­
angelo, according to his own statement, to interest himself less 
in numerical measurements than in the observation of atti e 
gesti, led a Josquin des Prez and his followers from a literal 
observation of the lawful consonances and dissonances to the 
expression of an ever-widening scale of human emotions in­
volving novel sonorities such as modulation, chromaticism, and 
treatment of dissonance with increasing boldness. 
The question of tradition and innovation in the Renaissance 
must needs be answered differently in the various fields of 
inquiry. New ideas and conceptions cannot be expected to 
begin in all branches of human creativity at the same time. But 
such phenomena as the discovery of perspective in painting, 
harmony in music, and the new language of emotion that 
slowly transformed both of these arts to give us the great master­
works of European painting and music are so fundamental and 
so new, and they come from such deep springs of human 
consciousness, that we may regard them as symbols of the dawn 
of a new era. 
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Bragard {Corpus scriptorum de musica [Rome, 1955]), and of Marchettus of 
Padua, Pomerium, ed. Joseph Vecchi {Corpus scriptorum de musica, Vol. VI 
[Rome, 1961]), the former usually frowning, the latter smiling, at the moderni. 
6. Couss. IV, 1541?: " . .  . Novae artis fons et origo, apud Anglicos 
quorum caput Dunstaple . . . et huic contemporanei fuerunt in Gallia Dufay 
et Binchois quibus immediate successerunt moderni Okeghem, Busnois, Regis 
et Caron, omnium quos audiverim in compositione praestantissimi." 
7. Ibid.: "Illi etenim in dies novos cantus novissime inveniunt, ac isti 
(quod miserrimi signum est ingenii) una semper et eadem compositione 
utuntur." 
8. Couss. IV, 299a: "Gallia namque me genuit et fecit cantorem. Ytalia 
vero qualemcunque sub Victorino Feltrensi, viro tarn litteris graecis quam 
latinis affatim imbuto, grammaticum et musicum." The first scholar to draw 
attention to Gallicus' study under Vittorino da Feltre was P. O. Kristeller 
in his article on "Music and Learning in the Early Italian Renaissance," 
Journal of Renaissance and Baroque Music, I (1947), 255-74, 266-67. 
9. Couss. IV, 369a: "Quis, oro, scire non debeat nullam prorsus ante 
Nostri Salvatoris adventum de piano cantu factam esse mentionem, huncque 
nobis christianis Angelicum ac tantae gravitatis canendi ritum a Spiritu Sancto 
postea magis quam ab hominibus traditumr1" 
10. Voces frangere refers to what we would now call "florid counterpoint." 
The fifteenth-century Ars contrapunctus secundum Philippum de Vitriaco 
distinguishes between contrapunctus, id est nota contra notam (Couss. Ill, 
23a) and cantus fractibilis in minoribus notis {ibid., p. 27a). Likewise, Pros­
docimo de Beldemandis (Tractatus de contrapuncto, Couss. Ill, 193 ff.) differ­
entiates between contrapunctus . . . stricte sumptus which he defines as 
"unius solius note contra aliquam aliam unicam solam notam in aliquo cantu 
positio" (jbid., p. 194a), in which dissonances are prohibited, and cantus 
fractibilis, which can take dissonances, "eo quod in ipso propter velo­
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citatem vocum earum non sentiuntur dissonantie" (ibid., p. 197a). Obviously, 
Gallicus' voces frangere is the same as Shakespeare's "division" ("Some say, 
the lark makes sweet division," Romeo and Juliet, III, v, 29), a term still 
used in the seventeenth century and defined in Christopher Simpson's Divi­
sion-Viol of 1665 (see the facsimile edition [London, 1955], p. 27) as "the 
Breaking, either of the Bass, or of any higher Part. . . . " 
11. Couss. IV, 344a and 3442?: " . .  . in variis cyfris ac diversis signis 
et caracteribus novos tota die cantus lascivose vanos exequentes totque stultas 
adinventiones in suis quas non intelligunt proportionibus phantasticantes. 
Quippe qui novunt cantus, quos mensuratos appellant, cyfris ac novis phan­
tasiis adeo plenos sepius fabricare, quod nee ipsi, qui fecere, valent illos ut 
plurimum enuntiare, quos nihilominus laudant, in re tarn vilissima, quasi 
magnum quod egerint, gloriantes. Quaenam haec vestra dementia cantores! 
Numquid haec tarn nobilis scientia vestris erit subdita cyfris? Absit. Canite 
quaeso, canite. Voces quantum licet frangite, novas quotidie cantilenas suaves 
et tinnulas excogitate, tempus circa longas breves semibreves ac minimas con­
sumite. Nam cum haec omnia perfecte nee aliud noveritis non dico quidem 
musici, sed neque veri cantores estis." 
12. Couss. IV, 3821?: "Verum quia vos [emended from Coussemaker's nos] 
magis delectat, o cantores mei, vulgo quam deo vestro canere, vos inquam 
vanitas illo permittente seducit, ligat ac inebriat cum vestris vanis cantibus, 
nam ingenium ibi valet, ubi mens intendit. Et nemo duobus dominis teste 
deo bene servivit, inquam." 
13. Having praised Boethius' musica, Gallicus continues (Couss. IV, 
300a): "Mei namque propositi non est theoricam hujus artis velle post tarn 
eximium virum, nisi forsan raro coactus tractare quin potius veram priscorum 
ecclesiae Christi praticam; quae tota nihilominus ab illo fonte [Boetii] pro­
cedit, si possim renovare." 
14. Couss. IV, 346a: "Sed non patri Gregorio placuit haec lascivia." 
These words are echoed in Bartolomeo Ramos' Musica practica of 1482 (see 
the edition of Wolf [Leipzig, 1901], p. 9 ) : "Sed nee Gregorio placuit litterae 
additio, quoniam quindecim tantum usus est." On Gallicus as a predecessor 
of Ramos, see Edward E. Lowinsky, "The Concept of Physical and Musical 
Space in the Renaissance," Papers of the American Musicological Society, 
1941 (1946), pp. 57-84, 75-76. 
15. It goes without saying that a Renaissance writer speaking of man 
usually thinks of him as unburdened by the toil and sweat that is the founda­
tion of life; he thinks of the free man who can devote himself to the higher 
things, and that means in particular to the seven liberal arts (see note 29, 
below). Thus, when Tinctoris dedicates a treatise to his royal disciple, Beatrice 
of Aragon, he expresses the hope she may find that he taught in it something 
worthy of a free man: "si in eo me libero homine digna precepisse [emended 
from Coussemaker's percepisse] inveneris."—Couss. IV, 47a. 
16. " . .  . Aures eruditas ofFendit."—Couss. IV, I l i a . 
17. " . .  . Modicum suavitudinis sensus auditoris percipit."—Ikid., 
18. " . .  . Aurium mearum judicio."—Ibid., p. 88a. 
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19. Couss. IV, 791?: " . .  . ad istas 22 concordantias me restrinxi, quas 
aevi praesentis compositores cantoresque priscis multo praestantiores, more 
Aristoxeni aurium judicio comprobatas, in usum assumpsemnt. . . .  " 
20. Boetii de institutione musica, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. 267: 
"Aristoxenus . . . qui auribus dedit omne iudicium. . . .  " 
21. Ibid., p. 268: " . .  . Aristoxenus musicus, iudicio aurium cuncta per-
mittens. . . .  " 
22. Ibid., pp. 196-97: " . .  . relicto aurium iudicio Pythagoras ad 
regularum momenta migraverit, qui nullis humanis auribus credens . . . 
nullis etiam deditus instrumentis . . . inquirebat, quanam ratione firmiter et 
constanter consonantiarum momenta perdisceret." 
23. Sometimes they are literally quoted as in the Tractatus de musica by 
Hieronymus de Moravia, ed. P. Dr. Simon M. Cserba, O.P. (Regensburg, 
1935), p. 123. 
24. Thus, for example, Jacobus of Liege in his Speculum musicae, Bk. II, 
p. 102: " . . . Aristoxenus, qui nimis sensui credidit. . . .  " 
25. "Bernelini cita et vera divisio monochordi" (Gerbert, Scriptores ecclesi­
astici de musica sacra potissimum, I, 314a—b: . . . ne iudicio tantum aurium 
illud committamus, et Aristoxeno proximare videamur, a Boetio autem & 
Pythagoricis condemnemur.") 
26. Seay's supposition (The Art of Counterpoint, p. 5) "that Tinctoris 
did not realize all the implications of his own approaches to music theory, 
that he was, in a certain sense, a revolutionary writer" becomes in this context 
of ideas completely unthinkable. 
27. See Edward E. Lowinsky, "Adrian Willaert's Chromatic 'Duo' Re­
examined," Tijdschrift voor Muziekwetenschap, XVIII (1956), 1-36, 7—13. 
There I examined the question of equal temperament associated by Renais­
sance writers with Aristoxenus' theorem that the octave is divisible into six 
whole-tone steps. Interestingly enough, Tinctoris, in the same treatise, refers 
to the Aristoxenian division of the octave into six whole tones (Couss. IV, 
p. 91) and to Boethius' refutation of it. If Tinctoris had had any practical 
musical reason for siding in this question with Aristoxenus against Boethius, 
I am inclined to think that he would not have hesitated to do so. But the 
time of the chromatic experiments, when equal temperament became a prac­
tical necessity, was still in the future. 
28. Liber de natura et proprietate tonorum (Couss. IV, 16-41). 
29. See Edgar de Bruyne, Etudes d'esthetique medievale (3 vols.; Bruges, 
1946), II, 385 ff. For Thomas Aquinas' views on artes liberates and artes 
serviles, see ibid., Ill, 335 ff. 
30. See Karl Weinmann, Johannes Tinctoris und sein unbekannter Traktat 
"De usu et inventione musicae" (Regensburg, 1917), p. 33 (a reprint of this 
book has been edited by W. Fischer [Tutzing, 1961]). Weinmann discovered 
in the Proske Music Library at Regensburg the unique copy of an incunabu­
lum, printed in Naples in the year 1487, containing a few chapters of a work 
on the use and the invention of music that has been lost. The print of 1487 
C167)

The Renaissance Image of Man and the World 
was, as it were, a sample from the book offered to his friend, the composer 
Johannes Stokem. The title, stressing two aspects of music usually neglected 
in medieval treatises, practice and history, and also the few chapters pre­
served show that we have suffered a grievous loss in the disappearance of 
this work. The chapters preserved, in which Tinctoris, following Horace's 
injunction, "mingled the sweet with the useful" ("dulci utile miscui") show 
an enchanting combination of practical lore, particularly concerning the in­
strumentarium of his time, and humanistically inspired ancient history of 
music and instruments written in by far the most elegant Latin found in any 
of his treatises. Unquestionably, this was the most humanistic, the most secu­
lar of Tinctoris' treatises; even Christ appears in it like a Christian Apollo. 
Here Tinctoris comes very close to the humanistic style and manner of Gafori, 
whose first work was published in 1478 in Naples, where he spent two years 
(1478-80) enjoying the stimulating company of the Flemish musician. 
31. Ibid.: " . . . ars: mensura: modus: pronunciatio: et vox bona." The 
term "modus" refers here certainly not to mensural notation but to style of 
melody and of singing. In this manner St. Augustine uses the term in his 
Confessions in a passage quoted by Tinctoris in his treatise on modes (Couss. 
IV, 19a): "omnes affectus spiritus nostri pro sua diversitate habent proprios 
modos in voce atque cantu . . .  " ("all affects of our soul have in accordance 
with their diversity their proper styles in voice and song."). The term "pro­
nunciatio" is defined in Tinctoris' Terminorum musicae difjinitorium, ed. 
Armand Machabey (Paris, 1951), p. 43, and in Couss. IV, 186i>, as "venusta 
vocis emissio." 
32. A. Machabey, op. cit., p. 39; Couss. IV, 186a: "Musicus est qui 
perpensa ratione beneficio speculationis, canendi officium assumit." The words 
"non operis servitio" ("not in the service of practice") following in Cousse­
maker and Machabey after "speculationis" do not occur in the original print; 
they appear only in the Brussels manuscript followed by Coussemaker. They 
would serve to sharpen the antithesis between theory and practice that 
Tinctoris attempts to soften. 
33. This escaped Seay who—after a correct exposition of Tinctoris' lack 
of interest in abstract speculation—says (The Art of Counterpoint, p. 5): "It 
is curious, on the other hand, that Tinctoris gives in his Diffinitorium the 
old, old definition of the musician, that taken over directly from Boetius [sic] 
and Guido. . . .  " 
34. See Karl Weinmann, op. cit., p. 35. 
35. Duo dialoghi delta tnusica del Signor Luigi Dentice gentil' huomo 
Napolitano (Rome, 1553), "Dialogo secondo," H3v: "Perche tutti errano in 
qualche cosa, o nella intonatione, o nella pronuntiatione, o nel sonare, o nel 
fare i passaggi, o vero nel rimettere & rinforzar la voce quando bisogna: le 
quali cose, parte per arte, et parte per natura s'acquistano." 
36. Cosimo Bartoli, Ragionamenti accademici (Venice, 1567), pp. 35-36: 
" . .  . io so bene che Ocghem fu quasi il primo che in questi tempi, ritrovasse 
la Musica quasi che spenta del tutto: non altrimenti che Donatello ne suoi 
ritrovo la Scultura; et che Josquino discepolo di Ocghem si puo dire che quello 
alia Musica fusse un monstro della natura, si come e stato nella Architettura 
Pittura et Scultura il nostro Michielagnolo Buonarotti; perche si come Josquino 
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non ha per6 ancora havuto alcuno che lo arrivi nelle composizioni, cosi 
Michelagnolo ancora infrattuti coloro che in queste sue arti si sono esercitati, 
e solo et senza compagno; Et l'uno et l'altro di loro ha aperti gli occhi a tutti 
coloro che di queste arti si dilettano, o si diletteranno per lo awenire."— 
Translation from Alfred Einstein, The Italian Madrigal (Princeton, N.J., 
1949), I, 21. 
37. See Edward E. Lowinsky, "The Concept of Physical and Musical 
Space in the Renaissance," pp. 66—74. Idem, "On the Use of Scores by 
Sixteenth-Century Musicians," Journal of the American Musicological Society, 
I (1948), 17-23, 20-21. 
38. See Heinrich Besseler, Bourdon und Vauxbourdon (Leipzig, 1950), 
pp. 177 ff., in which Tinctoris' date is connected with Dufay's new faux­
bourdon style of ca. 1430 in parallel sixth chords. 
39. Couss. IV, 78a: "Hinc in primis animadvertendum sex tantum con­
cordantiis, ut ex musica Boetii, ex dictisque Macrobii libro secundo in 'Sum­
nium [sic] Scipionis' accepi, nostros ma j ores usos fuisse, id est diatessaron, 
diapenthe, diapason, diatessaron supra diapason, diapenthe super diapason ac 
bis diapason." Oddly enough, neither Boethius nor Macrobius had more than 
five consonances; both excluded the eleventh, i.e., the fourth plus octave, from 
the consonances. See Boetii de institutione musica, Bk. II, chap, xxvii: 
"Diatessaron ac diapason non esse secundum Pythagoricos consonantias"; see 
Bk. I, chap. VII, for the enumeration of the five consonances: fourth, fifth, 
octave, twelfth, double octave. For Macrobius, see In somnium Scipionis, Bk. 
II, chap. I: "Sunt igitur symphoniae quinque id est . .  . ," and then follows 
the enumeration of Boethius' consonances in Greek. 
Tinctoris has eight consonances in one octave and reaches the number of 
twenty-two by repeating them in a second and a third octave in their com­
posite form, the third becoming a tenth and a seventeenth, etc. He denies that 
the composite forms are repetitions of the simple consonances: "Indeed," he 
exclaims, "I do not blush to assert that they really differ from their lower 
prototypes" ("immo eas differre realiter ab inferioribus asserere non erubesco") 
(Couss. IV, 79k), thereby again asserting the supremacy of the ear which 
certainly distinguishes between the sound of a third and that of a tenth. 
40. Tractatus de contrapuncto, Couss. Ill , 193-99. 
41. Ibid., p. 195b: "et dicuntur imperfecte quia licet consonantiam bonam 
reddant auribus humanis, non tamen perfectam, sed imperfectam." 
42. Couss. IV, 79a: "Perfectae sunt illae per quas tanquam principales 
et ad hoc magis aptas omnis cantus perfectiones constituuntur. . . . Imper­
fectae sunt per quas tanquam minus principales et ad hoc ineptas nulla 
cantus fit perfectio." 
43. Couss. IV, 301k: " . .  . separatis his [emended from "hie"] tribus 
perfectis consonantiis [fourth, fifth, octave], aliae sunt omnes dissonantiae, 
quamquam dytonus ac semidytonus, tonus cum dyapenthe sive semitonium, 
ac hujusmodi sint compassibiles. . . .  " 
44. Couss. IV, 325a, chap, xii: "Cur omnium dissonantiarum aliae sint 
auditui compassibiles, aliae vero non" (see chart, p. 327). 
45. Couss. IV, 8Sa-b: "omnis sexta, sive perfecta sive imperfecta, sive 
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superior sive inferior fuerit, apud antiquos discordantia reputabatur, et ut 
vera fatear, aurium mearum judido per se audita, hoc est sola, plus habet 
asperitatis quam dulcedinis . . . unde accuratissime notandum est nunquam 
sextam superiorem melodiose assumi posse, nisi earn una aut plures aliae sextae 
sequantur, finaliter ad octavam aut decimam superiorem sine interpositione 
concordantiae alterius speciei tendentes. . . .  " 
46. Couss. IV, 89a: "Nam semper et ubique sexta suavis est, si ei tertia 
vel decima supponatur, sed multo suavior si quinta vel duodecima . . . ," and 
then follows a three-part example illustrating the point. 
47. According to Pythagorean theory, the third must be calculated by 
superpositions of four intervals of a fifth ( 2 : 3 ) minus two octaves (1 : 2 ) . 
The formula is ( 2 / 3 ) 4 : ( 1 / 2 ) 2 = 64/81 . It was the Englishman Odington 
writing ca. 1300 who suggested for the first time that 64 : 80 = (4 : 5) was 
so good an approximation of the Pythagorean formula that the interval of a 
major third as well as that of a minor third ( 5 : 6  ) might reasonably be 
regarded as consonances (see Hugo Riemann, Geschichte der Musiktheorie, 
[2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1920], pp. 119-20). This radical innovation of the medi­
eval theory of consonances lay dormant until its revival by Bartolomeo Ramos 
(see following notes). 
48. Musica practica Bartolomei Rami de Vareia, ed. J. Wolf (Leipzig, 
1901), p. 98; translation in Strunk, op. cit., p. 203. 
49. Le Istitutioni harmoniche (Venice, 1558), Pt. 1, chap, viii: "Delle 
varie specie de Numeri" and the following chapters, in particular chap, xv: 
"Delle Proprieta del numero Senario, et delle sue parti; et come in esse si 
ritrova ogni consonanza musicale." 
50. Ibid., Proemio, pp. 1-2: "Nondimeno l'ottimo Iddio . . . ne ha con­
ceduto gratia di far nascere a nostri tempi Adriano Willaert, veramente uno 
de piu rari intelletti, che habbia la Musica prattica giamai essercitato: il quale 
a guisa di nuovo Pithagora essaminando minutamente quello, che in essa puote 
occorrere, et ritrovandovi infiniti errori, ha cominciato a levargli, et a ridurla 
verso quell' honore et dignita, che gia ella era. . . .  " ("Nonetheless, the 
good Lord has accorded us the grace to let be born, in our days, Adrian 
Willaert, truly one of the rarest intellects that ever cultivated the practice of 
music, who, a new Pythagoras, examining closely what she might lack, and 
finding there infinite errors, has begun to remove them, and to lead her back 
to that honor and dignity, that once was hers. . . . " ) 
51. Pt. 4, chap, xxxvi, p. 345: . . . ne il Senso senza la ragione, ne la 
Ragione senza il senso potranno dare giuditio di qualunque oggetto scientifico: 
ma si bene quando queste due parti saranno aggiunte insieme." 
52. De institutione musica, Bk. 1, chap. ix. 
53. See pages 19, 21, 30, 38, 62, 96, 337. H. W. Janson, in his work on 
Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London, 1952), 
Appendix, "Titian's Laocoon Caricature and the Vesalian-Galenist Contro­
versy," pp. 355—64, discusses and illustrates a precise parallel. In the second 
edition of his great work on anatomy, De humani corporis fahrica libri VII, 
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published in 1555, Vesalius uses a new and "specially cut initial V designed 
by an unknown artist, in which Apollo is shown preparing to flay Marsyas" 
(ibid., p. 362). Having been attacked violently by the old guard of Galenists, 
led by his former teacher at the University of Paris, Jacobus Sylvius, Vesalius 
intimates, as Janson convincingly shows, that he, "the victorious 'Apollo/ " was 
now "about to 'dissect' his unsuccessful rival, the 'sylvan' Marsyas." That the 
Apollo-and-Marsyas motif fits better into the work of a musician than into that 
of an anatomist is obvious. The only question in our case is the identity of 
Marsyas: Is it the corporate body of medieval theory to be superseded by 
Zarlino's epoch-making new work? Is it perhaps Vicentino and the chro­
maticists (see above, p. 160-61)? And, final thought, does Apollo represent 
Zarlino, or possibly Willaert, who is credited in the Proemio with the revival 
of a decadent art? Or does he stand for Willaert-Zarlino, the unity of creator 
and thinker, master and disciple? 
54. I have expressed my views on this problem in my articles, "The 
Concept of Physical and Musical Space in the Renaissance," pp. 72-74; 
"English Organ Music of the Renaissance," Musical Quarterly, XXXIX 
(1953), 541 n.; "Music in the Culture of the Renaissance," Journal of the 
History of Ideas, XV (1954), 529-35. 
55. De arte poetica, 355. The English version is from Horace: Satires, 
Epistles, Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (London and New York, 
1926), p. 479. 
56. The reference is probably to Cicero's De oratore, Bk. ii, chap, lxxxii, 
para. 334: "Contio capit omnem vim orationis et gravitatem varietatemque 
desiderat." 
57. Tinctoris refers apparently to Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. viii, chap, xiv 
(see The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon [New York, 19411, 
p. 1058): "There is no one thing that is always pleasant, because our nature 
is not simple. . . . This is why God always enjoys a single and simple 
pleasure; for there is not only an activity of movement but an activity of 
immobility, and pleasure is found more in rest than in movement. But 'change 
in all things is sweet', as the poet says. . . .  " 
58. Couss. IV, \52a-b: "Octava si quidem et ultima regula haec est quod 
in omni contrapuncto varietas accuratissime exquirenda est, nam ut HORATIUS 
in sua poetica dicit: Cytharedus ridetur corda si semper oberrat eadem. Quem­
admodum enim in arte dicendi varietas secundum TULLII sententiam, audi­
torem maxime delectat, ita et in musica concentuum diversitas animam 
auditorum vehementer in oblectamentum provocat, hinc et philosophus, in 
Ethicis, varietatem jocundissimam rem esse naturamque humanam ejus indi­
gentem asserere non dubitavit." 
59. Ibid., 152k: "Verumtamen in his omnibus summa est adhibenda 
ratio . . . nee tot nee tales varietates uni cantilenae congruunt quot et quales 
uni moteto, nee tot et tales [Coussemaker has quales] uni moteto quot et quales 
uni missae." 
60. The first music theorist of the Renaissance who had Greek treatises 
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translated into Latin for his own use seems to have been Gafori (see P. O. 
Kristeller, "Music and Learning in the Early Italian Renaissance," p. 268). 
The first one to have mastered Greek appears to have been Glareanus, whose 
main profession, of course, was that of a humanist and a professor of rhetoric. 
He was so proud of his superiority over other writers on music in this respect 
that he wrote, playing on the old antithesis between musicus and cantor: 
"How is it that there are so few musicians nowadays, and such a big crowd 
of singers? Unquestionably, because so few know Greek!"—Isagoge in musicen 
(Basel, 1516), chap. i. 
61. Couss. IV, 154a: "Tamen qualiter pronunciaverint aut composuerint 
scripto nobis minime constat, verum elegantissime id eos fecisse verisimilimum 
est." 
62. One notable exception is D. P. Walker who, in his "Musical Human­
ism in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," Music Review, II 
(1941), and III (1943) (available also in German translation, Der tnusi­
kalische Humanismus im 16. und fruhen 17, Jahrhundert [Kassel, 1949]), 
concentrated on the "effects," and in particular on their ethical side. It is a 
most useful study, even though "the author is disposed to underestimate the 
contribution made by fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century theory to the 
revival of ancient musical thought and literature" (see my review in Musical 
Quarterly, XXXVII [April, 1951], 285-89). See also Frances A. Yates, The 
French Academies of the Sixteenth Century (London, 1949), in particular 
chap. iii. 
63. Couss. IV, 191-200. 
64. Couss. IV, 200b: "Hos igitur effectus, si quis advertat, nunquam ei 
pigebit ingenium suum huic parti discipline applicuisse: imo in dies affectu 
flagrantissimo melodie studebit, qua reges, qua ceteros principes, quaque liberos 
homines usos fuisse et uti, gloriosum et commendabile est. Hec enim est que 
a Lycurgo, Platone, Quintiliano approbatur precipiturque, quorum precepta 
qui sequitur, et ars illi, et ille arti decori in sempiternum erit." 
65. Franchini Gafuri Theorica musicae (facs. ed.; Rome, 1934), with a 
Preface by Gaetano Cesari. The opening chapter is entitled: "De musicis et 
effectibus atque comendatione musice discipline capitulum primum." 
66. In his treatise on Complexus effectuum musices (Couss. IV, 193), 
Tinctoris reports about the use of music in the divine rites of ancient Rome, 
and adds: "Sed haec ad falsam religionem pertinent." He goes on to speak of 
King David as "verae religionis cultor." Most likely, Tinctoris made implied 
reference to the book De falsa religione by Lactantius, the early Christian 
writer, still quoted by Zarlino as attributing the invention of the lyre to 
Apollo Qlstitutioni, p. 3). 
67. Musica practica Bartolomei Rami de Pareia, ed. J. Wolf (Leipzig, 
1901), p. 2: "Quaelibet fabulosa et fidem excedentia videantur, mirabilium 
tamen operum effectricem esse musicam non dubium est." 
68. "Hi fuere, quos venerabilis antiquitas adeo mirata est, ut eos dixerit 
carminis dulcedine movisse feras, corda hominum possedisse, animas in 
corpora revocasse, manes ad misericordiam inflexisse et duras traxisse e 
montibus omos."—Ibid. 
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69. "Quodsi hac nostra tempestate tot miracula per musicam minime fiant, 
non arti, quae supra naturam perfectissima est, sed arte male utentibus impu­
tandum est. Si enim illi, quorum supra meminimus, probatissimi musici ad 
vitam revocarentur, musicam nostri temporis a se inventam negarent: usque 
adeo inepta, inconcinna dissipataque quorundam cantorum depravatione 
reddita est."—Ibid., p. 3. 
70. For literature consult works cited in note 62. 
71. See James Hutton, "Some English Poems in Praise o£ Music," English 
Miscellany, II (1951), 1-63. For a broad treatment of "Ideas of Music in 
English Poetry, 1500-1700," see John Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky 
(Princeton, N.J., 1961). 
72. Ambros, usually so perceptive, questions the soundness of mind of the 
late Renaissance writers such as Galilei and Doni, who in their "blind" 
respect for the Greeks believed in the "miracles of ancient music" (see 
Geschichte der Musik [Leipzig, 1881], IV, 155-56; cf. D. P. Walker, op. cit., 
p. 13, n. 39). 
73. We can observe the transformation of music as handmaid of theology 
to an art ministering to human needs in Tinctoris' treatise on the effects of 
music (Couss. IV, 191-200). The first six effects are these: "music pleases 
God; music enhances the praise of God; music augments the joys of the 
Blessed; music assimilates the militant to the triumphant Church; music pre­
pares for the reception of God's benediction; music stirs souls to piety." 
Theological overtones vibrate even in the series of psychological effects now 
following: "music expels melancholy; it resolves stubbornness of heart; it 
drives the devil away [he refers here to the story of David's playing the harp 
for the disturbed Saul]; it causes ecstasy; it elevates the earthly mind; it 
changes bad intention; it gladdens the human heart; it heals the sick, tempers 
the strains of toil, incites the soul to battle, it lures it to love, it adds to 
convivial gaiety," and—pride of the Renaissance musician—"renders famous 
those who cultivate it." Finally, "it sanctifies the soul." 
74. On Orpheus as a symbol of the power of music, see F. A. Yates, The 
French Academies, Index; on Orpheus in English literature, see John Hol­
lander, The Untuning of the Sky, Index. In the immense literature of dedi­
cations, prefaces, and dedicatory or introductory poems to musical publications 
of the Renaissance, Orpheus is an almost omnipresent figure. 
75. On the Timotheus tradition from antiquity through the Renaissance, 
see Erwin Panofsky, Early Netherlandish Painting (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 
Vol. I, n. 1972; see also the same author's article "Who is Jan van Eyck's 
'Tymotheos'r1", Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, XII (1949), 
pp. 80 ff., in which he formulated for the first time the brilliant hypothesis 
that Jan van Eyck's portrait inscribed "Tymotheos" presents Gilles Binchois. 
See further Nan Carpenter, "Spenser and Timotheus: A Musical Gloss on 
E. K.'s Gloss," PMLA, LXXI, No. 5 (1956), 1141-51. 
76. See note 78 for a clear enunciation of the idea of expression as opposed 
to contrapuntal and mensural complexity. 
77. On these changes and their significance, see Edward E. Lowinsky, 
"The Concept of Physical and Musical Space in the Renaissance," pp. 57-84, 
(173)

The Renaissance Image of Man and the World 
particularly 66-75; idem, "Music in the Culture of the Renaissance," Journal 
of the History of Ideas, XV, No. 4 (1954), 509-53, especially 528-43. I 
should like to refer here to Professor Janson's brilliant paper on "The Image 
of Man in Renaissance Art: Donatello to Michelangelo," in this volume. His 
demonstration of the Renaissance revival of the free-standing statue, i.e., the 
human figure freed from the domination of an architectural ensemble, seems 
to me the sculptor's equivalent of the composer's emancipation of polyphony 
from cantus firmus technique. In both cases this means also a liberation from 
an ensemble of theological-allegorical ideas. 
78. My translation. See the facsimile edition by Manfred Bukofzer, Docu­
menta musicologica, (Kasel, 1954), Vol. IX, F2: . . . ne inhaereant 
prolixis scriptis Musicorum Mathematicorum, qui finxerunt tot signorum aug­
mentationis et diminutionis genera, ex quibus nullus fructus, litis vero et 
discordiae plurimum oritur, ac res per se quidem clara dimcillima redditur: 
Verum omnes animi vires adhibeant, ut ornate canant, et textum suo loco 
applicent, quia Musica a Deo condita est ad suaviter modulandum, non ad 
rixandum, ac vere Musicus est et habetur, non qui de numeris, prolationibus, 
signis ac valoribus multa novit garrire et scribere, sed qui docte et dulciter 
canit, cuilibet notae debitam syllabam applicans, ac ita componit ut laetis 
verbis laetos addat numeros et econtra etc." 
79. On the change in the text repertory of the motet, see E. Lowinsky, 
Das Antwerpener Motettenbuch Orlando di Lassos (The Hague, 1937), 
especially pp. 77—78; on the Dido lament in Renaissance polyphony, see 
Oliver Strunk, "Vergil in Music," Musical Quarterly, XVI, No. 4 (1930), 
482-97, especially 485-90; and Helmut Osthoff, "Vergils Aeneis in der 
Musik von Josquin des Prez bis Orlando di Lasso," Archiv fur Musikwissen­
schaft, XI, No. 2 (1953), 85-102. 
80. Bk. iii, chap, xxiv; translation by Oliver Strunk, Source Readings, 
pp. 220-21. 
81. Ibid., pp. 226-27. 
82. While in general the development of polyphony in the sixteenth 
century goes in the direction of a decrease in contrapuntal complexity and an 
increase in expressive design, counterpoint and expression are by no means 
mutually exclusive. Josquin was perfectly capable of writing an expressive 
counterpoint over a given cantus firmus or even over a canon. The latter he 
does with supreme skill in his chansons, the former in such famous works as 
his Miserere, his Defloration on the death of Ockeghem, or his passion motet 
Hue me sydereo. It is with regard to the last named that Johannes Otto in 
the preface to the Secundus tomus novi operis musici (1538) exclaims: 
"What painter could render Christ's face in the agony of death as graphically 
as did Josquin in tones?" (For the original text, see my study on "Music in 
the Culture of the Renaissance," p. 524, in which I connected this remark, 
erroneously, with the passion motet cited in the following footnote.) 
83. The greatest work in this genre is perhaps Josquin's O Domine Jesu 
Christe, written for four voices in five partes (Werken van Josquin Des 
Pres, ed. A. Smijers, Motetten, Bundel II [Amsterdam and Leipzig, 1925], 
pp. 35-47). 
84. In his denunciation of Guido of Arezzo, Ramos had a predecessor in 
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the fourteenth-century innovator Marchettus of Padua. Ramos' sarcastic com­
mentary might well have been inspired by Gallicus' spirited defense of the 
venerable Aretinian against Marchettus as not only an experienced musician, 
but "pium monachum ac in ecclesia Dei famosissimum suo tempore."— 
Couss. IV, 324a. 
85. Gallicus preceded Ramos in the vigorous condemnation of the com­
plexities of the system of mutations while trying to absolve Guido from the 
burden of responsibility for these "frivolous" inventions (Couss. IV, 3741?). 
This is surely the chief reason why Ramos praised a man whose views on 
music were otherwise diametrically opposed to his own in these words 
(Musica practica, ed. J. Wolf, p. 44): "Well said that Brother Johannes the 
Carthusian: 'I speak not of a mutation of one syllable to another, but of a 
variation of one circumlocution to another. All that is needed is to note tones 
and semitones and sing with Gregory's [alphabetical] letters.' The same do I 
say about my syllables." In the concluding statement, Ramos is referring to 
the eight new syllables given by him to the eight notes—an invention designed 
to do away with the three hexachords, the thirty-six mutations, and the dis­
tinctions between an ordo naturalis and an ordo accidentalis. Ramos was 
centuries ahead of his time: the complexities of the medieval system survived 
in teaching methods into the eighteenth century, when the old controversy 
flared up for the last time in the famous encounter between Butstett and 
Mattheson (see Blume's excellent account in Musik in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, II, cols. 533-40). 
86. I refer here to a passage unnoticed, I believe, in discussions of equal 
temperament. Ramos Cop. cit., p. 50) mentions the traditional division of the 
octave into a fifth and a fourth, and then goes on, counter to all medieval 
tradition, to propose a division of the octave into an "almost equal quantity," 
namely, tritone and diminished fifth, "for the distance between B and F is 
the same as that between F and B, what difference there is does not matter 
to the practical musician, it does, however, to the theoretician who speculates 
on the difference of the semitone," that is, between the major and minor 
semitone. ("Est tamen alia quantitas, quae quasi nihil differt in sono, in 
quam diapason dividi potest, utputa tritonus et diapente imperfecta, quae 
vocatur semidiapente, ut b f et f t]
 } quoniam tanta distantia est inter b f, 
quanta inter f t) nee differt practicorum differentia, secus tamen theoricorum, 
qui differentiam semitonii speculantur.") The traditional medieval view is 
expressed by Jacobus of Li6ge, already noted earlier for his anti-Aristoxenian 
position. In the second book of his Speculum musicae (chap, xcvii, pp. 
224-38, esp. 226-27), he argues against the famous Aristoxenian theorem 
that the octave consists of six equal whole tones. If this were true, Jacobus 
observes, one could divide the octave into two equal halves, two tritones. The 
interval thus achieved, however, would not be an octave, but a "hexatone." 
The intervals of the hexatone would be "rudae et dissonae." Here is a case, 
he says, in which, according to Ptolemy, Aristoxenus' error becomes perceptible 
to the senses, not only understandable on mathematical grounds—a position 
precisely negated by Ramos. 
87. Op. cit., p. 103: "Pugnam non timeo, si praesente et iudicante ratione 
pugnabitur." 
88. Ibid., p. 42: "Sed non miror, quia sequax Guidonis est. Ego enim 
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caput conterere volo, ut corpus istud in erroribus constitutum cadaver iam fiat 
nee amplius vivere possit." 
89. Ibid., p. 81: "Nam defectus est in matheseos disciplinis per compara­
tionem aliqua probare." 
90. "Nicolai Burtii Parmensis, musices professoris ac iuris pontificii studi­
osissimi, musices opusculum incipit cum defensione Guidonis Aretini adversus 
quendam Hispanum veritatis praevaricatorem."—Fragments published by J. 
Wolf in his edition of the Ramos treatise, pp. 105—9. 
91. See P. O. Kristeller, "Music and Learning," p. 267. 
92. Burtius, Musices opusculum, chap, xii (not published by Wolf). 
93. At one point he speaks of "divina inspirante gratia," at another, of 
"divino quodam nutu" (ibid., chap. xiii). 
94. See J. Wolf's edition (op. cit., pp. 109-12) for excerpts from the 
writings of Hothby and Gafori directed against Ramos. 
95. Ibid., p. 45: " . .  . ut non solum sit utilis ecclesiastico cantui, verum 
etiam seculari curiosiori." 
96. Ibid.: "Erit igitur musica Gregorii, Ambrosii, Augustini, Bernardi, 
Isidori, Oddonis enchiridion, Guidonis, qui ab istis quasi totam assumpsit"— 
an additional slur on Guido—"suorumque sequentium sicut lex scripturae, 
quae non omnibus data fuit; nam aliqui sine ea hodierna die cantant. Nostra 
autem catholica sive universalis erit sicut lex gratiae, quae legem scripturae 
in se continet atque naturae. Sic etiam nostra totum, quod isti ecclesiastici 
viri et sapientissimi musici antiqui dixerunt et invenerunt, continebit." 
97. Ibid., pp. 106—7: "Postmodum si Gregorius illis tantum septem voluerit 
uti latinis litteris quotiens opus fuerit replicatis et Ambrosius atque Augustinus 
vestigia haec maluerint imitari quam aliena, cur non erubescis hunc ordinem 
pervertere et tuo supercilio censorio depravare? Tu sanctior forsan eleganti­
orque his columnis ecclesiae aut peritior? . . . Nam pii monachi doctrina, 
quae per universum sparsa, turn et ecclesiae approbatione, turn et notularum 
inventione mirabili in aevum tuo non obstante livore est duratura." 
98. I refer in particular to the Spataro correspondence (see Edward E. 
Lowinsky, "Adrian Willaert's 'Chromatic Duo' Re-examined," Tijdschrift voor 
Muziekwetenschap, XVIII, [1956], 1-36, especially 5-28). 
99. Willaert's chromatic experiment stands isolated in his own oeuvre, 
and it took a generation until similar experiments were published (see Edward 
E. Lowinsky, "Matthaeus Greiter's Fortuna: An Experiment in Chromaticism 
and in Musical Iconography," Musical Quarterly, Vol. XLII, No. 4 (1956), 
and Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (1957). Compositions by Ramos (Tu lumen) and by 
Spataro (a motet in honor of Leo X), which are probably the first polyphonic 
works in which the Greek genders were used, have been lost. 
100. See the facsimile edition by Edward E. Lowinsky, Documenta 
musicologica, Vol. XVII (Kassel, 1959). 
101. L'Antica musica, Bk. 1, chap, xxxv: " . .  . 6 molto necessario quando 
aviene che nelle parole si vuol dimostrare un effetto maraviglioso." 
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102. For a discussion of Zarlino's aesthetics of expression, see Edward E. 
Lowinsky, "Music in the Culture of the Renaissance," pp. 536-38. 
103. Letter of September 26, 1781, Mozarts Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 
ed. W. A. Bauer and O. E. Deutsch, 4 vols. (Kassel, 1962-63), III, 162. 
104. See chap. Ixxx of the third part entitled "Opinioni delli Chromatisti 
ributtate," op. cit., pp. 290—92. Although Vicentino is not mentioned by name, 
he was the obvious butt of Zarlino's remarks, being then the only one among 
the chromatisti who had ventured to have his ideas on the new musical gospel 
published. The opinions opposed are demonstrably those uttered by him. 
105. This comparison was suggested, years ago, by Professor Millard Meiss 
when I read a paper on "The Concept of Music in the Renaissance" to the 
University Seminar on the Renaissance at Columbia University under the 
chairmanship of Professor Hermann Randall, Jr. Professor Meiss suggested 
that Tinctoris might well have read Alberti's treatise—a supposition borne out, 
I believe, by the comparison following. 
106. See Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, trans. John R. Spencer (New 
Haven, Conn., 1956), p. 43. 
107. The Codex Huygens and Leonardo da Vinci's Art Theory (London, 
1940), p. 97; see on harmony and perspective, E. E. Lowinsky, "The 
Concept of Physical and Musical Space in the Renaissance," pp. 81-82. 
108. John White, The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space (New York, 
1958), p. 122. 
109. On Painting, p. 63. 
110. Ihid., p. 75. 
111. Ibid., p. 80. 
112. Ibid., p. 77: " . .  . be careful not to repeat the same gesture or 
pose." 
113. This forms the sixth rule of counterpoint in Tinctoris' treatise in 
which he admonishes composers and improvising singers to avoid repetition 
of musical figures ("redictas evitare"); see Couss. IV, pp. 150-51. 
114. Op. cit., p. 79. 
115. Erwin Panofsky, "The History of the Theory of Human Proportions 
as a Reflection of the History of Styles," in Meaning in the Visual Arts 
(New York, 1955), pp. 55-107, 91. 
116. Ibid., p. 98. 
117. See my study on "The Concept of Physical and Musical Space in 
the Renaissance," pp. 66-70. 
118. See Edward E. Lowinsky, Tonality and Atonality in Sixteenth-
Century Music (Berkeley, Calif., 1961), especially chaps, i, ii, v, vi. 
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Galilei, Galileo, 40, 107, 108, 109, 113

Galilei, Vincenzo, 130, 173 n. 72
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Glareanus, Henricus, 155-56,

172 n. 60
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Harvey, Gabriel, 66

"Head of Antinous," 95, Plate XIII

History of Magic and Experimental

Science; see Thorndike, Lynn
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Willaert, Adrian, 146, 171 n. 53,
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